THE ROUGH ROAD OUT OF GRIDLOCK

Good legislation, the adage goes, is a compromise that is mutually repugnant to every one. SCA 1, the complex traffic-congestion-relief and spending-limitation act facing voters in June, would fit that description precisely--except for one thing. It isn’t exactly legislation.

It is a compromise, one met with initial skepticism by several key interests--business, education, developers, legislators and the governor among them.

But once legislation becomes law, it is law--unless, of course, it gets amended. And that’s not so easy. The deal is cut. Game over. Compromise sticks. With SCA 1, that’s not so.

This is a hybrid, $18.5-billion package gingerly pasted together by the governor and legislative leaders last year. It involves part “ballot-box budgeting”--an amendment placed on the ballot by the Legislature to revise upward the state’s spending limits--and part tightly negotiated legislation, including an increase in the state gas tax to fund transportation projects, which would take effect only if voters approve SCA 1.

The result is tinkertoy policy-making: a piecework response to the rigid constraints of the Gann limits, the reluctance of the governor and legislators to risk hard political decisions and an ever-increasing reliance on the public--rather than elected representatives--to make complex economic and political decisions.

It shows what can happen when government allows too many problems to fester too long. It provides textbook examples of the uncertainties of coalition politics and of the impact that powerful special interests--like the California Teachers Assn. (CTA) and the California Building Industry Assn. (CBIA)--can have on state policies.

To begin this lesson in civic obfuscation, some historical perspective is in order. In June, 1988, California voters defeated two attempts to raise the limits on state spending imposed by the 1979 initiative written by the late Paul Gann. Proposition 72 would have restricted use of revenues raised by the sales tax on gasoline to transportation projects, at the expense of other state programs.

Proposition 71, sponsored by State Superintendent of Public Instruction Bill Honig and a coalition of school, government and labor groups, would have adjusted the state spending limit to allow about $700 million more for public programs, with education presumably having the first call.

On that same ballot, voters also narrowly rejected Proposition 74, a proposal spearheaded by Gov. George Deukmejian, which would have provided $1 billion in bonds to finance transportation improvements.

Smarting from defeat, Honig and the teachers qualified Proposition 98, to require that about 40% of the state general-fund budget be spent on public education. The CTA, the state’s largest public employee union, made it “a life-and-death issue.”

Voters approved Proposition 98 in November, 1988, and protecting education’s hard-fought budgetary gains became a crusade for the teachers and their Democratic allies in the Legislature.

But Proposition 98 stuck in Deukmejian’s budgetary and political craw. The teachers, never great allies of California Republicans, now commanded first call on money Deukmejian wanted for such programs as law enforcement and transportation.

As early as August, 1988, Republican legislators proposed putting a gas-tax increase on the ballot. They were about to face voters in areas of increased growth and traffic congestion--including parts of Orange County and the Bay Area suburbs--and there is nothing better than an election to focus the attention of a politician. That opened the gates to compromise.

Little assuaged by education’s gains through Proposition 98, Assembly Speaker Willie Brown (D-San Francisco) and legislative Democrats voiced their opposition early to any measure that would raise spending limits to accommodate transportation without also allowing increased spending for social services. It was a sticking point never wholly resolved--only papered over. Not wanting to leave office as “Governor Gridlock,” Deukmejian made his move during the 1989 budget negotiations. His message to Democratic legislators went something like this:

Sorry. Those ridiculous budget constraints forced on me by the initiative process, like giving the schools 40% off the top, leave less money for other programs--mostly the ones you support.

By the way, if you’re willing to tinker with Proposition 98, and you’ll promise I won’t get stuck with a tax increase, have I got transportation package for you! Can we talk?

And talk they did, governor and Legislature sitting down and reasoning together as they seldom had, in a series of “transportation summits.” Present were not only state policy-makers, but representatives of major interests with a stake in the outcome--developers, educators, business groups, labor unions, environmentalists, local governments, transportation groups, Democrats and Republicans, Northern and Southern Californians. From that diverse coalition, and out of the pressure cooker of last-minute budget horse-trading, came the fragile compromise of SCA 1.

In a Legislature not known for immunity from special-interest demands, opposition from any group could have killed the legislative package--or resulted in another initiative on the ballot. But the bills were signed and sealed. Nearly a year remained, however, before the measures would meet their still-uncertain fate before California voters. That’s a long time for a coalition to hold, as it must for the package to succeed.

That brings us to coalition politics and special-interest clout. Two groups offer object lessons: the California Teachers Assn., major supporters of Democratic campaigns and candidates, and the California Building Industry Assn., a politically powerful developers’ group with campaign ties to incumbents of both parties.

First, it is easier to build and maintain a coalition to achieve a goal than it is to implement a program. That is because implementation is never fair--seldom can everyone’s interests be served.

Second, how successful members of a coalition are in protecting their own interests depends on their strength within the coalition.

CBIA became the first major interest group to formally oppose SCA 1, deciding--after the deal was cut--that congestion-management legislation, by Assemblyman Richard Katz (D-Sylmar), put too great a burden on developers. Said an unyielding Katz, “The developers, figuring they were going to be money for the campaign, felt like they were in a position to leverage the deal.”

But on this issue they were not, because developers’ opposition is perceived as less a threat than opposition from “white hat” environmentalists who object to weakening the law.

The teachers are another matter. As Honig succinctly put it, the ballot portions of the package “are not going to pass unless we decide to vote for them. It’s as simple as that.” And legislators have responded.

During negotiations, CTA questioned whether spending-limit modifications would result in the schools getting less money than they get under Proposition 98. As the euphoria of the compromise faded, concerns mounted.

Third, coalitions are captives of the internal politics within its member groups.

As one player explained: “You have teachers who have gone to bat (for their leadership on Proposition 98) and they still strike in Stockton because they can’t get any more money for salaries . . . . Given the internal rumblings, the leadership can’t suddenly say, ‘Not only did we not win the fight to get the Holy Grail, not only have we not seen it yet, we are now negotiating to give it away.’ So the teachers then backed off.”

Backing off meant risking the deal--which underscores lesson four: Keeping a coalition together requires strong leaders. CTA ally Sen. David Roberti (D-Los Angeles) responded firmly to the teachers’ threats with reason and information. Deukmejian has hung tough with the CTA and with the developers--his longtime political supporters.

The issue of education funding remains unresolved. CTA voted last month to take a “watch” position on SCA 1 until its March meeting--well after Tuesday’s deadline to submit ballot arguments to the secretary of state. Thus the teachers exert pressure on the governor and legislators to spell out language protecting education’s share of the budget.

The risks are great that California will head into 1991 without hope of an adequate transportation system, paralyzed by the spending limit and hamstrung by budget restrictions already choking underfunded state programs. California’s new governor may have a major mess on his or her hands.

Therein lies lesson five: The likely outcome of building with Tinkertoys is a broken Tinkertoy.

The passage of SCA 1 can forestall fiscal chaos, but it won’t prevent it. Only rational long-term planning, unhampered by crazy-quilt budget constraints and sheer political expediency, will do that.

An electorate that demands nothing less from government will have learned the most important lesson of SCA 1.

SCA 1 SPELLS RELIEF

If passed by majority vote, Senate Constitutional Amendment 1 on the June 5 ballot would revise state spending limits under a complex formula reached by compromise between the governor and the Legislature. Contingent upon passage of SCA 1 are a number of Senate and Assembly bills affecting rail and highway transportation, enacting a 9-cents-per-gallon increase in the state gas tax and hiking truck weight fees. Together they make up an $18.5-billion package to fund 11 programs, from road and highway maintenance, repair and rehabilitation to development of intercity, commuter and urban rail systems.