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NEWS ANALYSIS : Vietnam and the Gulf: As Different as Jungle, Desert : Perspective: A war against Saddam Hussein is winnable. The one against Ho Chi Minh was not.

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TIMES STAFF WRITER

The specter of Vietnam hangs over the Persian Gulf like a recurring nightmare. It has shaped the way the United States would fight a war against Iraq, how the press would cover it, what the troops worry about in their moments of doubt.

Even though few men here below the grade of lieutenant colonel or sergeant 1st class are old enough to have fought in Vietnam, the lessons of America’s great misadventure have been lost on no one. From the White House to the ranks of teen-age privates, Vietnam is a memory that won’t go away, and what everyone asks in one way or another is: Could it happen again?

The answer, U.S. commanders in Saudi Arabia say, is no, providing that the United States can achieve the quick, decisive victory it would seek. “Let me assure you,” President Bush told the nation this month, “should military action be required, this will not be another Vietnam. This will not be a protracted, drawn-out war.”

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And Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, commander of Operation Desert Shield and a decorated Vietnam battalion commander, told several journalists this week that if there is a war, “I am going to do everything I possibly can do to viciously destroy them (Iraqis) as rapidly as possible.” In Vietnam, where the United States tried to win the “hearts and minds” of the people whom it ended up killing, no senior officer would have dared to utter such a blunt assessment of his mission.

Although comparisons are tempting, particularly as a fledging anti-war movement in the United States rekindles visions from the ‘60s, the most elementary difference exists: A war against Saddam Hussein--a primitive man disparaged by even the Arabs--is winnable; the one against Ho Chi Minh--a revolutionary hero of global repute--was not.

Ho’s soldiers had fought the French for eight years and won. They knew the land and had wide popular support, even in South Vietnam. Against the Americans, his North Vietnamese and Viet Cong guerrillas owned the jungle and the night, neutralizing the United States’ superior firepower. Their supply lines were able to survive B-52 bombardments and were generously nourished by Chinese, Soviet and East European allies. Their resolve to fight appeared infinite, and they matched each step of the gradual American buildup, even as their cities were being leveled and their harbors mined, with new attacks that resulted in more American casualties that led to more U.S. public disenchantment.

Iraq would enjoy none of these advantages. Its troops would have no sanctuaries, as did Ho Chi Minh’s in Cambodia and Laos. Even in Kuwait, the country they now claim as an Iraqi province, they are viewed as a murderous occupying force. They would not find an ally in the night. Instead, they would face new technology that would enhance the Americans’ ability to fight in darkness. Their supply lines across the open desert would be vulnerable to the 1,900 warplanes that will soon be on station here. Their communications and movements would be compromised by U.S. intelligence-gathering satellites. They would, in short, be forced to do something the Viet Cong never were: fight a war on America’s terms.

The goals of U.S. strategy in Vietnam were never quite clear. Here, if there is a war, they are: the use of maximum firepower to achieve the quickest possible victory. It would be a war that, for the first time this century, the United States would fight not to save a democracy but to protect its economic interests. It would capitalize on the lesson learned a generation ago that it is dangerous to nibble at the enemy while public support erodes.

In Vietnam, it took eight years before the United States reached its peak strength of 540,000 troops in 1969. President Bush, well aware that Lyndon B. Johnson’s measured escalation cost him the presidency, will have gotten 430,000 troops in place here--half the nation’s worldwide combat strength--in less than six months.

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“We’ve got a pretty good chunk of Marines in country,” Brig. Gen. Mike Myatt, commander of the 1st Marine Division, said the other day. “I think that tells you we’re serious.”

More than half the 58,000 U.S. dead in Vietnam were volunteers, not draftees. But this would be the first war fought by an all-volunteer army. Although grouching increases proportionately in relation to a soldier’s distance from the front--being considerably greater in the rear echelon, strangely--most troops here give the impression of being well motivated and genuinely patriotic.

“How do our troops stack up against those we had in Vietnam? They’re better,” said Master Gunnery Sgt. James Carter of Oceanside, Calif., a 27-year Marine veteran who served two tours in Vietnam. “No. 1, they get a lot better training. No. 2, they’re an all-volunteer force. You don’t get guys here just by chance like you did in Vietnam. I’m not going to say they’re smarter or have a better level of education, but they pick up on things quicker.

“I start feeling old when I realize I was in the service when some of their dads were just getting out of high school. The boys whose fathers were in Vietnam ask about the war, but most don’t show a lot of interest. They were pretty quick to pick up on the fact that this is an entirely different situation.

“Here you don’t worry about ambushes. Even without the moon you can still see 200 or 300 feet ahead of you at night. In Vietnam, you were lucky to see 12 feet ahead. And there’s the dust, something you didn’t have in Vietnam. If there’s movement out there and you’re alert, you’re warned. Yeah, the enemy can see you too, but I still like knowing where he is.”

Although names like the Ashau Valley and Hue and Dong Ha may mean nothing to today’s soldiers, most are keenly aware that Vietnam veterans were not given a heroes’ welcome home. “I’m proud serving my country here,” a corporal said, “but I don’t ever want to go back to the reception the ‘Nam vets got.”

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The tons of mail pouring into military post offices in Saudi Arabia--much of it addressed to “Any Soldier”--seems to have reassured the men and women in the Persian Gulf region that they do indeed have the public’s backing.

Vietnam has affected media coverage as well. Fourteen hundred journalists have passed through Saudi Arabia since Aug. 2 and none--except the network TV anchors--has been given the freedom correspondents enjoyed in Vietnam to simply go where they wanted, hitchhiking rides on helicopters and linking up with units of their choice.

David Lamb covered Vietnam for United Press International from 1968 to 1970.

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