NEWS ANALYSIS : U.S. Could Be Entangled in a Mideast Web

Two months after the triumphant climax of Operation Desert Storm, the Bush Administration’s hopes of seizing a new opportunity to solve some of the Mideast’s toughest problems are beginning to seriously falter.

Aggressive moves to convert a military victory into historic progress that would leave President Bush’s mark on the volatile region as well as the world have run into severe complications--some predictable, some unforeseen.

Three key problems--Iraq’s internal turmoil, hardening lines in the Arab-Israeli conflict and Kuwait’s bitter political infighting--have deprived the United States of a quick getaway from the scene of war and a smooth transition to the canvas of a “new world order.”

U.S. policy-makers now face the difficult choice of risking more of the nation’s international standing and military manpower to sustain the process or trimming back and accepting minimal solutions, if any. Neither course is without political peril, analysts note.

In Iraq, the Administration’s intervention on behalf of the Kurds risks a replay of the disastrous 1982-84 experience in Beirut, when U.S. Marines and diplomatic trouble-shooters were dispatched to ensure security and resolve internal and regional political disputes.

But the Ronald Reagan Administration was quickly drawn into the ethnic and sectarian quagmire of Mideast politics, and the original 30-day mission turned into 14 months, ultimately ending with a forced withdrawal and failure on all fronts.

“In this case, there’s even less of a blueprint in terms of what our long-term goals and plans are,” a leading U.S. military analyst said. “This is a very dangerous situation. Whatever our intentions, we could get stuck there for an indefinite period.”

As was the case in Lebanon, one question involves how to extract American troops. Even if an autonomy agreement is worked out between Kurdish leaders and Baghdad, “the Kurds will probably want security guarantees from the United States or the coalition” of Persian Gulf allies, conceded a senior U.S. analyst.

Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar announced Friday that the United Nations would take over the refugee camps built by U.S. and European troops. Despite their peacekeeping label, however, U.N. units traditionally are small and lack the necessary arms to hold off an advancing army. They generally are only able to monitor the peace and log violations.

Israeli military units, for example, simply drove through a U.N. force during their 1982 invasion of Lebanon. During Israel’s subsequent 3-year occupation, the U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon--which has remained there since 1978--played no significant role in getting Israel to withdraw.

Unless coalition forces are deployed in northern Iraq or nearby countries to back up the United Nations, U.S. officials say that the Kurds may not feel sufficiently secure to return to their homes. President Bush pledged again Friday not to keep U.S. forces in the region “one minute longer than necessary.” The difficulty will be determining what is “necessary.”

In 1982, U.S., French and Italian forces deployed in Lebanon to create a buffer so Palestinian guerrillas could withdraw departed after only 17 days of what was to have been a 30-day mission. U.S. ships carrying departing Marines were festooned with banners declaring “Mission Accomplished.”

Within a week, however, an estimated 800 Palestinians and Lebanese were massacred by a pro-Israeli Lebanese militia. All three nations were forced to send troops back for what turned out to be an open-ended deployment.

The Administration also is confronted with the possibility that the proud and industrious Kurds could be left in makeshift camps, not returned to their villages and fields. They will have minimal, if any, independent sources of income, food, schooling or social services.

“We should not really leave the Kurds in camps,” former Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger said Thursday on ABC’s “Nightline.” “That would repeat the Palestinian tragedy and create an impossible situation over the long term.”

But an open-ended U.S. presence in or near Iraq would confirm “the worst fears of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” the senior U.S. analyst said. A Newsweek/Gallup poll released last week said that 66% of Americans believe U.S. troops will still be protecting Kurds six months from now.

Some officials fear the de facto elimination of the “Kurdish problem” for Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. If autonomy talks collapse over specifics, as they have in the past, then the Kurds could be left indefinitely in camps under U.N. auspices, unable to challenge or pressure the Baghdad regime.

Arab-Israeli Conflict

Assessing the second major problem, the Arab-Israeli conflict, Administration officials increasingly are concerned that a land-for-peace swap to establish a permanent peace is now beyond reach. While they express optimism about getting Arabs and Israelis to a negotiating table, they concede that the process may not be followed by a meaningful agreement to end the 43-year dispute.

Despite reported minor Israeli concessions before Secretary of State James A. Baker III ended his third Mideast peace shuttle Friday, the gap between Israelis and Arabs is still wide on sponsorship, format, agenda and participants for a proposed Middle East conference. “That’s basically everything,” said the U.S. military analyst.

U.S. officials say that the need for a settlement is now greater than ever. The alternatives include heightened tension, a renewed Mideast arms race and the potential of another war. The Administration must decide whether it should expend its clout and international standing to achieve what already appear to be diminishing returns.

“I don’t rule out agreement on process, but I don’t see hopes on substance,” said the senior U.S. analyst. “A symbolic meeting (of Arab leaders and Israelis) in Cairo is not an unimportant event. But on breaking the logjams, even Baker does not think that’s imminent.”

Of the Middle East’s seven modern wars, the Persian Gulf conflict was the first in which Israeli civilians were directly and constantly involved because of the threat of Iraqi Scud missiles and chemical weapons. The war wrought major changes in Israeli attitudes that are likely to complicate peace efforts.

“There is a deeper long-term concern about whether Israelis can live with Arabs,” the senior analyst said. In growing numbers, he said, Israelis “believe Arabs will never make a real peace, only one to be broken.”

In addition, the analyst said, “There’s an awareness that American troops were in trenches alongside Saudis, Egyptians and Syrians. They fear profound changes in the way the United States thinks about Israel.”

Kuwait Internal Strife

The final problem, Kuwait’s internal strife, appears equally vexing. So far, U.S. and European pressure on the ruling Sabah royal family to open up the political system has met with stubborn resistance.

“The Kuwaitis always nod their heads. They say they understand. And they promise to act. Then they do just the opposite,” lamented a State Department official. The appointment of a new Kuwaiti Cabinet without a single opposition figure deeply irritated the Administration.

The current system limits meaningful participation to a mere 70,000 men who can date a family presence in Kuwait back seven decades. It excludes members of the resistance who fought Iraqi occupiers while the royal family was in exile.

U.S. officials fear that Kuwaiti failure to undertake democratic reforms could lead to internal unrest and even eventual strife. In contrast with past periods of internal tension, many Kuwaitis are now armed, and some officials fear that an isolated incident could trigger a spiral of violence.

“If the Sabah family wants to survive long-term, it will have to engage in change,” said Riad Ajami, a political economist. “The family has a window of opportunity to act in the next nine months to a year. If the Sabahs don’t move, then there will be trouble. That is a society in ferment. Most Kuwaitis will not accept going back to the status quo.”

Of equal concern is a continuing reliance on the anti-Iraq coalition to help pull Kuwait back together. The danger for the United States lies in being seen as the primary prop for an increasingly unpopular regime.

“We can’t afford to walk away from Kuwait after investing so much. But we also can’t afford to let things continue to disintegrate. Meanwhile, we can’t force the emir to do anything,” said a U.S. policy analyst. “At the moment, we’re stuck.”