All’s Quiet in Oakdale, Atlanta--Too Quiet : Lapses Evident in Cuban Detainees’ Riots Need Quick Correction

Critical questions about Federal Bureau of Prisons practices remain unanswered in the wake of the commendable, patient negotiations that finally freed 122 hostages seized by Cuban detainees at two prisons.

Though the hostages were released, millions of dollars in damage was done to the prisons. In addition, the riots forced the transfer of hundreds of inmates to other, already overcrowded, institutions.

How was complete control lost at two institutions--an aging maximum-security prison and a new detention center?

First, it is evident that there was not enough communication between government agencies about the progress of negotiations that would send 2,500 Cubans back to their homeland. Ideally, the Bureau of Prisons should have been following the negotiations, with their sensitive security implications, through its sister Justice Department agency, the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Given lead time, the bureau could have transferred the more aggressive and volatile detainees from the Oakdale, La., detention center to more secure facilities.

But the situation of a few thousand Cubans may not have been a priority in the overcrowded federal prison system, with its more than 48,000 prisoners.

It is equally evident that prison and INS officials were unaware of the depth of the detainees’ feelings against returning to Cuba, and the extent to which they would go to avoid returning.

The renewed U.S.-Cuban agreement to deport many Cubans who had come here in 1980 was announced Friday, Nov. 20, a few hours after Justice officials were notified. That evening the Oakdale detainees demonstrated their displeasure by starting a fracas in the cafeteria, breaking plates and glasses. This warning was ignored, possibly because of a reluctance to call in extra staff members to bolster what is in most prisons reduced weekend staffing. In any event, the detainees took over the center in a full-scale riot the next day.

Officials at the 85-year-old Atlanta prison must have been aware of the initial disturbance at Oakdale. Considering that theirs was a more hardened, larger group of detainees, their failure to heed the signal from Oakdale is perplexing.

Looking back, it’s clear that detainees should have all been locked in their cells while the situation was assessed. But if that did not seem justified at the time, certainly basic precautions were. Non-critical activities could have been halted, large gatherings of inmates prevented, feeding done in small escorted groups, inmates and cells searched for weapons and more staff members deployed. Armed officers probably could have been placed on roofs and a tactical response team assembled.

While the failure to prepare at both facilities is difficult to understand, the failure to respond effectively when the riots began is even more troublesome. How were the institutions seized and so many hostages taken? The detainees had less time to make elaborate preparations to revolt than their guards had to prevent it. It seems unlikely that the factions among the inmates could implement a “synchronize-your-watches” strategy, but the guards should have had a well-drilled response plan for any contingency.

How, then, did the detainees effect a surprise? Surely there were officers on posts and patrol trained to spot trouble and equipped to call for immediate assistance to deal with it.

Why weren’t the initial trouble spots isolated and contained? Who was making the vital decisions in the initial minutes of the riots? Was some needed permission to act lacking? One rioter was shot by a tower officer at Atlanta. Would decisive fire there, not necessarily to wound or kill but to separate and isolate riotous groups, have prevented a takeover?

Where did inmate weapons come from? Hostages tell of machetes being used. Now, prison inmates are adept at making weapons, but most often they are made from melted plastic (toothbrush handles are favored), sharpened bed springs and pieces of metal broken from lockers or filched from industrial operations. But machetes? Dangerous tools and equipment suitable for fashioning weapons should be carefully controlled and stored safely.

It is important that the questions be answered honestly and promptly. Needed corrections should be made at once. After all, there are 45 other federal correctional facilities across the nation whose inmates studied the response at Oakdale and Atlanta. Hostage negotiations may not be so successful the next time.