PERSPECTIVE ON THE GULF CRISIS : If We Start a War, Can We Stop It? : Invasion of Iraq would have myriad far-reaching repercussions with only one certainty: We’d be largely on our own.

Given the possibility that the United States might be plunged by a presidential decision into a war with Iraq, I urge (the Senate Foreign Relations Committee) to examine carefully and press the Administration for answers regarding the following three clusters of critically important issues:

1) What are the political limits and the likely geopolitical dynamics of war, once the President decides to initiate it?

For example, one has to be concerned that the use of air power in order to mitigate casualties for U.S. ground forces will require the killing not only of the hostages but also of thousands--perhaps tens of thousands or even more--of Iraqi civilians, who are not to be held responsible for Saddam Hussein’s flagrant misconduct. I wonder if this is politically viable, in terms of the longer-range relationship of America with the Muslim world. And is it morally admissible?

It is also not clear to me how the Administration envisages the termination of the war. Are we counting on a total surrender or a negotiated outcome after a spasm of violence? If a complete military victory becomes necessary, are we prepared to occupy all of Iraq? Are we logistically prepared for a war that is not promptly resolved by air power, and are we psychologically prepared for heavy American casualties?

Once war begins, Iran and Syria may not remain passive and the war could spread. One has to anticipate the possibility that Iraq will seek to draw Israel into the war. Does the Administration have a contingency plan in the event that Jordan becomes a battlefield? What might be the U.S. reaction if some Israeli leaders seek to take advantage of an expanded war to effect the expulsion of all Palestinians from their homes on the West Bank? The gulf crisis and the Arab-Israeli conflict could thus become linked, our efforts to the contrary notwithstanding.

I believe the Administration is paying insufficient attention to these inherent uncertainties of war. The war could prove more destructive, more bloody, and more difficult to terminate than Administration spokesmen and sundry private advocates of war seem to think. An American military invasion of Iraq would be likely to set off a chain reaction that could bog America down in a variety of prolonged security operations, in a setting of intensified political instability.

2) What are the likely broader after-effects of the war?

The Administration is yet to move beyond vague generalities regarding its concept of the postwar Middle East. Yet considerable anxiety is justified that the United States might not be able to extricate itself from the Middle Eastern caldron, especially if in the meantime the Arab masses have become radicalized and hostile to the Arab regimes that endorsed the U.S. military action.

With the United States embroiled in the Middle Eastern mess for years to come, Europe and Japan--free to promote their own agendas--would pursue enhancement of their economic power.

It is probable that fundamentalist Iran would become the dominant power in the Persian Gulf, and that terrorist Syria would inherit the mantle of leadership among the Arabs. It is also possible that the destruction of Iraq by America and the resulting radicalization of the Arabs might leave Israel, armed as it already is with nuclear weapons, more tempted to use its military force to impose its will in this volatile region.

None of the above possible developments would be in the American interest. Yet I do not sense that sufficient strategic planning has been devoted by the Administration to an analysis of the wider shock effects of a war that is bound to be exploited by other parties for their own selfish ends.

3) Finally, what is being done to ensure that the war’s burdens and sacrifices are more fairly distributed among its potential beneficiaries or participants?

One cannot help but be struck by the relatively limited contributions of our allies. Some states with forces in Saudi Arabia have indicated that they will not participate in offensive operations. The American public certainly is not satisfied with the financial support extended by Germany and Japan. Is the Adminisitration satisfied? What additional financial contribution can be expected from the Saudis and the Kuwaitis? It is noteworthy that Saudi Arabia has already benefited very substantially from the oil crisis, and that the emir of Kuwait and his family are in the forefront of those arguing for Americans to initiate military action. Are we thus--despite all of our rhetoric about “the new international order”--not running the risk of becoming the mercenaries in this war, applauded and financed by others to do the fighting and the dying for them?

I believe that it is already evident that the principle sacrifices of war--both financial and in blood--will have to be borne by America, and to a massively disproportionate degree. Such evident unfairness will inevitably have a very adverse impact on American attitudes toward its allies, with deleterious consequences for American public support for the so-called international order.

Therefore, in my view, neither an American war to liberate Kuwait nor a preventive war to destroy Iraq’s power is urgently required, be it in terms of the American national interest or of the imperatives of world order. President Bush’s initial commitment to punish Iraq and to deter it remains the wisest course, and one that this nation can resolutely and in unity sustain over the long haul.

By any rational calculus, the trade-offs between the discomforts of patience and the costs of war favor patience. Both time and power are in our favor, and we do not need to be driven by artificial deadlines, deceptive arguments, or irrational emotion into an unnecessary war.