William Crowe : Veteran of Mideast Crises Reflects on Current Standoff By Gregg Easterbrook

Retired Adm. William J. Crowe Jr., born in 1925 in landlocked La Grange, Ky., was chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1985 to 1989. Crowe served in the Navy for 43 years, his career beginning at the close of World War II and concluding, with the U.S. military under his command, with the 1986 Libya bombing, the Persian Gulf operations during the Iran-Iraq War and the destruction of an Iranian airliner by the U.S. guided-missile cruiser Vincennes.

Crowe was a surprise choice for the joint-chiefs post. His reputation was more of a bookish sort--he holds a Ph.D. in political science from Princeton--than a warrior. He set a trend, though--the current joint-chiefs chairman, Army Gen. Colin L. Powell, holds a master’s in business administration. Crowe’s tenure at the joint chiefs was distinguished by reduction in interservice rivalries, a shortening of chains of command and increased authority for the chairman himself. This was required by the Goldwater-Nichols defense reorganization bill, passed just as Crowe was taking office and, to the delight of Pentagon critics, enthusiastically embraced by Crowe. Crowe was also an active participant in diplomatic efforts to bring top Soviet generals for tours of U.S. military facilities--and vice versa.

Since retiring late last year, Crowe has been a professor at the University of Oklahoma, a member of a Washington think tank--the Center for Strategic and International Studies--and a popular lecture-circuit speaker.

Question: What are the current chances of avoiding fighting in the Persian Gulf?

Answer: There are many possible scenarios, but looking at it rationally, considering that our presence there is increasing every day, the prospects for avoiding hostilities are improving. But you can’t discount the vagaries of the area or the possibility of a misstep--the sorts of accidents that have in the past started unintended wars.

Q: Were you surprised by the sudden announcement of a kiss-and-make-up between Iran and Iraq?

A: I wouldn’t give it the significance some people are. Saddam Hussein has already derived from his Iran campaign most of the benefits he was going to get out of it. Now he’s got bigger things on his mind, and he’s clearly trying to reduce his problems so that he can concentrate on the United States. Iran’s in such bad shape, Hussein is not giving away much of value.

Q: Will it be a lasting peace between those two nations?

A: No, not unless Iraq comes out of this crisis completely deflated.

Q: It’s now being said that the Israelis are out of joint because we are not including them in this operation. Does that seem true to you?

A: If they do feel that way, they’re gravely mistaken. Surely they must understand that with the political imperatives of the Arab World, the United States cannot afford to have Israel associated with this effort. Of course, the Israelis have their own peculiar way of looking at events, and they are insatiable when it comes to anything that generates closer ties to the U.S. They may feel they’re missing a great opportunity--but that has an unreal air about it.

Q: There’s been speculation that if combat begins between the United States and Iraq, the Israeli military would take advantage of the distraction to begin attacking military installations in western Iraq that threaten Israel. Might that happen?

A: I think without coordination with the United States and the other countries involved, it would be a terrible mistake for Israel to blunder into a conflict that might develop.

Q: Just after Hussein took Kuwait, there was a great deal of worry that he would invade Saudi Arabia immediately--before we were in position to do much about it. But he didn’t. What do you read into that?

A: Certainly from a military standpoint, there’s a lot in that. I think even at that early stage it was becoming clear to Hussein that he had seriously miscalculated the political unity he would create in the West, and that he was in for some real political static.

Q: Why has Western reaction been so forceful?

A: To me the most remarkable thing about the whole crisis, which distinguishes it from any other in the postwar period, has been that the that Soviet Union has not been at cross-purposes with the United States. This has thrown the whole business in a new light, giving the President a latitude that no postwar President has ever had in dealing with these sorts of crises.

Though our attention is right now focused on the Middle East, the biggest single factor at play is that so far all this business of improving our relations with the Soviet Union has already paid off handsomely. If this crisis had taken the pattern of the past--with the Soviet Union continuing to support Iraq and supply it with arms--we could not have done what we are now doing.

Q: So in your mind the question of whether the Soviets will join us in some sort of blockade is secondary to the simple fact that they’re not opposing us.

A: Oh, absolutely. Imagine, for example, if Soviet ships were escorting Iraqi merchants vessels through our lines. There would be no way we could have the effect we’re having now. You know, these are not just hollow words Mikhail Gorbachev has been mouthing over the past months--with a real international crisis in progress, he’s put his money where his mouth is, and we should acknowledge that.

Q: Why aren’t the Soviets helping Iraq? Do they really now see their national interests more aligned with the West than opposed? That would be a historic shift.

A: It’s my sincere belief Gorbachev genuinely is trying to forge a non-confrontational foreign policy, so to back the aggressor in this crisis would give the lie to that image. And he’s consumed by internal problems. You notice that suddenly the Soviet Bloc, which has mesmerized us for months and months, has suddenly dropped out of the front section of your newspaper. One plus for President Gorbachev is that the gulf crisis is giving him some time to address his internal problems outside the international spotlight.

Q: About a week ago you said that if Hussein invaded Saudi Arabia, our forces would slow him down but not be able to stop him. Has that changed ?

A: Oh yes. The balance of forces has not only changed, but shifts more in our direction with each passing day.

Q: That tends to suggest the situation will evolve into a lengthy stalemate.

A: Might very well. I was on “Good Morning America” today with Gary Sick (a Middle East expert), and he painted a very gloomy picture of our ability to maintain a physical presence very long in Saudi Arabia. His concern was national resolve in the face of irritating problems: that being there will cost of a lot of money, that having a large number of troops in a harsh climate will be upsetting, that troops will be complaining--which they always do. I have a lot more faith in our forces than that.

The problem with this kind of reasoning is that it springs from the Vietnam analogy. But remember, in Vietnam we were at war. Americans were being killed every day. I just cannot believe that if our presence in the Middle East enables us to avoid war, that will be so discombobulating to the American public that we won’t be able to remain. If we let boredom overcome us at the risk of war, that’s a terrible indictment of the U.S.

Q: What if the gulf presence becomes a war?

A: Well, if there’s war, and your casualty lists are growing every day, there may be a great difference in the way the American public reacts. But so long as the American presence in the Middle East avoids war, I would think we can have a lot of patience.

Q: Will there be political pressure for U.S. forces to invade Kuwait and try to bring the matter to a swift conclusion?

A: We’re starting to hear that already. That really bothers me. I would hope that we make our decisions on sounder grounds than: “We’re there, let’s do something.”

Q: A stalemate could last months, or years.

A: But a peaceful stalemate is in our favor. If the American people are going to be staunch on the first day, they have to be staunch a year later, or two or five, too. But I don’t think it will last years. If the embargo remains in place, I just don’t see how Iraq can manage that long. Though, almost inevitably, when this kind of thing starts, the original estimates of how long it will take or how quickly the other side will break are always too optimistic.

Q: Iraq’s military is being depicted in the media as a ferocious power. Yet it just fought Iran, a disorganized and ill-equipped state, for nearly a decade and achieved next to nothing. How does the Iraqi army rate?

A: I don’t think they’ve yet faced a first-rate opponent. They enjoy the advantage of troops that have been in combat--which is a big plus. But I don’t think their performance in the Iran War was particularly distinguishing. They weren’t very aggressive and showed few original tactics. The main success they had was hunkering down and using their artillery to decimate poorly trained Iranian troops attacking in an irrational fashion. The Iraqis may turn out to be fighting for their homeland, which always provides high motivation. But I don’t think we’ve seen any evidence they are especially good soldiers.

Q: If Iraq tries to run our blockade, will w e simply sink their ships?

A: Maybe. But we’ve confronted this problem a number of times, starting with the Cuban blockade, and found there are things you can do to stop ships without sinking them--if they’re not warships. Usually, merchant ships stop when challenged. But you know the way to run a blockade is to do it undetected. And in the confines of the gulf that will be very difficult.

Q: Suppose Hussein takes his American hostages or restrictees or whatever euphemism is used and distributes them to his military installations, blockade-running ships and so on--so that if we fire on his forces, we will kill Americans. What will we do then?

A: I had not heard that scenario. The best I can think of is that Hussein would subject himself to universal condemnation if he did such a thing. I’m not so sure he’s got enough Americans to do the kind of thing you’re suggesting.

Q: You think Hussein is sensitive to international censure?

A: You know we keep psychological profiles of leaders all over the world, to predict what they will do--and we’ve been notoriously unsuccessful with it. But I think he is more logical and sensible than he’s getting credit for in the press. Not to say he isn’t ruthless. But he’s already taking some sensible diplomatic steps. You know Hussein didn’t enjoy telling Iran he would accept their peace terms. But he’s made some rational calculations and done what he had to do. Hussein is not a man without mental resources.

Q: There’s been considerable talk about possible use of chemical weapons by Iraq. Have we taken our chemical weapons to the area as a deterrent?

A: There’s a great deal of emotionalism that swirls around this subject. Strictly as a weapon of war, chemicals are by no means the most inhuman weapon we have. Artillery fire, for instance, spreads the victim’s body all over the landscape. It’s horrible. Incidentally, casualty figures for gas use in war when people have been prepared for it have been relatively small. And if you’re prepared for gas, as we are, you can treat and neutralize some of its effects. It’s not necessarily fatal.

Q: Then why does gas seem so especially gruesome to the public?

A: This stems from World War I, when people returned home maimed by chemicals and were there as visible evidence of the ravages of gas--instead of, say, being blown to shreds by an artillery shell and no longer around for anyone to observe. I’ll tell you, if Hussein thinks the United States is aroused now, wait till he uses gas. He will be risking retaliation of a very, very high order.

Q: If there is a long-term stalemate, how will we manage so many Americans in the middle of the desert--maintaining troop readiness and morale?

A: I lived in the Middle East for a year, in Bahrain, and can tell you that, curiously enough, about eight months of the year the weather is very nice there. I played tennis there all year long. I never saw anybody not do anything because it was hot--you just complained a lot.

There’s been a lot of fighting done in the world in deserts, some of it by us inNorth Africa in World War II. We’ll deal with desert stress in the traditional way, by rotating troops. Incidentally, we fought in a more frustrating environment--wet heat, in Vietnam. But the U.S. military is pretty good at taking comforts with it. It would be amazing to think we could train troops to survive under fire but not to withstand peaceful waiting around simply because the climate was unfavorable.

Q: Warships of many nations are now converging on the gulf. Will this operation shake out as U.N.-coordinated, NATO-directed, multilateral or what?

A: I can’t say. With the internal politics of 30 or even 40 nations involved, it could be some time before we know. But I will say that after the coordination with the Russians, the next best thing that’s happened in this crisis is the unusual consensus of our formal allies. Given NATO’s track record, President Bush has done an extraordinary job of bringing Western leaders together.

Q: Why is European support so strong? I think back to the Libya bombing of 1986, when U.S. planes had to fly that crazy, circuitous route around France. Why is this year’s reaction so different?

A: Simply because the European powers don’t have to deal with Russia in their calculations . . . .

Q: Any other reasons?

A: There was considerable revulsion to the idea of a country simply overrunning its neighbor. But everybody in the West is also now rather more sophisticated in their understanding of the role of oil in the world economy. And perhaps with the passage of time we are building new kinds of democratic leaders.

Q: Not in Kuwait. The Kuwaiti government we are leaping to defend is hardly a form the Western World endorses.

A: That to me is the most interesting overlooked aspect of the whole business. I grew up to believe the United States was opposed to the idea of absolute monarchies. This is a tremendous dilemma for us. But remember that, with maturity and affluence, the U.S. has become a status-quo power.

Q: What is our greatest national interest here? Oil? Protection of the oppressed? Assertion of our role as a superpower?

A: I think it’s oil. It’s nice to frame this in high principle, and that’s very effective in the United States. We as a nation are swayed by principle and ideals, and that is good. But oil is the major issue here.

Q: Let’s shift off the gulf to the defense budget. You’ve said that the Defense Department has a “vested interest” in taking a gloomy view of the world. The gulf aside, doesn’t that have to change?

A: The Pentagon is acknowledging that the world is changing. Their learning curve may be more gradual than others would like, but they can’t ignore the obvious about world events. They will use the current crisis to slow change down. But they’re back in the real world.

Q: Are major strategic systems like nuclear carrier battle groups going to be cut?

A: Of course. There are domestic problems plaguing the United States that must be addressed, and that means defense spending is going to have to suffer. But the health of the country demands it. Our future demands it. One of the terrible things about the gulf crisis is that it focuses our attention on foreign affairs. But right now the most pressing problems facing this country are domestic--our infrastructure, our economy, our ability to lead the world in technology, the environment, drugs and, more important and basic than any of them, our education problems. In this sense, the reduction in military threat has come at a very good time, because as a nation we’ve got to turn our energy to domestic issues.