THE IRAN--CONTRA HEARINGS : Excerpts: Opposition More Muted While We Were Doing It Than After It Failed

Following are excerpts from testimony Friday by Lt. Col. Oliver L. North before the Senate and House committees investigating the Iran-contra affair :

Iran Connection

(Chief Senate counsel Arthur L. Liman asked about North’s meeting with President Reagan in December, 1985, when the two discussed the secret program, then in progress, of selling arms to Iran to win the release of American hostages.)

Question: Do you recall telling the President of the United States that if the Iranian venture was discontinued at that time, that the lives of the hostages might be taken?

Answer: I recall, certainly very clearly, putting that kind of message forward. . . . Our concern was that having started the route, wisely or unwisely--but having started that in August and September (1985) and having a disaster on our hands in November as a consequence of what the Iranians clearly saw as a double-cross--that we had indeed increased the jeopardy to the hostages, rather than reduced it. . . .

Q: . . . And was there any discussion of the fact that, if we started selling them arms, that once we stopped, we were going to run the risk that more hostages would be taken?

A: Yes, and there was frequently discussion of that aspect of this whole initiative. But again, and I want to make it very clear, we believed--I believed then and I still believe today--that had we been able to get to a point where we would have had a meeting with, for example, the vice president (George Bush) and (Hashemi) Rafsanjani (Speaker of the Iranian Parliament) . . . we could get beyond that risk, and that once you had established the dialogue that we were seeking to establish, that we could, in effect, start working an outcome to the Iran-Iraq war, which would then lead to a reduced need for this kind of thing to begin with. And this is important, because much jocularity has been created over the fact that I gave a tour of the White House to--

Q: Well, I’m not joking about it, and--

A: I know that, but I would like to say this, counsel. One of my purposes for taking the second channel (an Iranian intermediary in the arms-for-hostages dealings)--who was also a brave young man and also a soldier in his country--through the White House was to show him the Nobel Prize that was won by Teddy Roosevelt. And I took him into the Roosevelt Room and I showed him that prize, and I said: “This is a Nobel Peace Prize. In fact, the first one ever given to an American. And it was given to a President who saw that it was to the advantage of our country and to world peace to sit down in Portsmouth and have a conference with two adversaries, the Russians and the Japanese, who were fighting a war thousands of miles away from us, that had no immediate impact on America, and we solved it.”

Q: . . . Did you believe that when you were talking to that young man, it was the equivalent of talking to people like (former Chinese Premier) Chou En-Lai, which (former National Security Adviser Henry A.) Kissinger did?

A: No.

Q: Did you realize, sir, that you were dealing with a country that had very, very strong feelings toward the United States--

A: A great animus.

Q: --expressed by a very, very powerful leader?

A: I knew well exactly what he was and what the leadership represented. I also noted the fact that, during the time that we were pursuing this initiative, there were no acts of terrorism addressed against Americans, and that the rhetoric from that very strong leader against us was reduced considerably.

Q: Colonel, there’s a saying that “failure is an orphan.” The committee has heard testimony, and will hear testimony, that Secretary (of State George P.) Shultz was opposed to this (arms-for-hostages) venture, the Secretary of Defense (Caspar W. Weinberger) was opposed to it. At the meeting on Dec. 7 (1985), the Chief of Staff (Donald T. Regan) was opposed to it. Mr. McFarlane (former National Security Adviser Robert C. McFarlane) said that, when he returned from London, he was opposed to it. . . . Had you become the principal advocate of having this program go forward?

A: I don’t believe I was the principal advocate. Certainly (CIA) Director (William J.) Casey was always a supporter of it because he saw several objectives that could be achieved by it. And I would simply observe that, like some of my other activities, the opposition that I heard was far more muted while we were doing it than it ever was after it failed, or after it was exposed. And I kind of get the feeling, counsel, that there were a lot of people who were kind of willing to let it go along, hoping against hope that it would succeed, and willing to walk away when it failed. . . .

Q: . . . Now, were you told following this meeting with the President that the President wanted to make another try?

A: I was told to initiate another effort.

Q: And who gave you those instructions?

A: Adm. Poindexter (Vice Adm. John M. Poindexter, then the new national security adviser).

Q: . . . Did there ever come a moment when you asked yourself: “Why doesn’t the secretary of state agree with me? Why doesn’t the secretary of defense agree with me?”

A: They don’t have to agree with me. I was simply providing advice and input and recommendations and options to my superiors. When they gave me direction, I carried them out. . . . I wasn’t asking for the secretary of state to agree with me.

The Diversion

(North was asked if he had discussed with Poindexter the idea of using surplus proceeds from the Iranian arms sales to help the Nicaraguan contras. )

A: Correct.

Q: And that was before you put it (the proposal) in any memoranda?

A: Yes. Just--and I don’t recall specifically on this case, but my normal modus operandi on making a proposal such as that would be to go over and sit down with the admiral and talk to him. And, normally, the admiral would like to think about it. I mean, the admiral is not a hip-shooter, as I am accused of being.

Q: A cautious man?

A: I think so.

Q: Prudent? A man who plays by the book?

A: My sense is that he is exactly that. Let me just make one personal observation. . . . You, know, there’s a long history of rivalry between the services. And he and I are both part of the same naval service. And even though some of my Marine colleagues might not like to hear this, that is an admiral I would follow up any hill, anywhere. And I really mean that because I think he also saw the necessity of taking risks, and he was willing to do so himself. And he placed himself in jeopardy, and he was the kind of person who recognized the risks, weighed the benefits and made decisions.

Q: And he discussed the risks of using the funds for the contras with you?

A: Yes.

Q: What did he say?

A: This had better never come out. And I took steps to ensure that it didn’t, and they failed.

A Shadow CIA

(North was asked about Casey’s proposal that proceeds from the Iranian arm sales could be “pulled off the shelf” to fund other covert activities besides the contra resupply operation.)

Q: Why don’t you give us a description of . . . what he meant about pulling something off the shelf.

A: Director Casey had in mind . . . an overseas entity that was capable of conducting operations or activities of assistance to the U.S. foreign policy goals that was a . . . self-financing, independent of (congressionally) appropriated monies. . . . There were other countries that were suggested that might be the beneficiaries of that kind of support--other activities to include counterterrorism.

Q: . . . Director Casey was proposing to you that a CIA outside of the CIA be created, fair?

A: No.

Q: Well, wasn’t this an organization that would be able to do covert policy to advance U.S. foreign policy interests?

A: Well, not necessarily all covert. The director was interested in the ability to go to an existing--as he put it--off-the-shelf, self-sustaining, stand-alone entity that could perform certain activities on behalf of the United States. . . .

Q: . . . You understood that the United States government put certain limitations on what the CIA could do, correct?

A: That is correct.

Q: And I ask you today, after all you’ve gone through, are you not shocked that the director of central intelligence is proposing to you the creation of an organization to do these kinds of things outside of his own organization?

A: Counsel, I can tell you that I am not shocked. . . . I don’t see that it would necessarily be in any way a violation of anything that I know of. . . .

Q: . . . Did the director ever tell you that he contemplated that this private organization would operate pursuant to presidential findings (written authorization)?

A: We never got that far.

Q: Did the director ever tell you that this private organization would be subject to oversight, pursuant to the laws of the United States, by Congress?

A: Again, the discussion didn’t get that far. Let me just give one example to you, if I may. When we ended up needing a ship to perform a certain task, there was nowhere to get one on short notice, and so this organization produced it practically overnight. . . .

Q: . . . That ship was to be used for a covert operation?

A: That is correct.

Q: And, is it a fact, sir, that it was purchased out of the funds that were generated by the Iranian arms sale?

A: It didn’t cost the taxpayers of the United States a cent. . . .

Q: . . . Was the President of the United States told about the fact that that ship had been purchased?

A: I do not know.

Q: The Congress wasn’t told . . . at the time.

A: I don’t believe they were, sir.

Q: So that, as far as your own personal knowledge was concerned, the people who approved the purchase of this ship in this covert operation were you, the director of central intelligence and Adm. Poindexter?

A: And (retired Air Force Gen.) Richard Secord, who was managing the private commercial operation (that bought the ship). . . . When we found ourselves without the capability, unbelievable though that may seem, to put a radio broadcast . . . (into Libya)--and we couldn’t find a ship in the entire CIA inventory or the United States Navy that was able to do it--the director of central intelligence came to me and within, I think, 72 hours, we had a ship.

Q: Don’t you think that’s a decision that the President of the United States should make?

A: If the director of central intelligence asked me to produce a ship, and I did so, I think that is good and sufficient.

Blatant Falsehoods

(North was asked about an arms-for-hostages negotiating session with Iranians in 1986 in which he served as head of the U.S. team . )

Q: Now, you’ve already testified that in these negotiations, it was necessary for you to make representations that weren’t accurate--

A: No, they were blatantly false.

Q: Among other things that you would describe as blatantly false were the statements that the head of state of Iraq had to go, that the President of the United States regarded him in an unfavorable way--

A: Sure, and others--

Q: --including an expletive.

A: --lots of others, all on tape.

Q: And did you discuss with your superiors, in particular Mr. Casey or Adm. Poindexter, before you went into the negotiations that you would be saying to an official of the Iranian government that the United States supported the removal of the head of state of Iraq, that the United States would give some assistance on the Dawaa prisoners, etc.? (Al Dawaa is an Iran-supported Shia guerrilla movement opposed to the Iraq regime.)

A: I did not discuss those specifics, no. . . .

Q: . . . You were making a statement about the removal of a head of state, about the United States committing to defend Iran . . . right?

A: Yes. . . .

Q: . . . Did you also talk about the fact that there were 2 million homeless people in Iran. . . . And did you talk about the fact that the United States would supply aid, like a Marshall Plan, for them?

A: . . . The fact that I exaggerated my connection with the President of the United States in order to further this initiative I have already admitted. The fact is, we in this country have always expressed concern for those kinds of matters. . . .

Private Bargainer

(Democratic Rep. Ed Jenkins of Georgia led off questioning by members of the two committees. He asked about a negotiating session with the Iranians at which the only U.S. representative was Albert A. Hakim, a business partner with Secord in companies that were involved in the Iranian arms sales and contra resupply operation overseen by North.)

Q: . . . Did you stop to think at all . . . that the only person negotiating for the United States of America with Iran that ultimately attained the (arms-for-hostages) agreement was a private citizen who had a substantial financial interest in the outcome of those negotiations?

A: I don’t believe I communicated that to Adm. Poindexter, no sir.

Q: And that never concerned Adm. Poindexter or yourself?

A: Well, it may well be, Congressman Jenkins, that I was most injudicious. . . . I quite honestly considered that to be motivation to make it succeed in that he had interests that . . . offered a greater chance for ultimate success.

Q: The fact that he had a financial interest?

A: The fact that he saw long-term the potential for financial interest.

Q: . . . I know that you have just testified today that you told many falsehoods to the Iranians. . . . What is disturbing me . . . is that (if) we were attempting to open up a new understanding and initiative with Iran, why would we start that off with a lot of falsehoods that would later, obviously, come back to haunt us very quickly?

A: Well, I quite honestly don’t think that any of these would necessarily have led to that kind of confrontation. I think that these things were, if you’ll excuse the expression, fuzzy enough . . . that if you could have just gotten beyond my level . . . we could have gotten beyond the issue of hostages and arms and quickly toward the kind of thing that would have yielded a solution to the war between Iran and Iraq.