How Many Bodies in Mideast War?

How many American soldiers are likely to die if a ground war breaks out in the Middle East?

1,200?

20,000?

32,000?

48,000?

In fact, each of those figures has been presented as a reasonable estimate of American casualties in a one-month ground war in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

But if you haven’t heard those figures, you’re not alone. According to an article in the December Washington Monthly, the American media have been remiss--at least until recently--in asking basic questions about Operation Desert Shield, such as, “How many Americans are likely to be killed?” and, “How many American deaths are justified in stopping Saddam Hussein?”

This apparent phobia about figures dates back to the moment Hussein invaded Kuwait, Washington Monthly editor James Bennet writes in “How They Missed That Story.”

Back in the first days of the crisis, the notion of sending any troops, let alone the more than 400,000 now predicted to be deployed in the Mideast by year’s end, seemed virtually unthinkable. In fact, the four news outlets the monthly has tracked since the invasion--ABC’s “Nightline,” with Ted Koppel, the Washington Post, the New York Times and the Los Angeles Times--all quoted sources who dismissed out-of-hand the idea of deploying American troops to fight a ground war.

As rumors of possible troop deployment began to leak, rising from an initial ceiling of 50,000 to 100,000 to 250,000, the press continued to print official denials, Bennet reports.

On Aug. 10, the New York Times quoted “one of the handful of a senior policy planners in the administration,” who called the last figure “preposterous.”

An Aug. 11 editorial in the Los Angeles Times--the monthly gives this paper better marks than the other media surveyed, but is nevertheless critical of The Times’ coverage of potential casualties--called the suggestion of 250,000 troops being sent to Saudi Arabia “mind-boggling.” The Times editorial predicted: “Hundreds of Thousands of American fighting men are not going to be put into the ferociously hostile environment of Saudi Arabia.”

Of course, the deployment did occur. But, according to Bennet, the same media that had at first reported why economic sanctions alone, or a naval blockade, or at most a massive air strike were the best options for resolving the crisis, failed to seriously question the wisdom of the rapidly escalating troop buildup. Nor did they adequately discuss potential casualties.

For instance, a Brookings Institution analyst presented on Sept. 5 a model suggesting that American and Saudi forces would suffer 32,000 to 48,000 casualties in a war lasting just one month, but only the Los Angeles Times reported it--and then on page 6.

John Mueller, the author of “War, Presidents, and Public Opinion,” is quoted in the monthly piece as saying that support for Presidents eroded as casualties mounted in Korea and Vietnam. If 20,000 soldiers were killed in the Middle East, it would be “catastrophic,” he says. “That would be vastly more than were suffered in Korea in the first year. . . . I can even imagine impeachment.”

Yet, Bennet points out, even now no pollster has asked the blunt question: “Is it worth 20,000 to 30,000 casualties to get Hussein?”

As testimony on Capitol Hill increases, more publications are focusing on Bush’s policies in the Middle East.

In its Dec. 10 cover story, Time attempts to paint a picture of “What War Would Be Like.” But even at this late date, the weekly seems reluctant to discuss the potential body count.

In the main essay, oddly titled “If War Begins,” the magazine states that in the first days of war, “100 or more lost U.S. aircraft would be a fair estimate.” It also quotes analysts who “figure the U.S. must anticipate the destruction of 100 to 200 tanks, each with a four-man crew and an equal number of Bradley Fighting vehicles, each carrying a dozen solders.”

But it isn’t until the penultimate paragraph that an actual estimate of U.S. casualties is quoted: 1,200 to 3,000 dead and 7,000 to 16,000 wounded in the first 10 days of fighting. And that figure, from a retired colonel, seems optimistic, given that in the previous paragraph British officers say they would expect to lose 2,000 soldiers from their relatively tiny force of 25,000.

Media reluctance to focus on this gruesome topic may be spurred by fears of being labeled unpatriotic. In another Time article in the package, for example, special correspondent Michael Kramer writes: “ . . . Baghdad undoubtedly took further comfort from the parade of skeptics counseling delay before (Georgia Sen.) Sam Nunn’s Senate Armed Services Committee last week.”

But patriotism and quiescence do not necessarily go hand-in-hand. The problem, as Bennet sees it, is not so much in President Bush’s policy per se, but rather in the suspect manner in which the decisions about the crisis have been made and presented to the American people.

“You don’t have to oppose the American troop deployment in the Middle East to worry about the singular absence of public debate--in the House and Senate, in the major papers, on TV--during those first few weeks,” Bennet writes. “You just have to believe that good debate makes good policy.”

REQUIRED READING

The human inhabitants of Botswana’s Kalahari desert call that vast expanse “the great thirstland.” For an animals’ eye perspective of this magnificent turf, turn to photographer Frans Lanting’s work in the December National Geographic. Some of his images--the bullfrog staring out from a huge rainwater pond, the drinking impalas--are charming. Some--the skinned Zebra, the snacking crocodiles and lions--are gruesome. But they are all captivating.