A World After AGREEMENT : Finding the Way Toward Strategic Arms Control

Attention naturally focuses on news that agreement has virtually been reached on a treaty to eliminate all Soviet and American intermediate-range nuclear missiles, to be signed later this year at a summit between President Ronald Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail S. Gorbachev. Both leaders have reason to be pleased--and so do both countries. U.S.-Soviet relations, and arms control, seem back on track. The climate is better, the rhetoric is civilized and arms reductions are welcomed by most people.

But what else does it mean? Does it consolidate a modest step in arms control or does it open up greater opportunities? Does it stabilize U.S.-Soviet relations so that we afford to turn to other things or does it mean there are new opportunities to pursue? Is it, in short, the end of a pull back from confrontation or the beginning of a new era of relaxation of tensions?

Reagan holds one key to answering these questions. He, alone, cannot make the eventual outcome into the “historic achievement” he has prematurely promised, but it cannot occur without his direct engagement. He may conclude that with an image of ability to deal with the Soviets, a disarmament agreement to demonstrate dedication to peace and a summit in Washington this year to display statesmanship, he should stop while he is ahead. On the other hand, he may see the intermediate-range nuclear forces agreement as the stepping stone to a larger strategic-arms agreement and a more secure place in history, validating this Administration’s approach based on “strength, realism and negotiation.” He will make the decision--whether through considered choice, or through piecemeal actions without regard for coherence, significance or consequences.

The future of U.S.-Soviet relations depends on Soviet decisions and actions as well as American ones. Gorbachev does not have a countdown of the months to his retirement. While conceivably (though improbably) he could leave the scene before Reagan, he may well be the Soviet leader at the start of the 21st Century. He can wait for the next U.S. Administration, or the one after, if necessary. But he is eager and concerned that movement in development of military technology may foreclose opportunities for arms agreement, so he does not wish to wait.

Gorbachev has taken the bigger steps in moving to reach the INF agreement. To remove the deployment of U.S. missiles in Europe, he has to give up four times as many Soviet warheads as the United States. And he has had to accept Reagan’s “zero option” of 1981--an offer first fashioned by those in Washington who only wanted to embarrass the Soviet Union when it would have to reject the lopsided deal. Moreover, Gorbachev has had to agree to this arrangement with no constraint (or restraint) on a U.S. “Star Wars” program that threatens to compel the Soviet Union into a new upward spiral of the strategic arms competition.

Gorbachev has accepted the INF agreement for four reasons: He has been determined to start the process of reducing nuclear weapons; the Soviet Union has feared that the preemptive capabilities of the Pershing 2 missiles would make it more difficult to prevent escalation to nuclear war in the event of any outbreak of hostilities in Europe; an agreement would give impetus to improved Soviet-U.S. and Soviet-European relations, and agreement would give new legitimacy to the arms-control process. The last may be the most important.

If the Reagan Administration were to leave office without having reached an arms agreement with the Soviet Union, its legacy would place a heavy burden on its successor: No agreement reached in 10 years; the expired SALT I Interim Agreement and unratified SALT II Treaty abandoned; no resumption of negotiations on nuclear testing or anti-satellite devices, broken off by the United States in 1980; a bogus “reinterpretation” gutting the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and official charges of Soviet arms-control violations widely circulated and believed (although, in reality, greatly exaggerated). All these problems, of course, remain. But their impact would be greatly diminished if the same Administration responsible for them had itself negotiated, signed and (preferably) ratified an arms agreement--any arms agreement--with the Soviet Union (INF was the most available). Under Gorbachev’s “new thinking,” to reopen the arms-control process was worth a few hundred warheads.

Gorbachev and colleagues were, however, well aware that Reagan might be content to settle for an INF agreement and a Washington summit--avoiding the hassle and complaints from the right wing of his own constituency for pursuing further negotiations and improved relations. Hence come Soviet efforts to induce the Administration to adopt a broader arms-control agenda, something well worth yet more Soviet concessions. As a result of this month’s meeting between Secretary of State George P. Shultz and Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze, negotiations on limited nuclear testing constraints will now begin. Agreement may yet be reached on a ban on chemical weapons. Finally, the big hope is possible agreement on strategic-arms reductions.

Reagan has now declared that seeking strategic-arms reductions of 50% is our main goal; Gorbachev has suggested such an agreement would be possible early next year. Shevardnadze brought Soviet concessions on some disputed strategic-arms points plus an indication that the Soviets would drop their insistence on linking more far-reaching constraints to the Strategic Defense Initiative--if the United States would recommit to strict observance of the ABM Treaty.

There remain several substantial unagreed points in the strategic-arms reduction talks, but these differences do not appear insurmountable. Verification provisions must still be worked out, but no longer appear a major problem. The question of the Soviet--and American--stands on the issue of strategic defenses and space weapons has, however, appeared to block agreement. Now the matter is coming down to a bedrock issue: Is the United States--in effect, is Reagan--prepared to accept a continuation of the existing U.S. commitment under the ABM Treaty? He can keep SDI on the basis that he himself set for it, consistent with the traditional interpretation of the obligations of the ABM Treaty (a treaty of unlimited duration), if he will now accept that commitment for 10 years. Even the length of that commitment may be negotiable. This would mean giving up the notion of applying the so-called broad interpretation, or reinterpretation, of the treaty that was introduced in his Administration two years ago--one Congress has refused to accept because the reinterpretation itself is fatally flawed. He would not, however, be giving up SDI. If reinterpretation were raised today for the first time, I believe it would probably not be adopted. But since the Administration did accept the idea publicly in 1985, however prematurely, it now feels committed to defend it.

If Reagan decides to rest on his INF laurels, he will retain a free hand to push the SDI test program (although losing some important congressional and public support) and he will avoid vexing his most conservative supporters. He will also lose a real opportunity to conclude his term with an act of statesmanship that would leave a legacy of solid, verifiable, arms reductions serving the nation’s long-term security interest.