A Bonanza for Hezbollah : Right Was on Israel’s Side, but Not Reason, in Grabbing Shiite

The Lebanese Hezbollah leader Sheik Abdel Karim Obeid has long been involved in terrorist activities, including the taking of hostages for political purposes.

In a properly functioning country, Obeid would have been arrested by his own government and either tried or extradited to a country whose citizens he had victimized. In Lebanon, however, there is no government, hence, no sovereignty, and no law enforcement, hence, no law. The Israeli abduction of Obeid last week therefore violated no law, international, municipal or moral. Like the abortive American attempt to execute Sheik Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah for his part in the bombings of the U.S. Embassy and Marine headquarters base in 1983, this was a “self-help” operation to neutralize a key figure in a terror apparatus.

However, Israel’s action was self-defeating, which in political terms is as close to foolish to make no difference. The reason is that the abduction of Obeid violated an elementary principle of prudence in dealing with terrorists--namely, to deny them the public attention and diplomatic reward they so ardently desire. And the American reaction to the apparent murder of Lt. Col. William R. Higgins violates precisely the same principle.

It is not yet certain that Higgins was murdered in response to Obeid’s abduction. Since there is no way to authenticate the date of the videotape showing his hanging, it is at least conceivable that Higgins was killed some time ago and that his body was stored away for several months until a convenient pretext to display it emerged. But whatever the case, Israeli decision-makers should have anticipated that the exchange rate of any transaction--violent or otherwise--with Hezbollah would not be favorable.

The Obeid/Higgins incident is clearly a political and public-relations bonanza for Hezbollah. Not only has it renewed its strength among Lebanese Shiites and gained the sympathy of the Arab world, restored the bargaining value of almost 20 Western hostages still held in Lebanon and reduced the likelihood of an early U.S.-Iranian rapprochement, it has also helped undermine U.S.-Israeli relations by getting much of the world to swallow the obscene claim that the murderers are not even responsible for the murder.

In all likelihood, this was exactly what the terrorists expected. At any rate, they have become accustomed to the spectacle of Western societies going through paralyzing displays of collective anguish every time a kidnaping or killing takes place. The immediate response in the United States to the Higgins killing--the ominous bulletins interrupting regular broadcasting schedules, the saturation coverage by all the media, President Bush’s decision to break off a political tour and return to Washington, the dramatic convening of the National Security Council in the dead of night--was characteristic of reactions to many other terrorist incidents, in greater or lesser degree.

This response is understandable and even admirable. But it is also regrettable, because it simply reinforces the terrorists’ belief that they have grabbed their victims’ countries by the jugular and can twist and turn and extort maximum gain--political, financial or both. The leverage for these gains comes from the media and political amplification of private pain and grief--that is, from the inability of the system to refrain from inflating the terrorists’ sense of self-importance and, thus, the frequency of their outrages and the brazenness of their demands. In Israel, the results have included the grotesque 1985 exchange of more than 1,500 terrorists for a few prisoners held by Ahmed Jibril’s Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command; in the United States, the deviant “arms-for-hostages” deal with Iran; in France, former Premier Jacques Chirac’s attempt to buy the last presidential election by ransoming the French hostages in Lebanon.

When editorialists thunder, congressmen and senators vent their outrage at terrorists and express their sympathy for victims and the Administration publicizes its emergency deliberations, meetings and action groups, passions are inflamed but little else is achieved.

And hysteria is no basis for an effective counterterrorism policy. Indeed, ill-considered hyperactivity is usually counterproductive. The collective obsession with hostages almost invariably strengthens the conviction of terrorists that they are on the right track. For though terrorists may be brutal, they are not irrational. Even if blind rage is their initial motive, they persist in their hijacking and killing because the reactions abroad persuade them that they are in possession of a valuable asset.

Rescue operations should be attempted if the risks and prospects of success are reasonable. The same is true of punitive or deterrent strikes, if the target can be identified and collateral damage avoided. But such circumstances rarely obtain, particularly in Lebanon. And without these conditions, the most sensible thing to do is nothing at all.

This is a difficult course to pursue, especially in democratic societies with competitive news media, because it seems callous as well as passive. But by depreciating the market value of hostages, it promises to make them unattractive to hostage-takers. And that is more effective and ultimately more humane than the futile posturing that now prevails. If terrorists can be caught and punished, they should be; if not, they should be ignored.