THE IRAN--CONTRA HEARINGS : Excerpts: Poindexter Tells of ‘Very Deliberate Decision Not to Ask the President’ on Diversion

Following are excerpts from testimony Wednesday by Rear Adm. John M. Poindexter, Reagan’s former national security adviser, before the congressional committees investigating the Iran-contra affair:

Future Deniability

(Senate committee counsel Arthur L. Liman asked Poindexter to describe the evolution of the decision to divert profits from the Iran arms sales to benefit the Nicaraguan contras.)

QUESTION: Is it correct that in the discussions that you had leading up to the Jan. 17 finding (approving the Iranian initiative), there was no discussion with the President of the United States about the possibility of using proceeds of the sale to support the contras?

ANSWER: There was none. . . .

Q: . . . When was the first time that you were told by Col. (Oliver L.) North about this possibility?

A: My best recollection is that this took place some time in February of 1986.

Q: And would you tell us what Col. North said to you?

A: . . . My recollection is that he said something to the effect that “Admiral, I think we can--I have found a way that we can legally provide some funds to the Democratic resistance through funds that will accrue from the arms sales to the Iranians. . . .” This is a very general discussion, but this was clearly a new aspect that I had not thought about before. To make a long story short, in the end, I thought it was a very good idea . . . and I personally approved it.

Q: Did he ask you for your approval?

A: I don’t recall how he phrased his request, but he was clearly looking for a signal from me whether or not to proceed ahead along this line. . . .

Q: And you gave it?

A: And I gave it to him. I personally did. . . . I think it’s important to understand my state of mind at the time and what things were of concern to us. The President’s policy with regard to support for the contras had not changed since 1981. The various versions of the Boland amendment came and went, but the President was steadfast in his support for the contras. In fact, in 1984 he campaigned on it in the election and was elected by a very large majority of the people.

So I was absolutely convinced as to what the President’s policy was with regard to support for the contras. I was aware that the President was aware of third-country support, that the President was aware of private support. And the way Col. North described this to me at the time, it was obvious to me that this fell in exactly the same category, that these funds could either be characterized as private funds . . . or they could be characterized as third-country funds.

In my view it was a matter of implementation of the President’s policy with regard to support for the contras. We were in the process of working on our legislative plan to get $100 million from Congress for essentially unrestricted support to the contras. We knew it was going to take time. . . . But we clearly in February were in a situation where the humanitarian assistance, the $27 million, was running out at the end of March. . . . So essentially, we needed bridge financing. The President was bound and determined and still is that he will not sit still for the consolidation of the communists on the mainland of America . . . and he feels that the most effective way . . . because we don’t want to send U.S. soldiers to Nicaragua, is to provide support to the contras and keep them alive until we can get the $100 million. . . .

And so after weighing all of these matters, and I also felt that I had the authority to approve it, because I had a commission from the President, which was in very broad terms, my role was to make sure that his policies were implemented. . . . After working with the President for 5 1/2 years, the last three of which were very close, probably closer than any other officer in the White House except the chief of staff--I was convinced that I understood the President’s thinking on this, and that if I had taken it to him, that he would have approved it.

Now, I was not so naive as to believe that it was not a politically volatile issue. . . . I made a very deliberate decision not to ask the President so that I could insulate him from the decision and provide some future deniability for the President if it ever leaked out. . . .

Q: And when you say “deniability,” are you saying that your decision was not to tell the President so that he would be able to deny that he knew of it?

A: That’s correct.

Q: And did you at any time prior to the attorney general’s finding . . . tell the President of the United States of the fact that proceeds from the Iranian arms sale were being used to support the contras?

A: I don’t--I did not. I want to make this very clear that . . . I did not talk to anybody else except Col. North about this decision until to my knowledge, to my best recollection . . . Nov. 24, 1986, to Ed Meese (Atty Gen. Edwin Meese III).

Q: . . . You did not tell the President of the United States?

A: I did not.

Q: And for a period of, whatever it is, nine months, you kept it from the President. . . ?

A: . . . If the President had asked me, I very likely would have told him about it. But he didn’t and, I think it’s, you know--the important part here is that on this whole issue you know the buck stops here with me. I made the decision; I felt that I had the authority to do it. I thought it was a good idea. I was convinced that the President would, in the end, think it was a good idea. But I did not want him to be associated with the decision.

The Destroyed Finding

(Liman asks Poindexter about the finding, or formal authorization document for a covert action, in which the President approved the sale of arms to Iran on Nov. 26, 1985.)

Question: Now admiral, when you saw the finding, am I correct that the finding itself was essentially a straight arms-for-hostage finding?

Answer: That is correct. It had been prepared essentially by the CIA as what we call a CYA (cover-your-ass) effort.

Q: Now, did the President of the United States sign that finding?

A: As I’ve testified before, he did--

Q: Now--

A: --on or about the 5th of December. I’m vague on the date.

Q: . . . Now, what happened to that finding?

A: . . . I destroyed that by tearing it up on the 21st of November, because I thought it was a significant political embarrassment to the President and I wanted to protect him from possible disclosure of this. . . .

Q: . . . You’re talking about the 21st of November, 1986?

A: 1986, that’s correct.

Q: Now, would you tell the panel the circumstances of your destroying this finding. . . ?

A: . . . The finding was very narrow. It was prepared before there had been a thorough discussion of the issue. . . . I felt that it was important that we improve on this finding so that we . . . clearly lay out what the (other) objectives were in the Iranian initiative.

(Poindexter explains that he forgot about the finding until Meese, appointed by the President to look into the Iran operation , asked for documents that would explain what had happened in November, 1985. )

POINDEXTER: . . . So Ed called me after lunch, as I recall, and said that he was going to send over a couple of his people either that afternoon or the next day, and I’m not sure which, and he asked if I would have the appropriate documents pulled together so they could take a look at them. I said I would do that. After he called, I called Cmdr. (Paul) Thompson (National Security Council general counsel) . . . and asked him to take charge of pulling these documents together, and then I called Col. North and told him that (my conversation with Mr. Meese--and asked him to cooperate with Cmdr. Thompson and Mr. Meese’s people.

. . . Later in the afternoon or early evening, Cmdr. Thompson brought into my office the envelopes that I had given him earlier containing the material we had on the Iranian project in the immediate office, which was essentially the various findings, and he pulled out this November finding--it was actually signed in December--and my recollection is that he said something to the effect that “they’ll have a field day with this” . . . His comment was that up until the time in November of 1986, the President was being beaten about the head and shoulders (with critics saying) the whole Iranian project was just an arms-for-hostages deal. Well, this finding, unfortunately, gave that same impression. And I frankly didn’t see any need for it at the time. I thought it was politically embarrassing. And so I decided to tear it up, and I tore it up, put it in the burn basket behind my desk.

(Liman asks him how he considered such an action part of his job.)

Q: . . . Did you regard one of the responsibilities of the national security adviser to protect the President from political embarrassment?

A: I think that it’s always the responsibility of a staff to protect their leader, and certainly in this case, where the leader is the commander in chief, I feel very strongly that that’s one of the roles. And I don’t mean that in any sense of, of, covering up, but ... one has to always put things in the President’s perspective and to make sure that . . . he’s not put in a position that can be politically embarrassing. . . .

Q: The President didn’t authorize you to destroy the finding, correct?

A: He certainly did not.

Praise of North

(Liman asks Poindexter to describe his relationship with North.)

A: It was a very good one. My management position (has been) that you pick the very best people that you can; you give them objectives and give them the broad authority that goes with that. You require general reports; you keep the responsibility, and you don’t micromanage what they’re doing. You have trust and confidence in your people. And I think of all the officers over the years that have worked for me, Col. North is probably one of the most capable. . . .

Stopping Leaks

(Liman asks Poindexter about an idea, mentioned in North’s testimony, for forming a permanent apparatus to undertake various covert missions and that would be supported by proceeds from transactions like the secret arms sale to Iran).

Q: Did (North) ever talk to you about off-the-shelf operations, full-service covert organizations, self-sustaining covert operations?

A: Not in those terms.

Q: And, you said that the idea might be one that you would find attractive. I think that we ought to get an explanation of why you would find it attractive to have covert operations funded out of the residuals of the Iranian arms sale rather than through the normal appropriations processes for the CIA.

A: . . . There are some significant problems with our present arrangement with the CIA in conducting covert activity. . . .

What I’m saying is that the present mechanism, where you have two large intelligence committees of the Congress with very large staffs, and you’ve got two appropriations committees that also want to know about covert activities when appropriated funds are involved, you have a very difficult situation.

At the CIA there is frankly, in my view, there is concern about conducting operational activities with some of the employees there. There is to some extent some friction between the operation side of the agency and the intelligence side of the agency. Because covert actions tend to be controversial, even when they’re briefed to Congress--which in my view is what causes the leaks--there is concern when covert actions fail. The risk of failure is high in many of these operations, and the result of failure, as demonstrated by these hearings, is too high a price to pay for many of the fine bureaucrats--and I don’t mean that in a pejorative sense--but that’s a very high price to pay for career government servants. And so they often are not anxious to support or recommend or conduct covert activities in a truly covert way.

And I’m saying that a private organization, properly approved, using non-appropriated funds in an approved sort of way, may be a solution to the problem. That’s all I meant.

Q: Did you ever discuss that concept with the President?

A: I did not.