Namibia and Angola May Be Ripe for Peace

The prospects have never looked better for peace in Angola and independence for its neighbor, Namibia. But suspicions and enmities run deep in Southern Africa, and could derail superpower initiatives.

There have been contacts among the Soviets, Americans, South Africans, Angolans and Cubans in recent weeks in London, Brazzaville (the Congo) and elsewhere. The superpower summit meeting in Moscow featured Angola/Namibia on its list of regional conflicts for discussion, raising hopes for a settlement.

Yet peace has been more than elusive. Ten years after U.N. Resolution 435 provided for internationally supervised elections, Namibia remains under South African control, with a guerrilla war raging in the north. Angola has lived with civil war since independence in 1975, and is experiencing increasing conventional warfare.

Namibia and Angola have become so intertwined that it is difficult to see one moving to peace without the other. The South Africans, with probably the most powerful army in sub-Sahara Africa, are deeply embroiled in both conflicts. They are losing small but not insignificant numbers of men and equipment as they underpin Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA rebels in their war against Angola’s Marxist government and as they conduct a less conventional war against the South-West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO), which is seeking independence for Namibia. Numbers of young white South Africans, conscripted into the army to fight in far-off battles in Namibia and Angola, are refusing the draft--risking jail or exile. The longer the South Africans support Savimbi, the more heavily the Angolan government relies on invited Cuban troops, who have increased to about 40,000.

The Soviets are reported to be keen, particularly after Afghanistan, to avoid an Angolan quagmire requiring the commitment of more military strength and prestige against the determined South Africans. The United States’ main concern, it seems, is the presence of Cubans on African soil. There are political dividends in seeing them packed off to Havana as part of a regional peace settlement, particularly in an American presidential election year.

On the rocky road to a negotiated peace, any party immediately involved--South Africa, SWAPO, Angola, UNITA or Cuba--could sabotage the process; one critical air or land attack could send peace out the window. It would be a major development if the Soviets and the Americans, as co-guarantors of peace, could cajole all the parties to the conference table in a really determined peace drive.

A perennial stumbling block is the influential military machine in South Africa. President Pieter W. Botha relies heavily on his defense advisers in the running of the country and in the conduct of diplomacy. He instinctively trusts military advice, particularly on matters that involve what he sees as the communist threat. I have heard military officers express suspicions that even if some Cuban troops withdraw, others could be flown in rapidly from, say, Brazzaville.

The recent push southward by Angolan and Cuban forces, reportedly with SWAPO guerrillas among them, close to Angola’s border with Namibia serves to confirm the suspicions of the South African military. Actually, the push appears to be aimed at winning valuable bargaining ground and prestige as a preliminary step to negotiations rather than a serious military threat to South African interests.

Botha, now in his 70s and in power for a decade, obviously can overrule his advisers, but he also has to consider his National Party’s domestic situation. It faces uphill battles against right-wing parties in local authority elections in October, and the right will be quick to accuse him of selling out to communism if the Marxist-leaning SWAPO is seen to be closer to power as part of a settlement. On the other hand, Botha has managed to tame black unrest somewhat in South Africa, at least on the surface, and he might feel more confident now about a Namibian settlement. He also seems to have a sense of urgency about his cautious plans for constitutional reform, which offer the black majority limited participation in government, and he might want to devote his twilight years in political life to these reforms. It thus seems that South Africa may be more willing than before to secure Angola/Namibia peace, which would coincide happily with the other important development--the Soviets’ clear wish to get untangled from a potential African Vietnam.

But, as one South African source has put it, for a deal to stick, all warring parties must be able to say that they won--or at least did not lose. It is a tall order, but peace has edged closer in the past month. If it is not clinched now, there will be continuing cross-border raids by South Africa, escalating conventional war in Angola, increasing superpower military involvement, no internationally recognized independence for war-torn Namibia, the loss of more young South Africans in a foreign war that cannot be won, and declining living standards for all in the region.

The advantages of peace are overwhelming, and all concerned are advised to seize the chance now.