Two Superpowers Climbing the High Road Up From Hostility

George Bush’s recent visit to Poland featured the bizarre spectacle of an American President praising a Polish dictator. Yet Bush’s support of now-elected Wojciech Jaruzelski helps legitimize public debate on a genuine dilemma facing the United States in Eastern Europe.

The United States wants to free the East Europeans without offending the Soviets. It wants change in the political order in Eastern Europe but is wary of change in the security order.

Is the former possible without the latter? Even today, many observers doubt that the Soviets will be able to accept changes now under way in Eastern Europe. They anticipate an explosion that will end the promise of Mikhail S. Gorbachev’s revolution. In the words of a recent RAND Corp. study, “Today, Eastern Europe’s persisting structural instability poses the greatest single threat of a major discontinuity in international politics.”

Events in Eastern Europe could indeed spin out of control, but part of the great pessimism many experts express about future Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe may rest on a dated view of East-West relations.

Many, perhaps most, Western observers see Gorbachev as an aberration. In terms of attitudes toward Eastern Europe, the majority of Soviet leaders are seen as little changed from the 1950s. But it can be argued that ever since the death of Josef Stalin, the Soviet Union has been making fitful efforts to become a normal member of the international community. Gorbachev’s genius would then lie, not in discontinuity, but in so accelerating the pace of change that the West at last begins to recognize it.

Looking back, we can see roughly four periods in East-West relations since 1945.

The Cold War, 1945-55: Soviet consolidation of control in Eastern Europe and American consolidation of influence in Western Europe. New lines of hostility were drawn down the center of Europe.

But any permanent “cold” required an enemy incapable of evolving into a more normal international partner. Stalin’s death in 1953 began the evolution. As soon as the regime stopped shooting people, cracks started appearing in the totalitarian structure and the Soviets began their journey toward normality. By 1955 the stage was set for Stalin himself to be denounced officially--and he was at the 20th Party Congress the following year.

Defense of the status quo, 1955-65: The two sides essentially tested boundaries of the postwar division of power but they drew back from any ultimate challenge to those boundaries. Each side attempted to stir rebellion in the other camp. But the invasion of Hungary, the Berlin Wall and the Cuban missile crisis established just how stable the new status quo already was.

Detente, 1965-1975: With boundaries firmly set, the two sides could begin cautiously exploring areas of common interest within an established security framework. The fruits of this effort were the non-proliferation treaty, the first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

Wary cooperation, 1975-Present: Although boundaries were fixed in Europe, they had remained fluid in the Third World. Superpower conflict centered in the Third World but both sides quickly learned that they had to observe certain rules of the road. Like the United States in Korea and Vietnam, the Soviet Union in Afghanistan acted according to a certain code of conduct, however brutal. Like the United States, the Soviet Union did not invade the neighboring state that gave provisions to the forces it was fighting. Like the United States in Korea and Vietnam, the Soviet Union used enormous power in Afghanistan but stopped short of applying its full might. And like the United States, the Soviet Union also did not allow its anger--when the great rival helped feed the rebellion--to end relations with the United States.

It may be that the U.S. defeat in Vietnam and the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan finally established the code of conduct in Third World crises. With such behavior established, cooperation could begin between the two superpowers in resolving some of these conflicts.

Can the process now be extended to understandings between superpowers about political change in their respective areas of influence? There is no clear reason why the answer should be negative. Either by itself or with other regional powers, no country in Eastern Europe or Central America threatens the security of the Soviet Union or the United States. Only when political change in these areas becomes linked in some way to the foreign-policy designs of either superpower do security considerations come into play. In other words, there is no reason for a Brezhnev Doctrine or a Monroe Doctrine if there is no extra regional power attempting to take advantage of political change in a way that could tilt the global balance.

Some months ago, Henry A. Kissinger was heavily criticized because one of his columns was interpreted to suggest a second Yalta, another great-power effort to arrange the affairs of Europe. A real attempt at condominium would be overreaching and would fail. But there is no reason why the superpowers cannot reassure one another about actions taken as inevitable change takes place in regions of special concern and sensitivity. Thus Moscow and Washington could each:

-- Reaffirm that its principal concern was national security, not the internal order of neighboring states.

-- Reassure neighboring states that it understood its commitments under the U.N. Charter regarding the use of force.

-- Pledge publicly that it would not seek nor accept military facilities or special privileges of any sort in the zone of concern to the other side. (Consistent with that pledge, Moscow could pledge to withdraw military personnel from Cuban soil once Washington had succeeded in establishing normal diplomatic relations with Cuba.)

There may yet be a tragedy in Eastern Europe. But even in that event, the process of Soviet international normalization is not likely to come to a permanent halt. The process begun so long ago will one day resume. As international politics become less ideological, the Soviet Union can relax its grip on Eastern Europe just as the United States can relax its grip on its own region. We should all hope that day comes sooner rather than later.