Nicaragua Terms Meet All U.S. Objectives

The success of the Central American peace plan in ending the U.S. war against Nicaragua represents the triumph of diplomacy and provides a model for resolving the civil war in El Salvador. The agreement signed by all five Central American presidents on Aug. 7 in Tela, Honduras, effectively ends the Reagan Administration’s dream of using a surrogate military force to overthrow the Nicaraguan government and clears the way for the normalization of relations between the two countries.

The genius of the plan crafted by Costa Rican President Oscar Arias Sanchez is the multilateral cover it gave Nicaragua to make concessions on internal affairs that it would not have made in response to a unilateral demand by the United States.

Nicaragua has accepted terms never before imposed on a country that was neither a colony nor occupied by a foreign military force, including internationally monitored elections and electoral rules that hold Nicaragua to standards that few countries in the world can match. The government has guaranteed not to interfere with even the most virulently anti-government newspapers and radio stations.

Moreover, it has granted broad amnesty to its erstwhile enemies and welcomed them to return, with international guarantees for their safety and the promise of aid for their reintegration into the life of the country.

No real concessions were required from the United States, other than its implicit agreement not to use force to overthrow the Nicaraguan government. Although few in the Bush Administration as yet seem able to understand the opportunity being handed them, the terms of the peace plan achieve all of the stated objectives of U.S. policy toward Nicaragua. Rather than nit-picking and complaining, the Bush Administration should be celebrating a major diplomatic victory.

Early on, the Nicaraguan government realized that in order to survive, it had to come to terms with the United States. Although military pressure from the U.S.-backed Contras added urgency to the quest for detente with Washington, it was not the decisive factor. Much more compelling was Nicaragua’s desperate need for international aid to rebuild its devastated economy and the fear that Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev might cut a deal with President Bush that would cut the Sandinistas off at the knees. Becoming a nonaligned socialist state with hostile relations with the United States was no longer an option.

At this point, it seems inevitable that the United States and Nicaragua will come to terms, although the timing is still very much in doubt. Whether it will take months or decades is up to the United States, for the Nicaraguan government is ready to move expeditiously.

Whether out of caution or vindictiveness, many in the Administration and Congress want to continue punishing Nicaragua. The trade embargo, the credit embargo that has blocked aid from international lending agencies and U.S. allies, plus an ongoing program of covert aid to the Contras and the internal opposition continue to destabilize the Nicaraguan government and prolong the suffering of the Nicaraguan people.

Although the Arias peace plan applies not just to Nicaragua, it previously had little impact on conflicts in El Salvador and Guatemala. President Arias has always insisted that the plan must first succeed in Nicaragua before it could be applied elsewhere.

This week’s agreement for the first time specifically addresses the civil war that has killed 70,000 people in El Salvador over the past decade. The agreement calls for a cease-fire, a dialogue between the guerrillas and the government and the reintegration of the guerrillas into the “institutional and democratic life” of El Salvador. For its part, the government of El Salvador promises to “strengthen” its commitment to pluralism and respect for human rights.

The first steps toward peace in El Salvador begin a journey that is likely to take years. In Nicaragua, multilateral negotiations have gone on since January, 1983. Moreover, the differences that separate the two sides in El Salvador seem enormous. The governing Arena party has a justly earned reputation for death-squad violence and extreme right-wing politics, while the guerrillas and their supporters advocate the large-scale redistribution of land and wealth.

The obstacles are enormous. But in addition to the model that the peace plan provides in Nicaragua, another reason to hope for successful negotiations in El Salvador is the new pragmatism displayed by the Bush Administration. If it can shed the ideological straitjacket of the Reagan Administration, it can work with Central American leaders to force both sides to the conference table. Otherwise, the stalemate on El Salvador could last another decade and cost at least another $3.5 billion in U.S taxpayers’ dollars.

While we are still digesting the lessons of Vietnam, it is not too early to consider the lessons of Nicaragua. The most important is the obligation to exhaust diplomacy before resorting to force. The Reagan Administration did its best to block a diplomatic resolution to its conflicts with Nicaragua, in the process turning close allies like Costa Rica into adversaries. We owe a debt of gratitude to our Latin American neighbors, particularly Costa Rica, Mexico and Venezuela, all of whom nurtured the peace process at critical times. Their diplomats turned out to be more effective than our gunboats.