PERSPECTIVE ON KOREA : The Summit Was the Undercard : What happened in Washington was unremarkable compared to improved Soviet-South Korean ties.

The Bush-Gorbachev summit produced a large number of bilateral agreements, most of which were of little importance. Key issues dividing the two sides before the summit, especially conventional arms control and the status of Germany, were left unresolved. The announced nuclear verification and chemical-weapons agreements were finalized weeks ago; the trade agreements must be approved by a reluctant U.S. Congress.

What may make this summit memorable, however, is its part in alleviating a perennial source of East-West tension: the long-standing confrontation on the Korean Peninsula. Mikhail Gorbachev’s decision to meet with South Korean President Roh Tae Woo in San Francisco has not only bolstered recent improvements in Soviet-South Korean relations, it also paves the way for formal diplomatic recognition between Seoul and Moscow. That, in turn, may offer hope for a diminution of hostility between North and South Korea.

For the last 40 years, the Korean Peninsula has been one of the most heavily armed and militarized areas in the world. Troops from North and South Korea--the world’s fifth- and sixth-largest military powers, respectively--confront one another across the 38th parallel, poised to go to war at a moment’s notice. The United States contributes more than 40,000 ground and air forces to South Korea’s defense, while the Soviet Union and China maintain defense commitments to the North. Thus, any local conflict would have global implications.

Although large-scale military hostilities between the two Koreas have not occurred since July, 1953, there is always a danger that one of the still-frequent border incidents could escalate to a level of fighting that neither side anticipated. There has been sporadic progress toward establishing a North-South dialogue since the 1988 Seoul Olympics, but at the very least, the continued division of the peninsula will be a source of acute East-West tension at a time when remarkable political changes have reduced or eliminated tensions elsewhere in the world.

A rapprochement between North and South will not come easily or swiftly. It may not come at all while the aging North Korean ruler, Kim Il-Sung, and his son, Kim Jong-Il, remain in power. Kim Il-Sung’s bizarre and despotic reign, which began under Soviet auspices after World War II, has been marked by unremitting hostility toward the South. The offensive posture and vast buildup of the North Korean armed forces, the campaign of subversion, sabotage and infiltration that the North has waged against the South, and the stridency of Kim Il-Sung’s rhetoric all suggest that Pyongyang’s animosity toward Seoul will remain entrenched and that any lasting settlement will have to await North Korea’s own perestroika , including a new top leadership.

Nevertheless, the Soviet Union, as the leading military supplier of North Korea, can play a key part in encouraging a reduction of tensions. The improvements in Soviet-South Korean relations that led to today’s scheduled Roh-Gorbachev meeting should provide Moscow with greater leverage for persuading the North to undertake a serious dialogue with the South.

There is a risk, of course, that Gorbachev’s overtures to South Korea will merely alienate Kim Il-Sung and induce North Korea to embark on an even more aggressive path. Certainly, the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, especially the short and violent revolution in Romania, heighten the sense of desperation in Pyongyang. So, too, has the growing criticism of Kim Il-Sung’s regime in the Soviet press. Last month, a reporter for the Soviet press agency Tass was expelled from North Korea after writing several less-than-flattering articles about life under Kim Il-Sung. Not surprisingly, the announcement of the meeting between Roh and Gorbachev provoked strong criticism in North Korea, including allusions to Moscow’s use of “sinister diplomatic tactics.”

Even so, it is unlikely that the North Koreans can easily reduce their military and political dependence on the Soviet Union. Roughly 80% of North Korea’s weapons come from Moscow. The sophisticated arms that Gorbachev has supplied to Pyongyang--MiG-29 fighters, Su-25 attack aircraft, SA-5 surface-to-air missiles and an advanced military air-control system--cannot be obtained elsewhere. North Korea will also have to rely indefinitely on the Soviet Union for spare parts and servicing of these weapons systems.

Traditionally, when North Korea has wanted to loosen its ties with Moscow, it has turned to China, playing the two communist giants against one another. That option is no longer feasible. The Chinese cannot come close to matching the quality of the advanced weapons that Moscow has recently provided to North Korea. Moreover, China, like the Soviet Union, has a strong economic interest in developing closer ties with South Korea. In recent years, trade between China and South Korea has been growing rapidly and the Chinese would be loath to take any steps that would disrupt the trend.

Consequently, North Korea has no real alternative to maintaining close ties with the Soviet Union. The Soviet-North Korean relationship is now far more important to Pyongyang than it is to Moscow. Soviet interests clearly lie in a steady improvement of political and economic relations with South Korea, which, unlike the North, can provide technology and investment for the ailing Soviet economy. Improved ties with South Korea will also bolster Soviet chances of attracting Japanese investment.

The Soviet Union’s motivations for closer ties with South Korea may be largely economic, but the political benefits from improved relations between Moscow and Seoul will also be great. Initially, North Korean leaders will feel betrayed by and resentful of this turn of events and may lash out in unpredictable ways. But over time, faced with increasing isolation, they will have little choice but to loosen controls at home and pursue a sincere dialogue with the South.

Thus, the relatively minor results from the Washington summit should not obscure the enormous political importance of the Roh-Gorbachev meeting. Most of the American participants at the summit focused their attention on arms control, U.S.-Soviet trade and the future of Germany. But the less-publicized meeting in San Francisco will ultimately do more than all the pomp and ceremony in Washington to benefit the security interests of both East and West.