A Big Obstacle Is Gone

By acceding to the long-held American position on the elimination of medium-range missiles from Europe, Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev has removed the largest single obstacle to an agreement. However, the issue of what to do with 72 West German Pershing 1A missiles with U.S. warheads may still prove troublesome.

For months Washington and Moscow have agreed in principle that both sides should remove all medium-range missiles from Europe. Until now, however, the Soviets have insisted that each side be allowed to maintain 100 warheads aboard such missiles outside Europe--which, in the case of the Soviet Union, meant Asia, from where the missiles could reach targets in China and Japan or be trundled back to European Russia in a crisis.

To the discomfort of its European and Asian allies, Washington accepted the Soviet condition, though making clear its preference for a global zero-zero agreement and imposing some conditions of its own.

Gorbachev now appears to have removed the obstacle that Moscow itself created. The Soviet Union, he said, is willing to include in an agreement all missiles with ranges of 300 to 3000 miles both inside and outside Europe.

This idea is eminently sensible. From the Soviet Union’s point of view, it would remove the threat that the United States would base its 100 allowable warheads in Alaska, within striking distance of Soviet territory. For Washington, it would make the verification of compliance much more manageable; it would be much easier to detect violations if the possession of even one missile was illegal.

Soviet officials talk in terms of wrapping up an agreement in 60 days. The Reagan Administration, badly needing a diplomatic triumph to offset the political damage from the Iran- contra affair, hopes it is true. The rest of the world should hope so, too, since an agreement on Euromissiles should accelerate negotiations in the much more important area of reduction of strategic nuclear arms.

However, obstacles remain. The most serious is the question of the West German Pershing 1As.

Except for the pressure of time, the problem would solve itself. The West German Pershings are obsolete and must be replaced soon, but it is extremely doubtful, given the anti-nuclear climate in West Germany, that the Bundestag could work up the nerve to authorize replacements.

The agreement is needed now, not later, however, and the Administration is thus far unwilling to ignore the West German defense establishment’s strong resistance to giving up the Pershings. West German officials point out that, if the Pershings were removed along with U.S. medium-range missiles, the only remaining nuclear missiles based in West Germany would be tactical weapons capable only of hitting targets in East or West Germany. To them, that is unacceptable.

Bonn’s position is understandable. But, given the strong public support for a Euromissile deal both inside and outside West Germany, it is hard to believe that the West German government is willing to take the responsibility for blocking an important arms-control agreement.