D-Day for Nicaragua Policy : Strip Away the Bluff, and What Remains Is Absence of Purpose

War means that people get killed. That banality is beginning to dawn on both sides in U.S. debate about Nicaragua and, in particular, about the future of the anti-government Contras. Yet this nation is still far from drawing appropriate conclusions about death in Central America.

When Congress voted two weeks ago to cut off aid to the Contras, it was not surprising that the Nicaraguan regime stepped up its military pressure. The only surprises were that it went so far and has been so successful. Indeed, the comandantes in Managua may yet rescue the Contras by creating a backlash in Congress.

Without continued U.S. military support, it is inevitable that the Contras will in time be defeated in one way or another. For the American left there is a lesson. Whether or not there has been merit in the Contras and their mission, they have largely been creatures of U.S. policy, and there is American responsibility for their future. Like them or not, it is immoral to ignore their fate, just as it was immoral to ignore the fate of the South Vietnamese who stood with the United States until the end. The congressional vote to stop all aid to the Contras has consequences, and they must be faced.

The American right, however, is incorrect in thereby arguing that the Contras should be given a blank check, whatever their mission or chances for success. Contra forces that are not supported by the United States can be withdrawn from Nicaragua; it is not inevitable that they must be left to die on the battlefield. Yet the Reagan Administration refuses to accept the consequences of congressional action or its share of moral responsibility for the Contras’ fate. Indeed, in the last congressional vote Republicans joined Democrats to defeat even “humanitarian” aid. That stance was clearly motivated by the U.S. electoral calendar rather than by the merits of the matter.

There is a case for sending some U.S. troops to Honduras in the face of the latest Sandinista-Contra battle. If valid distinctions can be made, they include separating what happens within Nicaragua from what happens in neighboring countries. There is little disagreement in the United States that, say, a Nicaraguan invasion of Honduras--beyond the “hot pursuit” of Contra forces--would pose a security threat to the region. This could be so even if the proximate cause for invasion was Nicaragua’s reaction to military action by the Contras.

Discussion in Washington about the dispatch of 3,200 U.S. troops to Honduras varies from genuine concern for regional security to utter cynicism: that this act is designed to sway congressional votes for Contra aid, or even to shift attention from this week’s indictments in the Iran-Contra affair. Whatever the motives, sending troops in these circumstances should rivet attention on the stakes. It should lead, finally, to the long-postponed but critical U.S. national debate on Nicaragua.

Indeed, uncertainty about the wisdom of sending American troops derives directly from uncertainty about American goals. Choosing these goals depends on analysis of the Nicaraguan regime and the threat that it poses within the region.

President Reagan continues to argue that unless they transform themselves the Sandinistas will pose a constant threat to the region. Democracy is the vital goal, and it alone can protect Nicaragua’s neighbors and ensure regional security. But Reagan, too, refuses to follow his logic to the end. In the face of Contra failure to turn revolutionary Nicaragua into a democracy, the conclusion must be that the United States should invade and finish the job. The President correctly perceives that this course is intolerable to a large majority of Americans. Indeed, even as the deployment of U.S. troops to Honduras was being announced Wednesday, the White House ruled out invasion. And during his last press conference Reagan chose the Central Intelligence Agency rather than the military as the vehicle for any continued humanitarian aid to the Contras.

Many of the President’s opponents on the Contra issue also agree with his goal: democracy, above all else, in Nicaragua. But they also lack the courage of their own analysis. If they are to block the President on actions in support of the Contras, they must adopt an alternative view of the Sandinista regime and the best way to deal with it.

This means putting regional security first and Nicaraguan democracy second. It means trying to negotiate limits on the capacity of the Sandinista regime to cause mischief in Latin America.

U.S. goals should be to reduce the size of Nicaragua’s military forces, to remove Soviet and other East Bloc advisers and bases, to gain pledges of non-intervention and to create means for verifying accords. These goals have the merit of smoking out the true intentions of Daniel Ortega and his fellow comandantes , and they provide a basis for negotiation that does not demand that the Sandinistas self-destruct.

Most Americans may be surprised to learn that the Reagan Administration has never tried to negotiate such security accords, nor have many opponents of current policy insisted that this approach be tried. It is at least worth an effort. The alternative is likely to be more killing in Nicaragua and a tightening of moral blinders in Washington as the Contras lose.