Panama: a Lot of Hogwash

Officially the Reagan Administration still clings to the hope that the United States can dislodge Panamanian dictator Manuel Antonio Noriega, but even inside the government there are fewer and fewer believers. The Administration’s retreat from its original demand that Noriega must leave Panama and its willingness to settle for his resignation as the commander of the Panamanian Defense Forces are admissions of failure. Now come the recriminations.

The key mistake in the Administration’s campaign against Noriega, some critics say, was the Justice Department’s decision to indict him for drug-trafficking; the indictments, filed over State Department objections, supposedly sabotaged negotiations that were aimed at his removal. Other second-guessers argue, just as fervently, that the crucial error was the State Department’s urging of Eric Arturo Delvalle, Panama’s nominal president, to dismiss Noriega--a move that backfired and ended with Delvalle in hiding. Some say that the United States blundered by encouraging a military coup that Noriega loyalists quickly quelled. Another theory has it that the tough economic sanctions imposed by the United States were misguided, paralyzing Panama’s economy and alienating ordinary Panamanians but leaving Noriega and his drug fortune unaffected. Elsewhere in Latin America, officials complain that the United States erred by acting unilaterally instead of taking advantage of offers from Latin leaders to mediate.

Well, to all those theories of what went wrong, we say hogwash. The United States is not at fault for Noriega’s stranglehold on Panama; he is. One might quibble with one or two aspects of the Administration’s campaign to oust him--the sanctions might have come sooner, for example. But, for the most part, the Reagan Administration has followed a sensible policy, obeying all international treaties and domestic laws while using its leverage over Panama’s economy. Against a ruler less stubborn and less brutal than Noriega, against someone who still cared a whit about his country, such measures would have worked.

If there is any moral to be drawn about the Noriega episode, it is that there are limits to American power--a lesson that we thought had been learned in Vietnam. Once it may have been possible for the United States to make or break another government. The United States, in fact, was instrumental in creating Panama 85 years ago; Panamanians won their independence from Colombia as U.S. warships and troops stood by. But the United States is unlikely ever again to wield that kind of raw power.

Since the United States cannot drive Noriega into exile, its only goal now should be to do what is best for U.S. interests. The Administration seems determined to continue the negotiations with Noriega, now redirected at securing his resignation as military chief and letting him remain in Panama. But even if he agrees--and he’s a notorious welsher--that would be a meaningless victory, one that might salvage U.S. pride but accomplish little else. Out of uniform, Noriega would still be pulling the strings of a puppet government headed by Manuel Solis Palma, the president whom he installed after Delvalle went into hiding. Just as Noriega, after the botched coup, purged the Defense Forces of its best men and promoted his cronies, Solis Palma has dismissed technocrats from his Cabinet and installed leftists, many with connections to Cuba and Nicaragua. What is in place now is hardly the sort of government that is likely to oversee free elections and restore civilian rule next year, no matter what promises are made to the United States. Would Norieguismo without Noriega be an improvement? Only very marginally.

The Administration also wants to extend U.S. sanctions against Panama--the theory being that without such measures the United States would have no leverage at all against Noriega, no chance of getting him to step down. We accept that argument, but we believe that the sanctions, like the U.S. recognition of the Delvalle government-in-hiding, cannot continue indefinitely. Already Panama’s once-thriving economy has been reduced to barter, the poor are fed by the churches and the foreign bankers who made Panama an important financial center are transferring their operations elsewhere. At some point the withholding of U.S. dollars and Panama Canal payments becomes simply cruel, and the United States, not Noriega, will be seen as the villain of this episode. If the United States wants to exercise any influence at all in Panama, it must be willing to lift the sanctions and it must deal with whatever government is in power--no matter how unpalatable that may be.