An Arab Point of Light That Bush Should Nurture

I met President Saddam Hussein in late August, 1979, at the Ninth Non-Aligned Heads of States conference in Havana. I was a political adviser to the Iranian delegation. It was during that meeting that representatives of revolutionary Iran first encountered the Iraqi leader.

Although the talks were largely useless, they provided some glimpses into the nature of Hussein’s personality and leadership. Twice in the course of the two-hour discussion, he lifted a cigar from his breast pocket. Instantly, his two interpreters, each flashing a fancy cigarette lighter, jumped to their feet and vied to be the one who lit the president’s cigar. At another time, I noticed two Iraqis walking backward and sideways when they left and returned to the room--in an effort to avoid turning their backs to the exalted leader. Throughout, Hussein appeared disdainful of the Iranian delegation’s uninhibited mode of expression.

Saddam Hussein is a modern dictator, par excellence. The country he rules is aptly described as the “Republic of Fear.” The delusion of grandeur that sent Iraqi soldiers into Kuwait again highlights the primary and lasting cause of the state violence that plagues the Middle East and threatens world order: dictatorship.

Since World War II, not a single Arab head of state in the Middle East has retired or limited his tenure to a fixed term. They have either died in office, been assassinated or deposed. The pro-Western dictators rationalized their repressive rule by invoking the communist threat, and Washington was all-too willing to assist them with training and equipment. Radical nationalist despots justified their brutality in the name of fighting imperialism or Zionism.

Now that the Cold War is over, the United States cannot credibly continue its support of Arab dictatorships under the guise of protecting them against Soviet intrusion. Moscow’s unambiguous condemnation of Hussein’s aggression should convince remaining skeptics that obstacles to peace and civility in the Middle East lie not beyond the region’s border but within its atavistic political systems.

U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East has been devoid of any concern for the general lack of democracy there. In the post-Cold War era, such concern need not contradict legitimate U.S. interests in the region. In fact, it may well be the least costly way of safeguarding those interests.

In Eastern Europe, Latin America, Asia and Africa, a preference for political pluralism is, in various degrees, an element of U.S. diplomacy and trade policy. With American lives on the line in the Arabian sand, U.S. policy-makers must abandon their static view of the region’s politics and political cultures. The tribal roots of Arab dictatorship make the road to democracy more difficult than some other parts of the Third World, but the region’s natural resources could enable its peoples to overcome the material impediments to democratic behavior with more speed than many other societies.

Washington frequently makes observance of human rights a condition of doing trade or aid business with it. It has never done so in the Middle East. But why shouldn’t the Saudi government permit its citizens to monitor its tolerance for human rights in exchange for U.S. arms? Why shouldn’t the sale of grain or communication technologies to Iraq be tied to the regime’s treatment of its Kurdish minority? The grievances of secularists in Saudi Arabia, and of Kurds in Iraq, are at least as serious and legitimate as those of the anti-communists in China or Jews in pre-Gorbachev Russia.

Every year the State Department publishes the details of extreme and pervasive human-rights violations in the states of the Middle East, and the White House responds as if the information were from another planet. The pro-democracy forces of many Third World dictatorships have their defenders in the U.S. Congress--but not a single Arab country is among them. If the United States goes to war with Iraq, it would be the first time that American soldiers would die on foreign soil without the honor of dying for democractic ideals.

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait presents the United States with a historic opportunity to include a pro-democracy objective in its Middle East policy. Doing this would not require a sudden change of direction or abandonment of allies. Forces for democracy, to be sure, have to emerge from within society. But Washington can foster them by encouraging the growth of a political culture that protects dissident voices.

This approach would help to blunt the appeal of Hussein’s demogogic tactic of emphasizing the double standards in U.S. foreign policy. It would also head off his attempts to project a Robin Hood image of himself, which can resonate with the Arab masses. Hussein is probably the most brutish of Arab leaders, but his rule is no less legitimate for being so. His expansionist drive can be readily comprehended if we remember that nothing produces more hubris in the mind of a dictator than success.

Thus, while Iraq’s aggression must be rolled back, restoring the Sabah dynasty to power in Kuwait can hardly make the American people feel proud. Siding with a tribal family who arrogated to itself an eternal right to rule and exploit a country’s oil reserves as its private property is not exactly an envious position for a nation that takes pride in championing democracy throughout the world. The U.S. military buildup in the Persian Gulf ought to have a more worthy purpose than safeguarding a “lifestyle.” A stated preference for democracy can be this purpose.

Hussein’s despotism should be countered by its antidote. Internationally supervised elections have been held in Namibia, Nicaragua, Cambodia and Afghanistan. Why not in Kuwait? It would be difficult to reach such an agreement but not impossible.

His rhetoric aside, Hussein does not relentlessly adhere to any dogma. While at war with Iran, he portrayed himself as the protector of the gulf sheikdoms’ sovereignty. Today, he wants to terminate their autonomy and special status. For 10 years, he ridiculed Khomeini’s preachings and claimed to be the defender of secular politics against Islamic fundamentalism. Today, he calls for a holy war.

He is not oblivious to means and ends. He is both high-risk gambler and ruthless realist. He simply wants to expand his domain as the all-powerful leader, but he is unscrupulously flexible in choosing his means of reversing his course, particularly when the survival of his regime is at stake. In short, Hussein can be forced to retreat sooner than it is generally believed.

War between the United States and Iraq will aggravate our Middle East problems and intensify the fragmentation and repressiveness of Arab states. Only a movement toward democratization can ease the dilemmas and frustrations that underly the spread of violence and adventurism in the region.