Israel Lacked U.S. Codes to Protect Its Jets

When Iraq fired its first Scud missiles into Tel Aviv, Israel faced a major obstacle to mounting a retaliatory strike because the United States did not provide electronic identification codes that would have prevented accidental attacks on its jets by U.S. and allied planes, government sources said Monday.

As a precaution before war began, Israel had put pilots in the cockpits of warplanes around the clock so that protection or retaliation missions could be launched instantaneously if the nation were attacked.

However, when the attack came Thursday, the lack of the appropriate “IFF” (Identification Friend or Foe) codes meant that Israeli aircraft could have been mistaken for enemy fighters had they entered Iraqi airspace.

The withholding of the codes indicates that the Bush Administration may have used more than pleas and promises of additional defense equipment to persuade the Israelis not to strike back and risk damaging the gulf coalition.

The United States is continuing to withhold the codes, but it did agree to clear an air corridor for a possible raid if future missile attacks were to cause serious casualties or deaths. It is not clear what the threshold is, or who would determine it.

The arrangement for allowing a possible Israeli aerial mission into Iraq was made only Friday after a longtime Israeli supporter in the United States complained to Sen. Arlen Specter (R-Pa.). Specter in turn contacted the White House, according to sources familiar with the “understanding.”

Israel has been praised for its restraint in past days. It is unclear how many factors besides the lack of IFF codes may have influenced its government’s decision not to retaliate immediately.

White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater said the question of confusion that would result from Israel’s launching a retaliatory air strike “was a problem. It’s always been a concern of ours.”

“It wasn’t so much that we refused to give them” the IFF codes, a U.S. military official said. “It was not used as pressure. We made it clear that we have enough problems in the theater coordinating aircraft from the coalition, and that we didn’t need others.”

Specter declined to discuss his part in resolving what one Israeli supporter called “a demonstration of the U.S. lack of trust” in Israel.

But it was learned from a pro-Israel source that Specter had been contacted about the matter Friday by Morris J. Amitay, former executive director of the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee, and now a lawyer and a lobbyist. Amitay would not comment.

A government source said Specter raised the matter Friday at a briefing by Administration officials that he attended, but was given a response that he regarded as unsatisfactory. Specter then turned to the White House, and later was told that the problem had been resolved.

Ruth Yaron, the Israeli Embassy spokeswoman, said the question of Israel’s access to IFF codes involves “details that are too operational for me to comment on . . . It’s very operational and very delicate. To respond might give the wrong perception, might give a signal to an enemy that is watching or waiting.” She added that her refusal to comment should not be read as confirmation or denial that an understanding now exists.

Yaron would not acknowledge that Israel had requested the IFF codes.

Under the understanding that has been reached, if Iraq again hits Israel with missiles and the damage is severe enough to prompt a decision to retaliate, Israel is to notify the U.S. air attache in Tel Aviv, who then will relay Israel’s intentions to the U.S. command in Riyadh. The information then is to be sent to the U.S. Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), which clears the necessary airspace, the pro-Israeli source said.

This source emphasized that the arrangement to free Israeli aircraft from the danger of being hit by coalition fire is not a formal agreement between the United States and Israel, but an “understanding” that in his view has the same effect as giving Israel the IFF codes.

The question of IFF codes figured in an earlier Mideast controversy--the July 3, 1988, downing of an Iranian airbus by the Vincennes, a U.S. missile cruiser. The Iranians later claimed that the passenger aircraft had turned on its IFF system, and was transmitting on a clearly identifiable frequency that the Vincennes should have received.

However, the official U.S. investigative report on the incident, which killed all 290 people aboard the aircraft, found that the IFF picked up by the Vincennes was a so-called Mode II--a signal associated with Iranian F-14 warplanes.

The issue of Israel’s launching a retaliatory strike against Iraq is a crucial element in the current conflict because of the repercussions such an attack could have on Arab members of the 28-nation coalition aligned against Iraq.

The day before the coalition began its air assault, Israel’s air force commander, Maj. Gen. Avihu Ben-Nun, said Israeli interceptors were flying around the clock against the possibility of an Iraqi attack.

Ben-Nun, acknowledging that Israel did not have the means to head off an attack by Iraq’s Scud missiles, said Israeli planes could hit the missile sites in an hour’s time and could strike the Baghdad region in an hour and a half.

After Iraq struck at Israel with Scuds, the United States and other coalition members engaged in intense diplomacy to keep Israel out of the Persian Gulf War, and Bush praised Israeli restraint.

After the first attack on Israel early Friday, allied airplanes intensified the search for Scud launchers in Iraq and Kuwait. After a second Iraqi attack Friday, the United States supplied Israel with Patriot missiles and U.S. crews trained in operating the anti-missile systems.