Angola Talks to Resume; U.S. Expects Accord : State Dept. Expert to Mediate at Geneva; Cuban Troop Pullout Is Key Issue

Negotiations on the future of Angola and Namibia will resume Friday in Geneva at a meeting that U.S. officials expect to produce a long-sought agreement for the withdrawal of all Cuban troops from Africa, the State Department announced Monday.

The Reagan Administration’s chief expert on Africa, Assistant Secretary of State Chester A. Crocker, will mediate in the talks between South Africa and a joint Cuba-Angola delegation, the department said.

A senior Administration official said that the only issue left unresolved is the schedule for removing Cuban forces from Angola. He said that Cuba and Angola have been dragging their feet on that matter, apparently to delay action until after today’s U.S. election.

‘Exaggerate Importance’

“Countries tend to exaggerate their importance in American elections,” said the official, who declined to be identified by name. “The Cubans and Angolans seem not to want to give (Vice President George) Bush a boost by giving the Administration a major foreign policy success.

“They are just waiting for the election, and it will come together after that,” he said.

The day before the negotiations open, Crocker will compare notes with Anatoly Adamishin, the Soviet Union’s highest-ranking specialist on Africa. The Soviets, who supply both Cuba and Angola with arms, will be represented by an observer during the talks.

Moscow has been “a helpful force” in the talks recently, the senior official added.

South Africa has ruled Namibia, a largely desert territory also known as South-West Africa, since World War I, despite repeated demands from the United Nations for the territory’s independence.

Removal of Forces

The U.S. official said that South Africa already has agreed to grant independence to Namibia as soon as there is a firm agreement for removal of Cuban forces from Angola.

Pauline H. Baker, a senior associate of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, said she does not share the Administration’s optimism.

“I have just talked to the Cubans, and it seems as though there is still such a large set of issues and they are so far apart that I find it very difficult to think they will wrap it up,” she said.

The interlocking Angola-Namibia negotiations have been a top priority item for the Reagan Administration since it took office in 1981. Crocker devised his controversial policy of “constructive engagement” toward South Africa as part of an effort to win Pretoria’s approval of Namibian independence.

Long-Sought Deal

Officials had hoped to wrap up an Angola-Namibia deal early in the Administration, clearing the way for the United States to apply diplomatic pressure to South Africa over apartheid, that country’s policy of racial segregation.

One official said that if the Reagan Administration completes the Angola-Namibia agreement before it leaves office Jan. 20, that would make it easier for the next President to concentrate on apartheid, an issue with far more political import in the United States.

“As long as Namibia remains in South African hands, it serves as a lightning rod,” the official said.

The Geneva talks, and a later ceremonial session in Brazzaville, Congo, to sign the agreement, will not affect the core issues of the Angola civil war, in which rebels of the UNITA organization of Jonas Savimbi are fighting to oust the Marxist government in Luanda. However, a coalition of African leaders is ready to try to mediate between the Angolan factions once an agreement is reached on the withdrawal of Cuban troops.

U.S. officials say that Savimbi and Angolan President Eduardo dos Santos may be closer to an accommodation than their bitterly antagonistic public statements would indicate.

The Administration’s optimism that a settlement is imminent is based on its conclusion that all sides have decided that the status quo is too dangerous and costly. Officials say that the Soviet Union appears ready to cut its losses after concluding that it has gained very little from its investment in Angola’s Marxist government. They add that Angola has been drained financially by the cost of maintaining the Cuba force.

On the other side of the equation, the officials say, South Africa appears to have decided that its continued domination of Namibia is too expensive. Cuban troops have recently moved into position near the Angola-Namibia border, a maneuver that has been interpreted as a message that Cuba is prepared to engage South African forces in Namibia if the independence deal falls through. U.S. officials say that South Africa is reluctant to spend its blood and treasury in defense of its position in Namibia because there is no obvious pay-off for the security of South Africa itself.

The joker in this deck may be Cuba. It is believed that the Havana government has received handsome compensation for sending its troops to Angola and it may be reluctant to bring them home. However, if Moscow decides to back away from Angola, the Cubans would have little choice but to leave.

Optimism on Afghanistan

The optimism over southern Africa parallels the Administration’s repeatedly stated confidence that the Soviet Union will meet its Feb. 15 deadline for withdrawing the last of its troops from Afghanistan. The reasoning is the same: The cost has become too high and must be cut back if Moscow hopes to accomplish President Mikhail S. Gorbachev’s ambitious economic reforms.

State Department spokesman Charles Redman on Monday dismissed repeated Soviet warnings that Moscow may reexamine its decision to leave Afghanistan if U.S.-backed Islamic insurgents continue their offensive against the Soviet-backed Kabul government.

“I’m not going to get involved in commenting on various comments that may be made (by Soviet officials) here and there . . . , “ Redman said. “We continue to expect them to comply with the obligation (to withdraw by Feb. 15) that they have undertaken.”

The purpose of the “Reagan doctrine” of supporting and arming insurgents--like the moujahedeen in Afghanistan or UNITA--is to raise the cost of empire to the Soviet Union. Administration officials happily underline evidence that the policy is producing the desired effect while discounting any indications that there are limits to Moscow’s willingness to endure political loss of face.

Baker of the Carnegie Endowment suggested that the Administration’s attitude is primarily political.

“There has been an awful lot of optimism coming out of the State Department recently,” she said. “It could be intended to help Bush in the election.”