The Simplistic Thinking on SDI Is No Debate at All

The father of the Strategic Defense Initiative, Ronald Reagan, will leave office in January, taking with him a vision that has not really been institutionalized in the ways that matter most.

Doctrinally, at the level of strategic ideas to capture the minds of people (as contrasted with a moral vision), SDI has been adrift virtually from the outset.

The Republican candidate, Vice President George Bush, sounds evasive on SDI deployment, which is unfortunate but certainly consistent with the mainstream Reagan Administration thinking on the subject. The Democratic candidate, Gov. Michael Dukakis, is not evasive; he believes that SDI is “a fantasy and a fraud and we ought to stop spending billions on it.” In common with many of SDI’s less rigorous critics, Dukakis has yet to explain how he can be so certain that a program is a “fantasy and a fraud” if he is unwilling to spend the necessary billions to pursue the research. In addition, the governor really must explain why he is so negative on strategic defense for the United States, but believes that the largely U.S.-funded SDI program for Israel should be continued “vigorously.”

Five and a half years into the political revival of strategic defense in the United States, the American electorate has a right to expect more detailed leadership on the subject than Bush has chosen to provide to date. He, unexceptionably, tells us that “full deployment” of SDI would be “very expensive” and that any decisions about it would have to depend on further research. Plainly fearful that he was appearing to wobble unduly on commitment to SDI, Bush has emphasized a willingness to “support research vigorously and fully.” Further, on Aug. 26 he affirmed that “when it is ready I’ll deploy it because we need defense as well as offense.” Of course, who is to say “when it is ready?” And ready for what? To render any Soviet first-strike planning impossible? To defend American society, thoroughly and reliably? To swat down a terrorist or crazy-state missile or two? In short, beyond grunts of general approval, candidate Bush is not saying anything about SDI.

Bush’s apparent stance on SDI may best be portrayed as one of tepid enthusiasm. However, he could specify the strategic benefits of a measured approach to SDI deployment--suitably qualified with regard to dollar cost and technology--and thereby highlight the irresponsible negativism of Dukakis’ position.

Surely it is not unreasonable, given the passage of years since President Reagan’s speech on March 23, 1983, to ask that the presidential candidates talk intelligently about strategic defense. What is needed is not the kind of simplistic thinking that today assails us. Instead, the candidates should debate what has been accomplished by research thus far, what they would like and would not like SDI to accomplish strategically and how important that accomplishment might be to the country.

In the mid-1980s it was only fair to excuse an absence of strategically intelligent argument about SDI on the grounds that the subject was very unfamiliar, raised long forgotten strategic questions and was technically forbidding to the non-expert. Today, as the father of the SDI is in his last months in office, strategic defense is about to lose the privileged status conferred by White House paternity. It so happens that, largely due to the lack of political leadership and competent strategic thinking, the SDI program already is gravely ill.

On July 30, 1987, the Pentagon’s Defense Acquisition Board approved a Phase I strategic defense system that envisaged two-tiered protection--by space-based kinetic energy kill vehicles to intercept missiles in their boost and post-boost phases, and by ground-based rockets for mid-course interception. Intense congressional criticism caused a rather humiliating retreat. Through its Defense Science Board, the Pentagon submitted a radically restructured program last April 13. The science board reportedly has recommended a step-by-step approach to defense deployments, beginning with a force of 100 ground-based interceptors at Grand Forks, N.D., which would be in compliance with the 1972 anti-ballistic missile treaty. Thus far, the Administration has not made a powerful strategic argument for any particular scheme of defensive deployment.

Signally lacking from either presidential candidate--though particularly from Bush, given his approval of SDI research and development--is leadership on the subject of strategic defense. Strategically, how important is SDI? Is SDI very important for high-technology leadership by the U.S. defense industry? (Is it as important as its funding has been for the much-touted Massachusetts Miracle?) Deterrence can be achieved by so-called offensive forces, by defensive forces, or by a mix of the two. Five and a half years since Ronald Reagan revived strategic defense as a legitimate policy issue, we have a right to demand that the candidates for his legacy explain their understanding of the choices before us.