Children Held Hostage: When No Policy May Be the Best Policy

It must be the nightmare of every head of state--children held hostage by terrorists. It has happened before: in Israel in 1974, in Djibouti in 1976, in Holland in 1977, in Lesotho earlier this year. All four episodes ended in assaults by security forces.

In the latest case, the episode began at Ordzhonikidze in the Northern Caucasus of the Soviet Union, where four armed men and a woman seized a bus with 30 school children on board. They demanded $3 million and a plane to carry them to Israel, South Africa or Pakistan.

At Ma’alot, in 1974, Israeli security forces stormed the school where three Arab terrorists held 90 students hostage. The terrorists were killed, but 16 of the children also died and 70 were wounded in the assault. In Djibouti, French commandos stormed the school bus held by six members of the “Front for the Liberation of the Somali Coast.” Two of the children were killed during the rescue, two were wounded. Dutch marines had better luck at Bovensmilde, where South Moluccan extremists held 105 school children hostage. All were released after four days of negotiations, and there were no casualties among the four remaining adult hostages following an assault 14 days later. When members of the “Lesotho Liberation Army” seized a bus with 71 passengers--most of them teen-agers on their way to see the Pope--the government took a hard line, declaring that “Every life must be spared, but we will not under any circumstance give in to the demands of terrorists.” A team of South African security forces stormed the bus two days later, killing three of the four hijackers; one child was killed and 20 were wounded.

On the basis of past Soviet behavior, a ruthless response in the Ordzhonikidze case was expected from the authorities. Instead, in return for releasing the children, the kidnapers were promised the money and the airplane, and were told that they would be allowed to fly out of the country. The promise was kept.

Still, the outcome of this episode must be seen as a success. No lives were lost. The kidnapers were taken into custody by the Israelis and were delivered to the Soviet authorities for trial. The money was recovered. The escape plane was returned. The Soviet government avoided a protracted crisis; decisions were reached and the episode was ended in a matter of hours. Despite the lack of full diplomatic relations, the Soviet and Israeli governments successfully worked together to resolve the incident--a practical demonstration of cooperation that has important and positive political implications for the future. And the Soviet government’s handling of the incident won applause in the Soviet Union. Everyone I spoke to during a visit to Moscow thought that General Secretary Mikhail S. Gorbachev had done the right thing. I was told that Gorbachev himself decided to meet the demands of the hostage-takers rather than risk the lives of the children.

It is intriguing to me, an American, that what Gorbachev did not only departs from the pattern of Soviet behavior demonstrated in previous hostage incidents, it also runs contrary to the conventional wisdom of how hostage incidents should be handled. It is also almost exactly the opposite of what the United States government says it will do if faced with similar circumstances.

American leaders have repeatedly declared that they will make no concessions to terrorists holding hostages--ever. During the recent presidential campaign, both candidates made categorical statements, in writing, vowing to adhere to a policy of no concessions. We Americans, however, also place great value on individual life and liberty, and our government has not always strictly adhered to its declared policy. It is difficult to say what would have happened had kidnapers taken a bus full of American school children and held them hostage somewhere in the United States. The duel of nerves between the hostage-takers and the authorities might have dragged on for hours--or days--in full view of television cameras. The tension would have become terrible. Undoubtably there would have been public pressure to yield to at least some of the captors’ demands in order to save the children, but to give criminals money plus an airliner and allow them to board it with their weapons would have been unthinkable. The more likely outcome: a desperate rescue attempt.

The Soviet government, of course, had several advantages. The hostage-takers in this case were not fanatical terrorists making impossible political demands but ordinary criminals who, judging by their actions, appear to have been rather simple-minded. Gorbachev was not surrounded by a cadre of political handlers, crisis managers, commanders of commando teams, hostage-negotiators, psychologists and other experts advising: that he ought not become personally engaged in negotiations with hostage-takers; that authorities at the scene should stall to wear down the hostage-takers and ultimately persuade them to surrender, or at least stall long enough to prepare an assault; that as the leader of a superpower he could not afford to appear weak by giving in to a gang of criminals, and reminding him that it would violate policy to make concessions.

Having never announced what he would do, Gorbachev had no policy; thus he could do whatever seemed appropriate under the circumstances without violating policy, losing credibility or setting a precedent. The American government, having repeatedly declared that it will never make concessions in a hostage situation, suffered a serious loss of credibility when it was discovered to have violated that policy by secretly selling arms to Iran for the release of American hostages in Lebanon. The United States might now consider the advantages of having no declared policy.

This is not to say conventional wisdom is wrong. It would be perilous to draw too many lessons from Ordzhonikidze. In giving the hostage-takers an aircraft and allowing them to take their weapons on board, the Soviet government took enormous risks. Once in control of the plane, the hostage-takers could have made new demands. There could have been a shoot-out on the aircraft, a possible crash, perhaps over a populated area, causing great loss of life. Had the plane veered off course over Israel, nervous Israeli authorities might have ordered it to be shot down. Or the episode could have turned into a protracted siege at Ben-Gurion Airport in Tel Aviv. Or it could have become a long odyssey, with the aircraft stopping at many places while the hostage-takers searched for a guarantee of asylum. The greatest risk, and the reason the United States declared a no-concessions policy, is that giving in to kidnapers may invite others to seize hostages, confident that their demands also will be met.

The Soviet handling of the episode does demolish some myths prevalent among American policy makers. The prevailing U.S. thinking was that the Soviet Union would never confront hostage episodes of this type, and if one ever did occur, the Soviet government would never yield to the demands of kidnapers.

The Soviet response to a hijacking in March of this year seemed to support that view. In that case, a family of jazz musicians tried to hijack an Aeroflot jet to London. Police stormed the plane after the hijackers reportedly murdered a flight attendant. Five of the hijackers died in the assault, along with three of the passengers; 20 others were wounded.

American officials believe that, given complete government control over the news media, the occurrence of any hostage incident would not be broadcast in the Soviet Union, at least not while it was happening. With no publicity, there would be no public pressure on the government, which could then deal with an episode quietly and efficiently. In fact, news of the episode at Ordzhonikidze was broadcast--while it was still in progress.

According to the American view, the Soviet Union places greater emphasis on collective welfare than on the fate of any individual. Therefore, it would be easier for the government to risk and, if necessary, sacrifice the life of any hostage. When I mentioned this to my Soviet interlocutors, they found it utterly absurd to think Gorbachev would have risked the lives of children at Ordzhonikidze.

Underlying the American perceptions of how the Soviet Union would deal with a hostage incident is a widespread belief or, rather, a fear that Soviets value life less than we Americans do. Therefore, they might be more willing to accept the prospect of horrendous casualties in a war; hence they might be more willing to go to war. While basing national strategy on the basis of a single incident or the actions of a single man is perilous, a leader who takes risks to save the lives of 30 children does not strike me as quite so ready to sacrifice a million times that many lives in a nuclear war. I find considerable comfort in that.

DR, DAVID SUTER / for The Times