Now Democracy Can Wait? : It’s one thing before war, another thing after

Kuwait’s ruling Al Sabah family was notably generous with its political promises after it was driven into exile last August by Iraq’s invasion. The assurances were virtually nonstop that the emir and other top leaders would see that post-liberation Kuwait had a new political order based on more representative government.

Now, after the tremendously costly U.N.-led intervention to free Kuwait from the invading Iraqis, that pledge so far remains unredeemed.

Now the emir says merely that new parliamentary elections are indeed planned, but not for 16 months.

Why the long delay?

Opposition figures fear, with good reason, that it’s to give the Al Sabahs more time to intensify their control. That’s exactly the kind of political process the leaders of Iraq prefer, no?

THE EVANESCENT SPRING: Kuwait for a brief period had the Persian Gulf’s freest parliament. But that experiment ended abruptly in 1986 when the emir began to fear that some legislators were becoming too independent.

The current National Council is essentially a rubber stamp for the Al Sabahs. When it meets on July 19 for the first time since the invasion it’s expected to set the conditions for the October, 1992, voting, including a possible expansion of suffrage. That in itself is a good idea. Under current rules, only about 10% of Kuwait’s population--none women--may vote.

But for now, martial law remains in force; the press is censored and public assemblies are banned. Unless these restrictions are ended, a freer political life, including open public debate, will have no chance to develop.

But should, in all fairness, the Al Sabahs be held to a standard of political behavior higher than that of the Gulf’s other traditionally autocratic ruling families?

WHY KUWAIT? Ideally, of course, the whole region ought to enjoy more representative government. But, for several reasons, Kuwait is a good place to begin: Its ruling family, when in distress and needing support from the democracies, solemnly indicated it was inclined toward greater power sharing. And Kuwaitis have at least some experience in responsible opposition politics.

Kuwait would clearly benefit if its leadership base were enlarged. A stable Kuwait will be a more secure Kuwait. Permitting wider and more effective participation in its political life is one prescription for greater stability.

But if Kuwait’s Al Sabah family is not capable of doing what’s best for the country, Washington has an obligation to help it see the light. After all that was risked, and accomplished, in the Persian Gulf, the American public will want to know why the Kuwaitis can’t create a significantly better political order than the one that was expelled by force of arms.

The issue is also one that should concern the United Nations. After all, it was collective military action that defeated the Iraqis. Would it now be inappropriate for collective moral action to take on the forces of political darkness in Kuwait?