The Signal from Krasnoyarsk : In Opening the Site, Soviets Bid to Preserve ABM Treaty

When an American delegation is invited to visit a top-secret Soviet facility, one that has been the focus of acrimony for four years, there must be a reason. If the tour was in fact approved “at the highest level,” it was intended to influence U.S. policy. In this case it appears to have been designed to assist in solving at least one serious out-standing problem in strategic arms control.

For almost four hours last week three congressmen and staff members, including a physicist and an engineer, toured the Krasnoyarsk early-warning radar site--the existence of which, it is generally agreed, violates the 1972 anti-ballistic-missile treaty. The treaty forbids the deployment of large phased-array radars for the early warning of missile attack--except on a nation’s borders, where they must be oriented outward. The Krasnoyarsk radar meets neither specification.

The Reagan Administration has consistently used the radar as justification for its accusations of Soviet plans to break out of the ABM treaty. In some quarters Krasnoyarsk is even seen as a reason to abandon the treaty.

The United States has its own new large phased-array radar at Thule, Greenland. It is almost surely a violation of the ABM treaty, and is a subject of deep Soviet concern. The Administration claims, however, that because an early-warning radar of a different type existed at Thule when the ABM treaty was negotiated, the facility may be upgraded without limit. Additionally, the United States plans another such radar at Fylingdales Moor in Yorkshire, England--near, but not at, the site of an older radar. The Administration claims that Fylingdales is also “grandfathered.”

At Krasnoyarsk the U.S. delegation saw a fragile, hollow shell. For a facility that has reportedly been externally complete for some time, the Krasnoyarsk radar is astoundingly empty inside. No equipment to send or receive radar signals is present--not even antennas.

On examination, the wealth of photographs and videotape returned from Krasnoyarsk raises more questions than it answers. Is the site being built or is it being dismantled, salvaged or mothballed? The Soviets said that it is still under construction, albeit more slowly than before.

The receiving-antenna complex is now covered with corrugated metal, which totally blocks radar signals from equipment mounted within. A photo taken in late 1986 by a French satellite seems to show both the transmitting and receiving buildings covered with material that protects against weather but is transparent to radar waves. If the receiving site was externally “complete” in 1986, it is not today. Inside, there are signs of sloppiness, disrepair or disassembly. One picture shows an electrical panel with openings for several connectors clearly labeled input and output in Russian. The connectors are absent, but the screw holes where they would be fastened seem to show marks of use. The cables to the gauges appear to have been crudely cut off.

By allowing a delegation from Washington to visit this particular facility, the Soviets were sending an important diplomatic message: They still want to preserve the ABM treaty, even in the face of Thule, Fylingdales and the Strategic Defense Initiative program. After seeing Krasnoyarsk, we now have tangible as well as diplomatic evidence of that desire.

Some of that evidence could be misrepresented. The delegation said that the Krasnoyarsk radar is not operational and thus not “deployed,” and therefore is not a violation. The treaty, however, explicitly counts facilities under construction as well as those operational or mothballed. The U.S. definition of deploy is “to site or locate at a particular place.” Because secret procedures for implementing the treaty were once agreed to, it is improbable that the United States would issue a public statement in conflict with its private undertakings with the Soviets.

The Soviets once proposed in the Standing Consultative Commission, where ABM treaty disputes should be resolved, that they would accept the U.S. radars if we would accept Krasnoyarsk. The United States responded that its radars were legal, and that Krasnoyarsk is illegal and must be dismantled.

Early this summer the Soviets suggested, in an “official informal” proposal floated in the Danish press, that they would limit the electric power supplied to Krasnoyarsk and permit periodic on-site inspections to assure the United States that the radar could only track satellites, which is permitted. The United States did not respond.

The Soviets seem to have offered their visitors a moratorium on construction at Krasnoyarsk in return for halting work at Fylingdales--but not Thule, which is operational.

Construction at Krasnoyarsk has slowed, or possibly stopped. It may now be an electronic Potemkin Village, invested with great political value. The Soviets are telling us plainly that the time to settle the issue has arrived, and that a reasonable trade, from our vantage point, might be arranged. They seem to be saying that if given a face-saving fig leaf they will make Krasnoyarsk permanently inoperable.

At what price? The United States should propose to trade Krasnoyarsk for the planned radar upgrade at Fylingdales and agree to reinforce the treaty. That would be cheap indeed, for the first bulldozer has yet to turn the first load of Yorkshire earth, and a large phased-array radar at Fylingdales is not critical to American defense.

If the United States wants to keep the ABM treaty, if it is interested in solving problems, it has two opportunities to say so: either at the next session of the consultative commission, or when the secretary of state meets the Soviet foreign minister in Washington. A fair deal seems to be in the air; it is our turn to make a real offer.