CALIFORNIA CLOUT : Pushing Around the Primary Date Could Put the Wrong Contender in the Presidential Ring

They’re at it again. Every time the Democrats lose a presidential election--which means every four years--the first thing they do is fiddle with the primary rules. “If we could just do something about the nominating process,” Democrats tell each other, “then maybe we could nominate a winner.”

It all started with Hubert H. Humphrey, who won the 1968 Democratic nomination without running in a single primary. Outraged Democrats rewrote the rules, to turn the process over to primary voters and caucus participants. Motivation was simple: “No more Humphreys.”

What they got was George McGovern. So, after the 1972 calamity, they changed the rules to dilute the power of ideological activists: “No more McGoverns.”

Instead they got Jimmy Carter. Democrats realized they had made a terrible mistake. Carter, an outsider, wasn’t a real Democrat. The party was not going to let that happen again so, after the 1980 disaster, another commission was set up.

This time the purpose was to increase the influence of elected officials: “No more Carters.” In 1984, the party Establishment got its way and nominated its favorite--Walter F. Mondale.

Bad mistake. Jesse Jackson and Gary Hart said the process was unfair because it gave insiders too much say. So the party appointed a “fairness commission.” Its mandate? “No more Mondales.”

Finally in 1988, the Democrats nominated someone who offended nobody. By having as little as possible to say about anything, Michael S. Dukakis was acceptable to every major Democratic constituency--liberals, moderates, special interests, elected officials and organized labor.

In fact, Dukakis was acceptable to everyone except voters. But that is a constituency Democrats pay little attention to as they choose a nominee.

After the 1988 debacle, Democrats said they were determined to leave the rules alone. They elected Ron Brown party chairman on a pledge not to fool around with the party’s nominating procedures.

But the temptation proved irresistible. Democrats use rules the way Jewish mothers use chicken soup. It may not do any good, but it’s one thing they know how to do.

So on Feb. 14, the Democratic National Committee agreed to a rules change that would allow California to shift its presidential primary from June 2, 1992--the last day of primary season--to March 3, right after New Hampshire. That way, the party assumes it will get a candidate of national stature able to win votes in the Sun Belt. “No more Dukakises.”

Both houses of the California Legislature have passed bills to change the primary date, and Gov. George Deukmejian has indicated he will support it. The measure is being held up, however, because legislators disagree over whether to move the 1992 primary for state offices.

But everyone agrees that moving up the presidential primary is a good idea. Democrats in Washington favor it because they say it will decide the nomination earlier and allow the party to close ranks behind the winner.

Republicans also favor an early California primary, but for a different reason. They assume California Democrats will nominate a liberal, and that will once again doom the Democratic ticket.

Californians favor the idea because they think it would give their state more say in the nominating process. Presidential politics is fueled by California money, but when it comes to choosing the candidates, California is an afterthought. By the time the campaign gets to the West Coast, it’s over. After all, California voted for Edmund G. (Jerry) Brown Jr., in 1976, Edward M. Kennedy in 1980 and Gary Hart in 1984.

Two questions have to be asked about each argument in favor of an early primary. Is that what will really happen? And if it is, will it be a good thing?

Take the argument that an early California primary will enable a candidate to sew up the nomination quickly. What Democrats forget is that “winner take all” primaries are over. The party decided they weren’t “fair.” So in one rules-writing binge, it outlawed them.

These days, delegates are apportioned according to the primary vote. Which means that if Californians divide their vote among two or three candidates, the race will go on.

But suppose Californians go overwhelmingly for one candidate. Is that necessarily good for the party?

Remember that the Iowa caucuses still come first, then the New Hampshire primary a week later and then California a week after that. The whole process could begin and end within two weeks. Someone could do surprisingly well in Iowa, pull an upset victory in New Hampshire and then wrap up the nomination in California--all before we know much about the candidate.

Hart almost did that in 1984. He surprised everyone by coming in second in Iowa. Then he upset Mondale in New Hampshire. Two weeks later, he won the Florida primary with almost no campaign. He coasted to victory on his momentum. If it had been California instead of Florida, Hart might have sewn up the nomination. And we wouldn’t have known a thing about him.

If the Democrats choose their 1992 nominee quickly, that is no guarantee the party will close ranks behind the candidate. They may spend the next four months crying, “What have we done?”

Democrats believe that only a well-known, well-financed candidate will have a chance in the California primary. That’s supposed to be a plus. Why should we encourage candidates with no national reputation to run for President?

Well, for one thing, because the only candidate the Democrats have managed to elect in recent decades was an unknown from nowhere (Plains, Ga.). These days, Democrats may be easierto elect if the voters don’t know too much.

It is also possible that California will reject well-known candidates in favor of some attractive new face who has just won the New Hampshire primary. California voters are nothing if not trendy, and a week is about the right amount of time for a trend to take root in California.

This means the best way to run in California may be to win the New Hampshire primary. So much for the argument that an early California primary will take attention away from New Hampshire. Money spent in New Hampshire--with 120,000 Democratic primary voters--may be a far better investment than money thrown away in California--with 3 million primary voters.

Remember the Southern regional primary in 1988? Thirteen Southern states voted together on Super Tuesday. That was supposed to take attention away from New Hampshire and nominate a Democrat who could carry the South.

The problem was that the Southern regional primary was too big. Nobody had the money to campaign in 13 states. When the 1988 campaign went South, it really went south--it disappeared. It became a “Tarmac campaign” with candidates bouncing from airport to airport, to get on local news.

Jackson won five states on Super Tuesday. Dukakis used a shrewd marketing strategy to carry the two largest Southern states. By concentrating his effort among Latinos and transplanted Northern liberals, Dukakis won plurality victories in Texas and Florida.

The candidates who got the biggest boost from the Southern regional primary were those two famous Southern moderates--Jackson and Dukakis. And George Bush, who wrapped up the GOP nomination by carrying every Southern state. That is not exactly what the Democrats had in mind when they came up with the idea of a Southern regional primary.

Republicans should keep that in mind as they celebrate the early California primary. California will force the Democrats to nominate a liberal in 1992, just as the Southern regional primary forced the Democrats to nominate a Southern moderate in 1988.

The bottom line is, no matter how you manipulate the rules, nothing will turn out the way you expect. This is called the Law of Unintended Consequences, and it is one of the two immutable laws of presidential politics.

The other is the Law of New Hampshire. It says no matter what you do, New Hampshire will always be more important than anywhere else.

No one has even thought about what an early California primary would mean for the Republicans. Let’s think about it now.

Sooner or later, some enterprising Republican is going to realize there are a lot of pro-choice votes in the GOP. A candidate could run a “send them a message” campaign in 1992. The message would be to change the GOP platform on abortion.

There is no better state to do it in than California, the most pro-choice state in the country. A pro-choice Republican could catch fire in California and embarrass the President, thereby causing a dramatic confrontation at the GOP convention.

So an early California primary might have the effect of disrupting the orderly renomination of Bush. How’s that for an unintended consequence?