Kings, Presidents, Envoys Involved : U.S. Decision on PLO: 32 Hours of Drama, Suspense

For a diplomatic move that reversed U.S. policy in the Middle East, it was, in fact, a cliffhanger in which no one involved seemed quite sure which way the decision would fall until the last moment.

For 32 hours, Arab kings and presidents, a fleet of diplomatic minions and two weary Swedish envoys in Geneva and Washington scrambled to shape history.

In the end, convergent pressures on both the Reagan Administration and on the Palestine Liberation Organization’s leader, Yasser Arafat, opened the way for the first dialogue between the world’s most notorious guerrilla movement and one of its oldest adversaries.

In Geneva on Wednesday, Arafat convened a press conference and delivered a delicately worded statement that accepted two U.N. resolutions on the Mideast, renounced terrorism and affirmed the right of all parties in the conflict, including Israel, to exist “in peace and security.”

In Washington, Secretary of State George P. Shultz, after hours of suspense, pronounced the pledge acceptable. Direct talks could begin.

“It was fascinating theater,” one of the main Arab participants said Thursday. “Everyone involved was held hostage to this moment, yet no one knew if it would come off.

“There was this terrible three-hour period Wednesday afternoon, a sort of black hole of information, while Washington made its decision.”

Although the stage had been set for a major breakthrough during a PLO summit in Algiers last month and a meeting between Arafat and five prominent American Jews in Stockholm last week, the letdown after a speech by Arafat before the U.N. General Assembly on Tuesday led most interested parties to think it would not happen this time around.

According to sources familiar with the situation, Israeli Foreign Ministry analysts had, in fact, advised their government that the PLO chairman had failed in his address to meet the three U.S. conditions for allowing diplomatic contacts. There was no need to act or appeal to the United States, they advised.

The PLO was also gently advised that Arafat’s words had not satisfied the Americans, who considered the pledge ambiguous. Swedish sources described the Palestinians’ angry reaction.

“They thought they had it in the bag. They were just waiting for confirmation that Washington would deal with them,” a Swedish envoy said. “Then the poor Swedish foreign minister had to tell them the bad news. They were dumbfounded when they were told.”

According to Arab sources, Bassam abu Sharif, a senior adviser to Arafat, began screaming, “What do they want? What more can we give?”

While the PLO and the Israelis appeared to think Arafat’s gambit had collapsed, others refused to give up.

Unknown to the Israelis, the real pressure then began to build. Moderate Arabs and European envoys worked furiously to persuade both the United States and the PLO not to let the opportunity pass.

Diplomats and State Department sources described a stream of late-night transatlantic calls Tuesday and another round beginning in the wee hours Wednesday among key parties in the United States, Europe and the Middle East.

Saudi Arabia’s King Fahd and his savvy ambassador in Washington, Prince Bandar ibn Sultan, tried to convince Shultz and Assistant Secretary of State Richard W. Murphy that “Arafat has gone as far as he can” in his language addressing the key conditions, according to one Arab source.

“They argued that to be an effective leader, to leave him useful to the process at the end of the road, this is all you will get out of him.

“The Saudis also emphasized that this had to be done by the Reagan Administration to permit the Bush Administration to come in with a clean slate,” the source added. “That was hit very heavily in meetings and in telephone calls.”

In two calls, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak also tried to convince Shultz that Arafat had met the basic requirements of recognizing Israel, renouncing terrorism and accepting U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338, key declarations on the Middle East.

Along the way, a flap erupted over the translation of Arafat’s speech, which was delivered in Arabic.

An Arab official argued that the PLO chairman had acknowledged Israel’s right to “exist” in peace in the Middle East. The Arabic word for “exist,” however, also means “live,” which is how it was translated by a U.N. interpreter.

On the issue of terrorism, the PLO delegate to Sweden, Eugene Makhlouf, told the Associated Press that there was another translation problem. Arafat said he “condemned” international terrorism, according to the official interpreter, rather than renounced it, as Washington demanded.

Makhlouf contended that the same word covers both concepts in Arabic.

The Arabs argued that the only discrepancy was semantic.

(Looking back later, Arab ambassadors said that--after years of being eclipsed by the powerful pro-Israeli lobby in the United States--the joint campaign of persuasion directed at U.S. officials was the single most effective Arab lobbying effort since the decades-old Arab-Israeli dispute first erupted.)

Meanwhile, the same envoys were also exerting pressure on Arafat in Geneva.

During his first call to Shultz, as it was approaching midnight Cairo time, Mubarak became convinced that Washington was genuinely resistant because of ambiguities in Arafat’s statements, sources said.

He then contacted Arafat, who was attending a dinner in his honor at the Egyptian ambassador’s home, according to Egyptian envoys. The Egyptian president bluntly told Arafat that, in his opinion, the U.S. rejection could be reversed if Arafat used the right words at his press conference the next day.

Emissaries from a host of other Arab and European countries, including Jordan’s King Hussein, relayed similar messages.

“The pressure was incredible,” said the Egyptian envoy.

“Having it all happen in Geneva made it comparatively easy,” the diplomat said. “Everyone was hostage to this place and this event. Unlike being in New York, where people go their separate ways at the end of the day, all the delegations were in the same hotels and meeting in the same smaller facility all day.

“They couldn’t avoid each other or the issue at stake,” he added.

The crucial figure in the final hours, however, was Swedish Foreign Minister Sten Sture Andersson, according to all accounts.

On Wednesday morning, Andersson was closeted with Arafat and his top aides for two hours. “He told Arafat that he must read out this statement clearing up the ambiguities,” a Swedish diplomat recounted.

The two men worked on the statement, this time in English to avoid any confusion over translations. Arafat wanted assurances that, this time, it would win U.S. approval.

Andersson then set up a line of telephone communications to Murphy at the State Department through a Swedish diplomat in Washington. “We put in a few things that Murphy suggested, mainly clearing up the phrasing,” the Swede said.

“Finally there was this text that everyone seemed to agree on, but Arafat still did not have his guarantee. We encouraged him. We said it was our very considered opinion that it would do the trick, but he was uncertain.”

On Wednesday afternoon, Arafat finally gave his now long-delayed press conference in English. At his side was a PLO translator in case Arafat misused or mispronounced a key word.

Israeli officials, however, still did not think that Arafat had met U.S. demands for an explicit acceptance of the key points. The same advisers concluded that the danger of a U.S.-PLO dialogue was over for now, according to Israeli Foreign Ministry sources.

But Washington had already begun preparations for Shultz’s stunning announcement. The groundwork had been laid after communication from the Swedes.

According to U.S. officials, at 1:30 p.m. Shultz met with President Reagan, National Security Adviser Colin L. Powell and White House Chief of Staff Kenneth Duberstein to brief them on developments. President Reagan, the sources said, indicated that he was prepared to open a dialogue with the PLO if the conditions had indeed been met.

By telephone, Shultz and Murphy heard a tape recording of Arafat’s press conference. By 4 p.m. they concluded that, after a 13-year diplomatic boycott, Arafat’s words were finally acceptable. Shultz notified Powell. Powell then alerted Vice President George Bush, sources said.

At 5:12 p.m., Powell briefed the President and asked for his final decision.

Then it was just a matter of time.

“We took basically an hour between about 5:15 and 6:30 to make the contacts with the countries that needed to be contacted, with the Congress,” White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater said.

Sources said Israel was pointedly not alerted until after the decision was firm. Israeli Foreign Ministry officials had earlier requested that Washington consult with Jerusalem before making any decision, but the Israelis were not told until a half-hour before Shultz went on television to make the announcement.

As it turned out, the final moments of the historic turning point in Middle East history were not decided by any party to the 40-year conflict.

The State Department consulted with the major television networks to learn what time after 6:30 would be best for them, sources said. Network officials asked for a brief delay to allow their news anchors to fill viewers in on the context of the day’s events.

At 6:33 p.m., as the broadcasters finished their summations, 13 years of stalemate between the United States and the PLO ended as Shultz gave his dramatic news.

Times staff writers Norman Kempster in Washington and Daniel Williams in Jerusalem contributed to this story.