Iran May Be Ready to Pursue ‘Non-Military’ Option to End War, but Iraq Must, Too

Iran’s new-found restraint concerning its war with Iraq is not difficult to explain. The failure to take the Iraqi city of Basra last January and the subsequent successful Iraqi offensives have suggested to Iranian leaders that a military victory over Iraq is no longer possible.

Iraqi aerial bombing has inflicted damage on Iranian oil and industrial installations, interfered with oil exports and, combined with the Iraqi use of poison gas and attacks on civilian centers, terrified the urban population. Chinese arms sales notwithstanding, Iran is having difficulty securing adequate arms supplies on the international market. Diplomatically, Iran is increasingly isolated.

Iran has successfully cut down government expenditures, reduced imports and geared its economy to a war footing. Usable foreign-exchange reserves stand at $4 billion to $5 billion. Nevertheless, the economy is hurting. The rationing of basic consumer goods is widespread; there is not enough foreign exchange to meet industrial-machinery and raw-material requirements.

These economic difficulties have exacerbated a long-running dispute within the leadership between the champions of private property and the advocates of further state control of the economy and intervention to redistribute wealth. For more than two years, action on a number of bills to allow the government to distribute land, control prices, intervene in the distribution of goods, protect tenants and set minimum wages for industrial workers has been stalled as a result of these differences.

Earlier this year the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini threw his weight behind the state interventionists. Their hand has been further strengthened by gains of seats in the just-completed parliamentary election. The prospect of further nationalizations and measures to distribute wealth and control private-sector activity naturally causes anxiety in the bazaar and among the business and property classes.

Gains by more radical elements in domestic economic policy have not been translated into gains in foreign policy, where the moderate elements--led by Hashemi Rafsanjani, the Speaker of Parliament--appear to be firmly in control. In the recent shake-up in the high military command, which saw the replacement of the chief of staff of the armed forces, Khomeini delegated to Rafsanjani his authority as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

Rafsanjani’s appointment does not place him in line to succeed Khomeini, as some commentators have assumed. He lacks the religious seniority to serve as the country’s supreme leader. But it greatly enhances his position. He is known as a pragmatist. He was the architect on the Iranian side of the Iran-U.S. arms-for-hostages deal, and he has spoken of Iran’s preference for a “non-military” solution to the war.

As the acting commander-in-chief he will be better placed to coordinate the operations of the Revolutionary Guards and the regular army, which do not work well together, and to prevent the duplication and waste of resources inherent in the attempt by the guards to create their own air and naval unit.

Iran will thus try to shore up its defenses and presumably to gird the army for renewed offensives. However, the reorganization of the command structure of the army will take time. Meanwile, Iran can be expected to continue suffering from arms shortages, general war weariness and diplomatic isolation. The Islamic Republic must therefore pursue the “non-military” option for ending the war as well.

There now exists, as there has existed for some months, an opening for bringing an end to the Iran-Iraq War. But whether it is usefully exploited depends not only on Iran but also on Iraq, and the readiness of the international community to urge flexibility on both sides.

The freeing of Iraqi territory from Iranian occupation may actually enhance the chances for an end to hostilities by removing Iraqi objections to a cease-fire in place. However, Iraq has proved to be more intransigent than Iran regarding cease-fire implementation plans suggested by U.N. Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar--including the generally reasonable nine-point plan of last September.

In this, Iraq has so far enjoyed full U.S. support. However, Vernon Walters, the U.S. special envoy who has just returned from a Persian Gulf tour, said that he had urged the Iraqis at least to study, rather than reject outright, the secretary general’s proposal. That would be a step in the right direction.