Critics of Nominating Procedure Still Wary of Change

“Our nominating process takes too long and costs too much money,” says former President Gerald R. Ford of the selection system which concluded this week, leaving voters with a November choice between Republican George Bush and Democrat Michael S. Dukakis.

Moreover, polls suggest that a good many Americans share Ford’s antipathy toward the prolonged, expensive and often seemingly irrelevant jumble of primaries and caucuses. In a recent Media General-Associated Press survey, 52%of those interviewed favored major changes in nominating procedures.

But for all the shortcomings of the current system, amply demonstrated in 1988, some analysts contend that the chief lesson of the past campaign is that the time has finally come to, in effect, leave bad enough alone.

“Every time you try to get cute with the rules, they jump up and bite you in the face,” says Republican National Chairman Frank J. Fahrenkopf Jr. about the 1988 nominating contests in both parties.

Ground Rules in Flux

For the past 20 years, the ground rules governing the way Americans pick presidential nominees have been in an almost constant state of flux as a result of national party edicts governing how convention delegates are selected, state legislative maneuvers to change the timing of their primaries or caucuses and federal laws limiting campaign giving and spending.

But critics complain that one result of this ferment has been to confuse politicians, the journalists who are expected to explain the system to voters and the voters themselves.

Another fault frequently found is that the procedural changes often have results that differ dramatically from their objectives.

The prime 1988 case in point was the Super Tuesday regional primary in the South, intended to assure the nomination by the Democrats of a Southerner, or at least a conservative. But in the long run its chief beneficiaries turned out to be the two most liberal candidates competing in the March 8 mega-contest, Dukakis and the Rev. Jesse Jackson.

The law of unintended consequences, as politicians refer to it, operated on the Republican side too, Fahrenkopf acknowledges. He cites the Michigan caucuses, the start of which was moved up to the summer of 1986, two full years before the GOP National Convention, in an effort to strengthen the state GOP.

‘Almost a Civil War’

Instead, the net result was “almost a civil war,” Fahrenkopf says, between supporters of Bush and of television evangelist Pat Robertson, with New York Rep. Jack Kemp’s backers caught in the middle.

Apart from contravening the objectives of their sponsors, the Michigan caucuses and Super Tuesday both interfered with what voters ideally are supposed to get from campaigns, the opportunity to know the candidates and their views.

The Michigan process started so early that the Republican candidates had not yet developed their positions. As for Super Tuesday, the magnitude of the contest--spread over 20 states, 14 of them in the South or in border regions--ruled out reasoned debate.

With little time to campaign, the contenders tended to spend most of it in Texas and Florida, skimping on the smaller states such as Alabama, whose Democratic Party Chairman John Baker called the contest “a disaster in terms of giving the people of Alabama a chance to learn about the candidates.”

One reason for such backfires is that proposed changes in the nominating system, though they are invariably promoted as intended to achieve such lofty reform goals as openness and fairness are, in fact, usually designed to influence the outcome of the nominating process. But since the choice of the nominee is generally shaped by broader forces than the rules--the national condition, the nature of the competition, for example--such schemes often flop.

Past Experience

Another factor that frequently makes rule changes counter-productive is that such changes are based on past experience. But as Richard Moe, a strategist in every Democratic presidential campaign since 1976 points out: “Every one of these things takes on a dynamic different from the one before.”

Consequently in every quadrennial some notions about the nominating process have been shattered. Among the so-called rules which were disproved in 1988 and prior campaigns:

--Serious office holders can’t find time to run. This idea was fostered by the success in competing for their party’s nomination of such unemployed politicians as Republican Ronald Reagan in 1980 and Democrat Jimmy Carter in 1976.

But Dukakis captured the necessary delegates for winning the Democratic nomination while serving as governor of Massachusetts. Other major contenders in both parties included U.S. Sens. Albert Gore Jr. of Tennessee and Paul Simon of Illinois, both Democrats, and Republican Bob Dole of Kansas--also his party’s Senate leader. From the House, there were Democrat Richard A. Gephardt of Missouri and Republican Kemp, both of whom also served in their respective party’s House leadership.

--Front-runners fade fast. This belief stemmed from the setbacks suffered in the 1968 nominating campaigns by two strong early favorites, President Lyndon B. Johnson on the Democratic side and Michigan Gov. George Romney in the Republican race.

Just a Myth

George Bush demonstrated this was just a myth in 1988 when he snapped back from his early defeat in the Iowa caucuses to overtake Dole, the upset victor in that state, just as President Reagan had recovered from his loss to Bush in Iowa in 1980 and Walter F. Mondale recovered after losing New Hampshire to Gary Hart in 1984.

--Charisma or a compelling issue is a requisite for success. This theory can be attributed to the winning personal charm of Democrat John F. Kennedy and Republican Ronald Reagan and to the ability of George S. McGovern to rally Democrats against the Vietnam War and Barry M. Goldwater to summon Republicans to the banner of old-fashioned conservatism in 1964.

But both Dukakis and Bush, with superior organizations and financial resources, managed to overcome opposition from candidates who had either more magnetic personalities, or more passionate commitment to issues, such as Robertson and Kemp on the Republican side and Jackson and Gephardt among the Democrats.

Looking back on his state’s disastrous Super Tuesday experience in 1988 and ahead to the unknown perils of 1992, Alabama Democratic leader John Baker contends:”The bottom line is you should leave things alone. You can do more harm than good by making changes.”

It is not that Baker and the increasing number of other politicians who share this view are blind to the system’s faults. They agree with the common criticisms that the campaigns drag on too long, place too much emphasis on fund raising and that the debate is usually too far removed from concerns that affect voters’ lives.

Wary of Change

Nevertheless, defenders of the status quo are wary of most of the proposed changes either because they view them as difficult to implement or likely to aggravate existing problems.

“I wish we were as smart as our British friends and could have an election in five weeks and it’s all over,” Ford recently told a conference of political scientists at the University of California at Davis. “The candidates would come out of it better mentally and physically.”

But brief campaigns along with a more active role in candidate selection by professional politicians and other aspects of the British system depend on strong political parties playing an influential role in the campaign process. In this country, scholars point out, the separation of legislative and executive branches by the Constitution, and an ingrained American suspicion of parties and professional politicians prevents parties from wielding that much influence.

Other suggestions for change include proposals for a regional primary. But opponents of that idea contend it would just bring with it the evils of bigness experienced on Super Tuesday.