Jordan Now Using Kid Gloves With PLO

Mahmoud Abbas, a member of the executive committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, arrived in Amman recently for talks with Jordanian officials about the Palestinian uprising in the Israeli-occupied territories.

Abbas was met at the airport by a government minister, his arrival was shown on the evening television news and, perhaps most important, he met for three hours with Prime Minister Zaid Rifai.

Such a visit might seem prosaic elsewhere in the Arab world, but it reflects a major change in the long-strained relationship between Jordan and the PLO. In the view of Jordanian, Palestinian and other analysts, the change was brought on by events in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Delicate Balance

With the United States having embarked on a new peace plan, the delicate balance between Jordan and the PLO may become crucial to the success of the Middle East mission now being undertaken by Secretary of State George P. Shultz.

Two years ago, Jordan’s King Hussein announced that he was suspending political coordination with PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat because of Arafat’s refusal to accept two U.N. Security Council resolutions as the basis for negotiations with Israel. The resolutions explicitly recognize Israel’s right to exist.

Last fall, Hussein publicly snubbed Arafat at a summit conference of Arab leaders, and it was only through the intervention of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait that Jordan agreed to accept an emissary from the PLO.

“The change in Jordan’s attitude over the past three months has been astounding,” a Palestinian official here said. “The PLO has gained a lot out of the uprising. They’re more confident, more sure of themselves.”

Two years ago, Jordan announced a $1-billion, 5-year aid program for the West Bank. Privately, Jordanian officials admitted that the goal was to undercut PLO popularity in the occupied territories and win supporters for King Hussein.

Even the most optimistic Jordanian now admits that the effort was a failure, that the PLO is probably stronger than before in the occupied territories and that Jordan’s support is waning.

The volume of aid under the program, largely from the United States, Britain and Jordan itself, has slowed to a trickle.

“The impression is clear that Jordan gave a party and nobody showed up,” a European diplomat said of Jordan’s program for the West Bank.

As a result, there may be less willingness on the part of residents of the occupied territories to accept a Jordanian role in any negotiations over the future of the area. And Jordan itself may be reluctant to take a commanding role.

The leadership of Palestinians in the West Bank and on the Gaza Strip is still in the formative stages, diplomats said, and the emerging leaders tend to look to the PLO and Arafat to represent their interests in international diplomacy, even though they may disagree with the PLO on some matters.

“The big problem is that . . . the uprising . . . enhances the feeling that the PLO should have a role in the negotiations,” one Western diplomat said.

Israel has said repeatedly that it will never negotiate with the PLO, a position supported by the United States.

“After the uprising, it will be much harder to persuade Arafat to accept a subsidiary role in the talks,” a prominent Palestinian said. “It seems clear that the PLO will demand an equal footing with Jordan or an independent role.”

Jordanian officials are still concerned that the uprising may force Israel to take reprisals that would upset the delicate balance among Jordan’s 2.5 million people, more than half of whom are Palestinian.

Meanwhile, suggestions are heard from hard-line groups in Israel that Palestinians should be deported en masse, presumably to Jordan.

“We are very worried,” Jordanian Information Minister Hani Khasawneh said. “I’m afraid the Israelis will get an aggressive, short-sighted vision since they are strong. We would prevent any new exodus to the east bank of the Jordan.”