PERSPECTIVE ON DEFENSE : ‘Yes’ to the B-2, but ‘No’ to More B-2s : Arguments for a nuclear bomber are no longer compelling. There is a good case for 15 planes with a conventional role.

Proponents of the B-2 Stealth bomber have been given a boost by the success of the Stealth fighter in the war with Iraq. But as they try to capitalize on this success to sell the Administration’s full program of 75 bombers, they run into a paradox.

The more they promote the B-2 for conventional, non-nuclear uses in contingencies such as the Gulf War, the more they undercut the argument that anything like 75 airplanes is needed.

Thus, the question of the B-2’s real mission--conventional versus nuclear--is the central one in the debate. It will largely determine the fate of the program.

It makes more sense now to think about the B-2 as a conventional bomber with some nuclear capability--the exact reverse of the rationale that began this $64.8-billion program more than a decade ago.

The Air Force has been in the forefront of redefining the B-2 as a conventional bomber. Its case goes something like this: We have the F-117 Stealth fighter, which can deliver precision-guided bombs. And we have the B-52, which has tremendous range and payload. Both performed exceptionally well in the Gulf War. The B-2 puts it all together in one package, and so would offer a terrific--though very expensive--conventional capability.

There’s merit to this argument. Reason one, the conventional role entails repeated exposure to air defenses and therefore stealthiness is even more important. If losses were even 2% per day, less than half of the planes would be left after a 40-day air war like the one we had with Iraq. In contrast, the mission of nuclear deterrence requires only that a bomber have a credible capability for one flight.

Reason two is that in the conventional role there may be little or no defense suppression. Because of its ability to carry out its mission directly from a base in the United States, the B-2 might be the first U.S. weapon on the scene.

At the same time that the case for the B-2 as a conventional bomber has been strengthened by the success of air power in the Gulf War, the case for it as a nuclear bomber has receded with the end of the Cold War.

The B-2 was to make three distinct contributions to our nuclear capabilities. It was to hunt Soviet mobile missiles mounted on rail cars or trucks. But the difficulty we had locating mobile Scud missiles in Iraq demonstrates the near-futility of trying to search for mobile missiles in the Soviet Union, a land mass 50 times larger.

Buying B-2s would allow us to take full advantage of Strategic Arms Reduction Talks treaty rules that allow us extra, uncounted nuclear weapons on bombers. But with the passing of the Warsaw Pact, the freeing of Eastern Europe and the chaos in the Soviet Union, the number of nuclear targets is shrinking and we have less need for these extra weapons.

The third contribution of the B-2 in a nuclear role was based on the projection that Soviet air defenses were going to improve so much that Stealth aircraft would be needed to get through them. But it looks less and less likely that the Soviet Union will be able to continue spending $10 billion to $15 billion a year on air defenses as previously projected. If they don’t, our current bomber and cruise missile force will continue to be able to do the job. And let’s remember that by the time any U.S. bomber would reach the Soviet Union, it would be preceded by thousands of intercontinental ballistic missile and submarine-launched warheads that would degrade air defenses.

The arguments for the B-2 as a nuclear bomber are no longer compelling, and if we’re going to spend the $34 billion remaining for the full B-2 program, there should be a compelling reason.

The current Air Force plan for 75 bombers and the previous plan for 132 were both based on what the B-2 added to our ability to execute our nuclear targeting plan.

Buying B-2s for the nuclear role means buying the ability to deliver more weapons. Buying B-2s for the conventional role means buying time--in the conventional role B-2s can be used repeatedly. The question of how many B-2s are needed for the conventional role depends on the number of targets requiring the unique capabilities of the B-2 that need to be hit simultaneously.

Thus, re-thinking the B-2 into a primarily non-nuclear role means re-thinking the number of aircraft needed.

For example, suppose 50 B-2 sorties were needed to destroy a particular set of targets in a non-nuclear war. In principle, that could be accomplished with 50 B-2s on one pass, 10 B-2s on five passes, or for that matter one B-2 on 50 passes. How many B-2s you would need depends on how many of the 50 targets are time-urgent--that is, must be hit on a single pass.

The fact that B-2s are “re-usable” in the conventional role suggests that we should be able to get a lot of mileage out of a relatively small force. If we look at recent experience, a very good case can be made that the 15 planes already approved by Congress could be a highly effective force (assuming that B-2 testing is successfully completed over the next five years).

Three examples come immediately to mind where the B-2’s combination of stealthiness, range and payload could be of value in non-nuclear conflict.

Libya raid. The 1986 U.S. raid on Libya involved 84 combat aircraft and 35 support aircraft, which came from two carrier battle groups and eight foreign bases. Six B-2s supported by six tankers could carry out an equivalent raid.

“Silver bullet.” The Air Force has indicated that during the Gulf War, some targets in Iraq that required a large payload of bombs were too distant for F-117s to hit and too well-defended for B-52s to go after--at least until later in the war when Iraq air defenses were largely suppressed.

Acting as “silver bullets,” B-2s could attack well-defended, deep targets from the outset of a future conflict. Such a role for B-2 would include some targets that were time-urgent and others that were not. Since a silver bullet role is one where other, tactical aircraft are also available, it’s likely that few B-2s would be needed.

Leading edge. The final scenario is, thankfully, hypothetical: What if Saddam Hussein had continued on to Saudi Arabia? In this scenario, raised by the Air Force, we would not have had either ground troops or our F-117s, F-15s and F-111s nearby to respond. At least for several days, our best shot at stopping the invasion could come from a combination of heavy bombers and cruise missiles.

In this case, B-2s could serve as the leading edge of a larger air attack, much as F-117s functioned in the Gulf War. The leading-edge role is potentially the most demanding case. B-2s could be going against a significant target base with little or no help from tactical aircraft for the first several days. Still, a very good case can be made for a small B-2 force. Ten B-2s could carry 160 precision-guided 2,000-pound bombs, or twice the payload of the 42 F-117s we used in the Gulf War.

Such a force of B-2s combined with Tomahawk cruise missiles could essentially poke out the eyes and ears of the enemy’s air defenses so that other less stealthy systems could penetrate with impunity. If we face a scenario in the future where heavy bombers are forced to act as a stop-gap and carry most or all of the load in the early days of an air war, then a mixed force of B-2s, B-52s and B-1Bs might make sense in the same way that we used a mix of F-117s, F-15s, and F-111s in the Gulf War.

In sum, it appears to me that the number of B-2s required for the conventional role in any likely post-Cold War contingency is to be much lower than the numbers previously considered for the nuclear role. Based on the analysis just reviewed, I do not believe the case has been made to go beyond the 15 planes already approved by Congress.