How a Vain Little Man Saved England : TRAFALGAR Countdown to Battle, 1803-1805 <i> By Alan Schom (Atheneum: $24.96; 421 pp., illustrated) </i>

Of perhaps only one man can it be truly said: He saved England. Yet Horatio, Lord Nelson, the vain little man whose statue stands atop a tall pillar in London’s Trafalgar Square, is deserving of that accolade, for with inferior numbers of men, ships and guns, he crushingly defeated in a single great battle the combined fleets of France and Spain, and in so doing he saved Britain from a near-certain invasion by Napoleon’s armies.

The Battle of Trafalgar (Oct. 21, 1805), was indeed the “greatest British naval victory in history.” Although often treated as an isolated naval engagement, it actually was the culmination of the British Royal Navy’s 29-month campaign to thwart Napoleon’s elaborate invasion plans.

Schom, drawing upon both French and British sources, has here placed the battle in its proper historical perspective. In the process, he has given full credit to Adm. Sir William Cornwallis (younger brother of the general who surrendered to Washington at Yorktown), a modest man who deserved, but failed to receive, as much credit as did the honors-avid Nelson for the ruination of Napoleon’s schemes.

Previous historians have overlooked or disparaged the enormous achievements of this exceptional officer, but it was Cornwallis, the “unobtrusive hero,” who commanded the Channel Fleet, and it was through his mastery of naval strategies that Britain was able to control the English Channel for more than two years before the Battle of Trafalgar.

In all seasons, Cornwallis’ ships successfully blockaded the French and then the Spanish ports as well. Not only were the French and Spanish fleets rendered otiose, but Napoleon’s great armada of 2,343 transports, built at enormous expense to carry 167,500 men across the English Channel, was forced to lay idle and useless in its ports.

It was Cornwallis who created and sent to do battle with the “Combined Fleet” of France and Spain the British fleet commanded by the “more flamboyant and charismatic Nelson.” Never recognized nor rewarded for his singular achievements, Cornwallis was, in fact, relieved of his command soon after Trafalgar, and put permanently ashore.

Schom also gives full credit to William Pitt, who became prime minister in May, 1804, for it was he who raised a mighty army to fight on the beaches should the French invade and, more important, reinvigorated a Royal Navy that had become run-down and demoralized by neglect.

Of particular interest is the author’s full account of the French side of the naval campaign: the unique problems they faced and the extraordinary personalities involved. Foremost, of course, was Napoleon, declared emperor on May 18, 1804.

To say that Napoleon was a difficult man to serve under would be a monumental understatement. He never understood naval affairs and he was given to towering rages when his admirals refused to obey his commands or were incapable of following them. His orders, sometimes capricious, frequently changed too quickly to be carried through. He devised no fewer than seven separate plans for the invasion of England; none was executed.

It must be admitted that the behavior of some of the French admirals, particularly that of the aristocratic Vice Adm. Pierre-Charles Silvestre de Villeneuve, would have driven even a mild-tempered leader to distraction. Villeneuve, full of excuses for not sailing when ordered, deliberately disobeyed Napoleon’s direct orders. Even with superior ships in superior numbers, he lacked confidence in his ability to defeat the British, and when he finally did put to sea from Cadiz it was only because he had learned that his replacement was on the way. In the battle off Cape Trafalgar that followed, his orders were so erratic that he baffled not only his own admirals and captains but Nelson as well.

Schom, a former professor of European and French history, has the rare ability to describe naval affairs and naval battles in words readily understood by landlubbers. He also obligingly spares the reader the burden of translating French quotations. Aided by some simple and excellent drawings, his descriptions of the several individual battles which compose the tumultuous battle of Trafalgar are superb. This was no easy task, for not only were the movements of the ships often complex but, to add to the confusion, engaged in the battle were both French and British ships named Surefire, and both a British and a French ship namedNeptune and a Spanish Neptuno. Both Nelson and Villeneuve had said that they wanted a “pell-mell battle,” and the bloody conflict that ensued certainly was that. The “Combined Fleet” of 33 ships--six more ships of the line than Nelson could command--carried 2,568 guns compared Britain’s 2,148; the French and Spanish ships were manned by nearly 30,000 men, while Nelson had but 17,000. The men on both sides fought valiantly, but the British had the advantage of more experienced sailors and more capable commanders. In the end, French naval power was utterly destroyed and Napoleon’s dreams of the conquest of Britain dissolved.

British casualties at Trafalgar were 1,690, of whom 448 were killed--including Nelson, of course, and two captains. Spanish and French casualties were 6,953, of whom 1,038 Spanish sailors and 3,370 French sailors were killed. Fourteen of the Spanish admirals and captains and seven of the French were killed or wounded.

Interestingly, Schom does not tell us Nelson’s last words, spoken to his flag captain (“Kiss me, Hardy”), assuming, one supposes, that they are known to all, even to Americans.

Deftly drawn biographies bring to life the principal actors in the great drama: the admirals, captains, politicians and generals. Lesser but interesting characters also enter the stage.

Napoleon was besieged by inventors with new weapons and ingenious devices. Among them was Robert Fulton. More interested in his invention than in the outcome of the war, he tried to interest both British and French in his submarine without success, even though he proved to them that his submersible craft worked and that it could launch torpedoes. Among the amateur strategists who sought to advise Napoleon was one enthusiast who proposed attacking England simultaneously by way of a tunnel, an invasion of ships and an armada of hot-air balloons.

If any fault can be found, it is in the author’s fondness for exclamation marks and italics, a minor quibble for such a thoroughly researched and splendidly written book.