PACIFIC PERSPECTIVE : Opening to New East Asian World : The Cold War ended and erased in the process the scheme of regional relations. A unified Korea could be the key to a cohesive new framework.

The Cold War ended with the dismantling of Soviet military-political alliances. In its wake, America’s network of alliance systems worldwide has also begun to unravel. While the end of the Cold War can only be welcomed, the post-Cold War era has not yet fully begun. Even in Europe where a new structure of security is being built upon the foundations provided by the Helsinki process, concerns remain about the durability of the new order. If questions about stability still remain in Europe, then such questions apply even more broadly to East Asia, the next region in line to undergo the transition out of the Cold War.

In fact, the heat of superpower confrontation in East Asia has already diminished to a considerable extent, which in turn will inevitably lead to a fundamental restructuring of existing arrangements. We already see the first manifestations of this process in the improvement of Soviet and American relations with former adversaries in the region. Moscow has normalized relations with Beijing and will soon do the same with Seoul, and in time, with Tokyo. The United States has started a dialogue with Vietnam and is ready to see a resolution to the conflict in Cambodia.

The two superpowers also face the daunting task for redefining their alliance relations in the region. Moscow has reduced its presence in Vietnam, and now confronts the need to fundamentally reorder its relationship with North Korea. Washington must also contemplate a new set of relations with its regional allies such as Japan, South Korea and the Philippines.

On the whole, the unfolding dynamic in East Asia is a healthy one. However, there is at the moment no alternative framework capable of providing new sources of cohesion among the various countries within it. Without such a framework, continued erosion of the present system can create new sources of tension, even as it removes Cold War-inspired ones. For example, a Soviet-Japanese resolution of the Northern Territories (Kuril Islands) issue will remove the basis for the U.S. military presence in Japan, and thereby undermine one of the central pillars upon which postwar Tokyo-Washington relations have been built. Inevitably, other dimensions of the bilateral relationship between these two countries will also be affected.

Similarly, if North-South Korean talks proceed smoothly, calls for removal of U.S. troops from Korea will also grow. Uncertainties arising from erosion of U.S.-led alliances, however, pale in comparison to the unpredictability inherent in any comprehensive change of Soviet regional policy. For example, reduced Soviet support could lead the North Koreans to initiate reforms of their own or, by raising their frustration to extreme levels, trigger vengeful and destructive actions.

If the postwar military alliance net works that the United States and the Soviet Union forged with various East Asian states become increasingly less relevant, what sort of post-Cold War arrangement can we envision that would ensure both cohesion and continued progress for the region? Who is to provide leadership in creating a post-Cold War order in East Asia? Conventional wisdom has long held that a multilateral arrangement for regional security and cooperation is not feasible. This line of reasoning, however, resulted from the fact that no agreement could be expected among the powers so long as Cold War tensions remained. In such a confrontational environment, moreover, no state could be accorded legitimacy to initiate steps toward building such a framework.

Thus, questions remain about future structure and leadership for the region. The United States may wish to hold onto its pre-eminent regional position, but its growing reluctance to underwrite the costs of leadership suggests that it cannot retain its current position over the longer term. Japan clearly possesses the economic and financial wherewithal sure to be required for such leadership. Unfortunately, few in the region would like to see an increase in Japan’s political clout alongside its already preponderant economic role. The Soviet Union is clearly in no position to assume leadership. China certainly is not up to the task, either.

Some have been tempted to argue for a condominium of sorts between the United States and Japan, with the former providing the larger balance of political leadership while the latter takes a relatively bigger role in economic matters.

Such thinking, however, is seriously deficient. Neither Beijing nor Moscow is likely to view the emergence of such an arrangement favorably. It is not clear that other countries in the region would fully welcome it, either. Also, such thinking seeks to preserve the status quo at a time when farsighted policies are needed.

Taking all this into account, let’s consider the international role for a unified, democratic and economically strong Korea. There are several reasons why this new nation could have the necessary legitimacy to initiate steps toward the creation of a post-Cold War multilateral arrangement.

In marked contrast to the other powers in the region, Korea does not have a history of external aggression or interference. A unified Korea would still be in no position to seek dominance in Asia. Also, having long endured the consequences of superpower machinations, Korea would have a genuine interest in seeing a stable arrangement worked out that will balance the interests of the big as well as the smaller states in the region. Finally, though it will be in no position to have hegemonic ambitions, a unified Korea will not be an insignificant regional power. With a combined population of 64 million, enhanced economic and political power and cultural affinity with most of the actors in the region, Korea’s voice would be respected but not feared.

It is clear that Korea, divided as a result of confrontation between the major powers, cannot be united without mutual cooperation. In turn, this Korean state will be in a unique position and have a vital interest in ensuring that the momentum created by unification leads to a broader effort toward the creation of a regional, multilateral framework.

Such a future is possible but not inevitable. Several developments could undermine it. A resumption of hostile conflict between the two Koreas would end all prospects for unification. Another negative outcome could result from the superpowers’ attempt to use the reunification process for short-term gains. For instance, if Moscow sought to use Korea as a lever against Japan, or if the United States sought to prolong division in order to retain the basis for its military presence in the region, then neither unification nor a regionwide framework is likely.

At a minimum the major powers must recognize and work to prevent the outbreak of armed hostilities on the peninsula. Even more important, they must not perceive the end of division in Korea as merely the removal of one hot spot among many in the world. They must see Korea’s unification as a key to opening the way to the creation of a new order in East Asia.