Tower Workloads Often Cited After Near Disasters : Aviation: Officials are warned of staff shortages. FAA data shows California is the near-miss capital of the U.S.

Tragedy loomed beyond the beckoning strobe lights pointing the way to runway 25-Left. A jetliner on final approach to Los Angeles International Airport, its landing lights ablaze in the night sky over Inglewood, extended its massive landing gear just minutes from touchdown.

At the same moment on the ground, the crew of a commuter plane awaited takeoff clearance, the smaller plane’s nose wheel lined up on the white line reaching down the middle of runway 25-Left toward the dark sand dunes of Playa del Rey.

More than 100 tons of jetliner descended steadily toward the runway threshold already occupied by the little turboprop--until, finally, it was too late for the commuter pilots to flee, even had they known what was swooping down behind them. They didn’t.

But this was 1988, a moment in the shadow of the future. That time, at the last second, the jetliner aborted landing. That time it thundered low over the runway, its great jet engines making the commuter plane shudder as it climbed back into the sky for another approach. That time a merely shaken commuter captain lived to contemplate the departure that was “almost my last.”

It would be nearly three years later before a SkyWest commuter plane also waiting for takeoff clearance would be destroyed by a landing USAir 737 on nearby runway 24-Left. Thirty-four people would die, but not until 1991.

Yet, the eerie similarities between the 1988 near miss and last month’s deadly crash echo still in the commuter pilot’s written report, filed only days after the 1988 incident. Just as the recent LAX accident raised questions about staffing shortages in the airport traffic control tower, the commuter captain had questioned the safety and efficiency of overburdened controllers.

“LAX . . . is not fully staffed and has many controllers that are not full performance level,” the captain wrote in 1988.

In fact, federal authorities have been warned repeatedly over the past five years that overworked and understaffed controllers were factors in numerous near disasters, according to a Times review of federal aviation safety reports. The records were obtained from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration through a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit.

The reports, filed by pilots and air traffic controllers, also describe hundreds of near misses in the air and on the ground--and add to the current debate about the adequacy of air traffic controller staffing. Nationwide, the number of control tower workers has been substantially lower since 1981 when President Ronald Reagan fired 12,000 striking controllers.

Ironically, renewed debate over staffing levels of air traffic controllers, particularly in the Los Angeles area, comes at a time when busy California airspace is claiming an increasing share of the nation’s near midair collisions.

As the unchallenged near-miss capital of America, based on Federal Aviation Administration statistics for 1990, California accounted for about 27% of all near-miss incidents reported in the U.S. Most of the state’s near misses occurred in Southern California, according to the NASA reports.

Near misses, of course, are usually harmless. Some experts even regard them as reassuring evidence that the safety system works. Indeed, air travel is 25 times safer than automobile travel, according to Lloyd’s of London.

Still, in 1990, more near midair collisions were reported over California (121) than the combined total for the next two leaders, Florida (50) and Texas (49). Aviation experts estimate that at least five times as many near-miss episodes occur but go unreported.

Among those that were reported, a number cited problems with air controllers. For example, in 1989 a jetliner crew taking off from Ontario International Airport said that they were ordered by a traffic controller “wildly, in a very panicked voice,” to change direction after lifting off. Apparently they were in danger of hitting another aircraft, but the new direction put them on a collision course with the San Gabriel Mountains.

“They (controllers) definitely lost control of the situation,” noted the report by crew members who managed to navigate out of the trouble. They blamed “a very critical work overload” in the control tower and said that the condition “is typical” at major U.S. airports, especially in California.

Another example at Ontario: In 1990, moments after taking off, a fast-climbing airliner suddenly cut power and nosed over as if to emulate a plunging roller coaster. For the passengers in back it was a breath-taking maneuver, but also a lifesaver. The crew was able to avoid a small plane that flashed by barely 100 feet away.

“We scared our plane full of passengers,” wrote the captain, blaming inadequate air traffic control. “The only ‘fix’ is to restore the manpower levels which Reagan destroyed and update the system equipment.”

Last month, U.S. Rep. Barbara Boxer (D-Greenbrae), who chaired congressional hearings into the LAX runway crash, said that since 1981 about 3,000 fewer controllers have had to handle 12 million more operations nationwide each year--that is, 20% fewer workers doing nearly 50% more work.

She called such numbers part of “a pattern of unfortunate trends” that contributed to the Los Angeles accident.

Federal safety investigators, who have linked the runway collision to controller error, also disclosed that a backup controller position had been left vacant in the LAX control tower despite a series of runway near misses and repeated recommendations to fill it.

An official of the Federal Aviation Administration who testified before Boxer’s House subcommittee on government activities and transportation said, however, that no additional controllers are needed.

“We believe we have a level of air traffic controllers which is exactly where we want to be,” said Joseph Del Balzo, the FAA’s director for system development.

NASA reports filed by air traffic controllers often express a contradictory view. For example, after an Arizona commuter flight was nearly hit by a small plane approaching Prescott in 1989, a controller blamed the near miss on an understaffed facility. “Only one controller was working local control” during a period of intense traffic activity at the FAA’s 54th busiest air terminal, the controller complained.

Earlier, an Orange County controller, accepting responsibility for putting two planes on a collision course, had filed a report saying:

“Our facility is short of controllers. All of us have been working six-day workweeks and around two hours on position without a break.”

Steve Bell, president of the National Air Traffic Controllers Assn., questioned the system’s capacity to handle constantly increasing airport traffic without significant staff increases as well.

“The FAA is trying to milk the airspace for every possible new operation while giving short shrift to the overall problem of managing a safe and efficient flow of ground and local air traffic,” the union representative said.

The Air Line Pilots Assn. also advocates more controllers, especially as air travel volume grows. John Mazor, a spokesman for the union in Washington, said accidents are likely to increase if the safety system does not expand to meet the workload.

“In a lot of places where the system is overburdened only the extraordinary efforts of pilots and controllers prevent disasters,” Mazor said.

Whether overburdened or not, Southern California has the busiest skies in the country. And no other region has had a more tragic history of midair collisions. In 1986, an Aeromexico DC-9 collided with a private plane while on descent for a landing at LAX. The small plane had strayed into restricted airspace reserved for commercial jets 6,500 feet over a residential neighborhood in Cerritos. Eighty-two people were killed, including 15 on the ground.

And in the 1970s there were three midair collisions in the region, the worst a 1978 San Diego crash involving a PSA 727 that killed 144. In 1975 a Golden West Airlines commuter plane collided with a private plane over Whittier, killing 14, and in 1971 a Hughes Air DC-9 crashed in mountains above Duarte after hitting a Marine fighter jet. Fifty died.

That record provided impetus for a number of rules requiring, for example, that most small planes be equipped with devices called transponders and, beginning this year, altitude encoders that make them easier to spot on radar--both by air traffic controllers and by commercial airliners that gradually are being equipped with anti-collision equipment (known as TCAS).

Also, larger zones of restricted airspace have been created to help keep private planes farther away from the heavily traveled routes used by commercial planes. But even with the most restricted airspace in the nation, there are ample opportunities for conflict between airplanes doing everything according to the rules.

A year after the Aeromexico crash, a small private plane similar to the one that collided with the jetliner flew into airspace off Long Beach reserved for departing jetliners. A traffic controller saw the conflict on radar and alerted the airline crew.

“Captain saw the small (blue and silver) plane and yelled. I pulled off power, dove and rolled right,” the co-pilot, who was at the jetliner controls, wrote in his NASA report.

“It looked like we were going to hit him. The other airplane rolled hard over to the right, nearly inverted, and dove. We came within 500 feet. . . . In this near miss the controller deserves the credit for a quick and accurate (warning).”

And later, in the skies over the San Fernando Valley, a jetliner en route to Dallas from Burbank came within 300 feet of a small plane. “No evasive action was taken; it was too late for any maneuvering,” the captain wrote, then complained about the number of light planes that fly in areas with commercial jet traffic.

“There will be another midair collision involving a commercial airliner in the near future,” the pilot warned. “My fellow airline pilots who fly regularly to the high risk (high density) areas like Southern California feel like I do. It’s a crap shoot. So far we’ve been lucky.”

A number of factors make Southern California especially vulnerable to midair conflicts. First, is the sheer number of airports in the region--five major commercial airports, five military airfields and 18 airports for private planes. Also, the Los Angeles Basin is home base for the world’s largest concentration of private planes and pilots.

Big, high-performance jets share the same sky with small, slow aircraft; radio frequencies often are congested, a sign of heavy workload on air controllers; the air traffic patterns are complex and there are chronic visibility problems due to smog, haze and coastal fog.

A sampling of NASA reports illustrate how these elements can affect safety in the air.

Several factors were present in 1986, for example, when a twin-engine jetliner on approach to Burbank suddenly encountered in the haze a small white-and-yellow private plane, not more than 200 feet away at the same altitude.

“We performed an abrupt diving maneuver to avoid collision,” the pilot wrote. “Fortunately, the subject aircraft also performed an evasive maneuver. We were lucky not to collide.”

The pilot noted that no traffic controller had alerted them to the danger, adding:

“I operate into Burbank frequently and attempt to be extremely vigilant because of the high potential for this type of occurrence. . . . This incident could occur on any given day at Burbank, Orange County or Long Beach airports given the complex airspace structure and mix of general aviation and turbojet aircraft.”

And visibility was one of the factors in a 1985 Ontario incident. Controllers had cleared a jetliner to taxi into position for takeoff, but the pilot hesitated, explaining in his report: “Just as our nose was on the runway we noticed landing lights through the fog.”

He said he immediately called the tower and was assured that no traffic was inbound to land. Just then a small plane sailed out of the mist and landed where the jetliner was supposed to be. Controllers said the small plane had failed to get landing clearance. Also, it was not visible in the night fog and apparently did not show up on radar, either.

Finally, the jetliner pulled out onto the murky runway as instructed by controllers and waited for their clearance to roll out for takeoff. Meanwhile, the cockpit radios picked up an exchange between the tower and another jetliner approaching to land--apparently on the same runway. The incredulous crew scurried for a taxiway.

“We proceeded to get off the runway before they cleared him to land on top of us.”

Commercial pilots flying in and out of Long Beach Airport and John Wayne Airport in Orange County often refer to “the swarms” of small aircraft they encounter off the coast, especially on nice weekend days.

In 1989, one jetliner coming in to Long Beach from the ocean was down to nearly 2,000 feet when it met a single-engine plane approaching head-on. The co-pilot at the controls put the jetliner into a diving right turn. They were recovering and starting to climb after clearing that traffic when they encountered a second small plane, again coming head-on, requiring a sudden steep climb to avoid.

“We missed both aircraft by approximately 200 feet,” the captain said in his NASA report. “There is absolutely no doubt that if . . . evasive action had not been taken a collision with either aircraft would have been a certainty.”

In another incident at Long Beach, a jetliner pilot complained about takeoff patterns that launch commercial carriers into the middle of small plane traffic. “Long Beach has always been a potential midair collision site,” the pilot wrote in a report on a 1986 near miss in which “we almost creamed a light aircraft” that didn’t show up on controller radar.

Of course, near misses occur all over the country and under all sorts of circumstances, according to the NASA reports.

Approaching Providence, R.I., a jetliner cruising at 10,000 feet was nearly run down by a corporate jet on a perpendicular course. In a quick evasive maneuver, the jetliner abruptly climbed, missing the other plane by about 300 feet. A flight attendant was knocked to the floor in the aft galley.

Near Portland, Ore., a commuter plane descending through a cloud layer emerged to glimpse a smaller plane a few hundred yards away on a collision course. The pilot pushed forward into a steep drop, injuring a flight attendant but missing the light plane by no more than 10 feet.

Outside Phoenix, a jetliner crew dodged numerous hang gliders while descending through 7,500 feet. Twice the jetliner was forced to climb to avoid the small craft that were invisible to air traffic control radar. In one case, the jetliner came within 150 feet of a hang glider.

And approaching Tucson, an airline captain was surprised to look up and see “10 to 20 open parachutes above us.” A military exercise was under way in the commercial airway, without approval, the pilot was told when he radioed traffic controllers.

“It is very uncomfortable to be underneath parachutists who appear to present a hazard to your aircraft,” the captain reported.

Rol Murrow, assistant western region representative for the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Assn. in Los Angeles, a trade group that represents private plane owners and operators, said his members are concerned about improving air safety, in part, by increasing the separation between commercial jets and small planes. He also said the skies are getting safer, but can never be risk-free.

“Aviation safety is excellent--but accidents will occur,” he said.

AVOIDING MIDAIR COLLISIONS

Electronic systems that warn pilots of potential midair collisions are being phased in on all commercial aircraft using U.S. airspace. By 1994, all planes with more than 30 seats will be equipped with a Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System known as TCAS II. It will not only alert pilots to danger, but also will advise them to climb or descend. Smaller aircraft will use the less-expensive TCAS I, which is a warning system only.

1. TCAS II radar broadcasts “interrogation” signals from the host plane in all directions.

2. When the radar hits an “intruder” plane, the intruder’s Mode C transponder returns radio signals indicating its altitude, rate of ascent or descent, heading and velocity.

3. TCAS II analyzes these responses, comparing the projected course of the intruder to that of the host to determine potential for collision.

Alerting the Pilot

A cockpit screen that can flash warning lights is a key element of the TCAS system. A horn and electronic voice also are sounded when danger nears. Here’s what the screen shows:

A. Amber caution: Intruder at 10 o’clock, 1,000 feet above host, descending

B. Amber caution: Intruder at 1 o’clock, same altitude as host, level.

C. Red warning: Intruder at 2 o’clock, 500 feet below host, climbing.

D. Asterisk: Twelve positions on the bearing clock face, corresponding to numbers on the face of a clock.

NARROW ESCAPES

* Top five states for near-miss incidents reported in 1990:

Incidents 1 California 121 2 Florida 50 3 Texas 49 4 Arizona 23 5 Washington 14 National Total 452

* Incidents reported in other states with major airports:

Incidents New York 13 New Jersey 13 Illinois 9 Georgia 5 Dist. of Columbia 2

COLLISION COURSE: PILOTS HAVE LITTLE TIME TO REACT

When Aircraft Converge

If you stand 12 feet away from this illustration, you will see the silhouette of a T-33 aircraft as it would appear--or not appear--from the distances indicated in the table at left. The time required to cover these distances is given in seconds for combined speeds of converging aircraft at 360 and 600 m.p.h. The blocks on the lower left mark the danger area for the speeds quoted, when aircraft are on a collision course. The danger area is based on the recognition and reaction times shown in the table on the lower right.

See object: 0.1 (SECONDS)

Recognize aircraft: 1.0

Become aware of collision course: 5.0

Decision to turn right or left: 4.0

Muscular reaction: 0.4

Aircraft lag time: 2.0

TOTAL: 12.5

Source: U.S. Navy