PERSPECTIVE ON THE SOVIET UNION : New Dealings With a New Russia : The Communist Party is ousted, an anti-colonial revolution is on. There are ways we can help, and important limits.

When I saw Mikhail Gorbachev in the Kremlin two years ago, he ended the conversation with a wistful comment: “Knowing what was wrong has been relatively easy. Knowing what is right has proved to be extremely difficult.”

The roller coaster of events in Moscow--first the ominous coup, then the return of Gorbachev and the triumph of Yeltsin--has resolved Gorbachev’s dilemma. The Communist Party has been dissolved. The transformation of Soviet society will now take place under the aegis of democracy. For the first time a new kind of state is coming into view on Soviet soil: less militaristic, loosely confederated and less expansionist.

None of this seemed likely while the old Establishment backed by Gorbachev and the reformist elements under Boris N. Yeltsin were threatening to paralyze each other. The defeat of the coup tilted the balance decisively toward the reformist elements, in the process giving America an opportunity to liberate itself from excessive reliance on the personality of Gorbachev and to define purposes appropriate to a historic new opportunity.

Our Goals for Russia

Gorbachev will go down in history as one of the seminal figures of this century. The collapse of communism, the liberation of Eastern Europe, the easing of state terrorism were all made possible by his courage and his initiatives. But the coup was defeated by men and women dedicated to another leader. That Gorbachev first brought Yeltsin to Moscow, that many Yeltsin supporters are former Gorbachev disciples, is a poignant demonstration of how cruel history can be.

In any event, long-term U.S. policy should not be identified with a single individual. It should reflect an answer to this fundamental question: What do we want from any state located on the territory that is now the Soviet Union? In my view, our goal should above all be peaceful, nonthreatening conduct. That is what the neighbors of the Russian Empire have never had, under czars or commissars, in 400 years of modern Russian history. America should encourage institutions--not personalities--which guarantee this.

The Soviet Union is the heir of the czarist empire, which started as the duchy of Muscovy and in the course of 250 years spread to the center of Europe, to the shores of the Pacific, to the gates of India, inundating entire countries and peoples like the sea. Many of the republics now seeking independence have been Russian for less than 150 years. There was never any act of free choice that created the “union” that the coup plotters, and many officials still in power in Moscow, wanted to preserve. Not a single republic voluntarily joined the empire.

Creating obstacles to this relentless expansionism is the most desirable outcome for the peace of the world. Ideally, the Soviet Union should be strong enough to defend itself but not cohesive enough to launch attacks abroad.

Support for decentralization should not be viewed simply as a matter of Machiavellian self-interest. Such an outcome would benefit the Soviet people, by allowing them to concentrate for the first time on improving their own well-being. After all, decentralization is the highest form of democratization. That goal now seems in sight.

The Soviet Union is undergoing two revolutions, which are partially related and partially distinct. One is a democratic revolution against the institutions of the Stalinist state. The other is an anti-colonial revolution against the acquisitions of the Russian Empire since Peter the Great. The first revolution is aimed at 74 years of communist history; the other seeks to undo 400 years of Russian imperial history.

The two movements could go part of the way together, because both believed they could fight most effectively under the banner of democracy. But at some point they were bound to diverge, because democratic governments in the republics were inevitably going to try to be independent.

When the process first started, Gorbachev did not grasp this inevitability. He visited Lithuania to argue against secession. He said, “Before you get a divorce, it is important to have a dialogue.” Replying with what turned out to be the basic challenge, the Lithuanians said: “But we’re not married.”

The abortive coup, in my view, was directed above all against the forces that were trying to undo 74 years of communist history. It was probably the last stand of the institutions of the old guard--the military-industrial complex, the KGB, the Army, the Communist Party. On the other hand, the second revolution--the one that will determine the location of the new borders of the Soviet Union, and who belongs to it--is just beginning. And the players are not necessarily the same.

Before the coup attempt, the United States was sliding into a situation where its emphasis on the personality of Gorbachev risked involvement in a power struggle between him and the republics. I thought that was a mistake, since it would have put America on the side of the centralizing Establishment, albeit its reformist wing.

In fairness, in the early period of Gorbachev, there was no alternative. It was Gorbachev, holding the then still all-powerful position of general secretary of the Communist Party, who started the process of reform. Gorbachev must have believed that he could promote change through the Communist Party, and he undoubtedly underestimated the difficulties. Two years ago he told me that he once thought the whole process of perestroika would be completed in four years. And then he added with some melancholy: “Now I realize it hasn’t even started.”

Eventually, the institutions he created to put pressure on the Communist Party made it impossible for him to save the institutions to which he owed his career. Nor was he any longer able to break deadlocks through sheer force of personality and will.

Gradually, Gorbachev was transformed from a leader of the reform movement to a manipulator of contradictions that he himself had created. His initial strategy was brilliantly successful, because he convinced the reformers that a faster pace would trigger a revolt by the right-wing opposition, and he persuaded the right-wing leaders that he was the best barrier to victory by the radicals. He kept this high-wire act going with great skill for years; but as the new institutions developed lives of their own, his difficulties mounted.

The price he paid was a gradual loss of confidence on all sides. When Gorbachev came back from the ordeal of being deposed and detained, his former friend and confidant, Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze, wondered publicly whether the president himself might have been the chief plotter. Clearly, Gorbachev’s capacity to inspire the people who used to be his disciples has eroded.

Yeltsin Bit the Bullet

American policy has no choice but to base itself on these new realities. Gorbachev deserves admiration for his historic achievements. But he no longer has the capacity or the authority to act as the principal agent of change. The focal point of reform and decentralization has shifted to the forces that defeated the coup. None of them fought under the banner of Gorbachev; most enlisted in the name of Yeltsin. Gorbachev’s only constituency may lie within what remains of the institutions that tried to overthrow him. The military-industrial complex might yet see Gorbachev as their best hope for holding the country together. Yet this is precisely why Yeltsin has been so insistent on staffing those institutions with his own people.

Whether we like it or not--and many Western leaders in the past have demonstrated an ostentatious dislike for this idea--the coup has elevated Yeltsin to the position of commander of the reform movement. Unlike Gorbachev, Yeltsin bit the bullet. He faced the fact that Marxism-Leninism was dead and that the Communist Party was discredited. He has based his program on the restoration of private property, the establishment of democratic institutions, the repudiation of the Communist Party and autonomy for the republics under a loose confederation. The thrust of all these measures was to wreck the centralized Leninist system.

All these objectives are now within reach. Perhaps Gorbachev still hopes to make a comeback as the republics cope with the dissatisfactions that are bound to accompany the shift to market economies. But in the wake of the coup and the abolition of the Communist Party, Gorbachev’s only realistic option seems to be to retreat into a position similar to the one occupied by the British monarchy at the end of the last century: a constitutional ruler with considerable personal influence, particularly in foreign policy, but no final authority.

As for the United States, it should take care to avoid getting involved in these internal Soviet disputes. It must be seen to support principles, not personalities. The United States and its allies must also understand that the coup leaders, despite their incompetence, reflected some real grievances. The Soviet people will face severe hardship this winter. And the industrial democracies need to make every effort to alleviate it. They should be prepared to extend emergency aid in the form of food and medical supplies. They should immediately form a group of experts to determine what is needed. But they should use the new conditions to ensure that aid helps those who need it, rather than turning it into a tool for strengthening central government organs. Emergency aid should be given as much as possible through the republics.

Getting through the winter would permit a study of what long-term aid may be appropriate. Earlier this year, I opposed the so-called “Grand Bargain,” which would have committed $30 billion a year in Western aid to the Soviet Union in exchange for promises of reform, for two reasons. It seemed to me a device to give patronage to the Soviet centralizers behind Gorbachev, possibly for use against the reformers around Yeltsin. Second, the Grand Bargain risked fostering the dangerous illusion that the Soviet Union can be bailed out by government programs.

Trillion a Year?

That is simply not the case. No democratic government or combination of governments has the resources, and the Soviet Union lacks the appropriate institutional framework for such a program. East Germany, a country of 16 million people with a much better infrastructure than the Soviet Union, requires a yearly subsidy of about $100 billion and still has 40% unemployment. To do as much on the Soviet scale would require a trillion-and-a-half dollars yearly.

There is no shortcut to a restructuring that can attract the largest pool of available capital, which is private investment. This requires two steps: the adoption of a constitution that establishes a relationship between the central government and the republics, and the passing of laws to create a predictable environment for investment.

The Russian Empire has always been highly centralized. The large army required to control the various nationalities has created a constant temptation for foreign adventures. Evoking a foreign danger has served as a means of suppressing differences between nationalities. No European country has sent its armies abroad as frequently and with such missionary zeal as the Russian Empire. Annexation became almost routine. Since there were already so many nationalities in the empire, further additions seemed to be consistent with the essence of the state. Were repression to start again, these now-dormant tendencies would almost surely reappear.

On the other hand, the United States should not risk reawakening Russian paranoia by acting as if it wanted to break up the Soviet Union for its own purposes. Gorbachev may still be able to salvage a loose confederation, along the lines of the so-called nine-plus-one agreement that was negotiated between nine of the republics and Moscow. The Bush Administration has so far rightly acted with great circumspection. But the post-coup restructuring is the time to put forward some fundamental principles to avoid misunderstandings later on:

The United States has never recognized the incorporation of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union. It would be simply carrying through the implications of existing policy if it moved toward recognizing the independence of these states.

As to the other republics, the U.S. actions should be geared to whether they act democratically to fulfill the conditions laid down for secession in the nine-plus-one agreement. When these are met, the United States should move toward recognition.

In any event, the United States and its allies should leave no doubt that repression of freely elected governments in the republics will be received with the same condemnation and opposition as the coup.

If the Soviet Union evolves in the direction foreseen by the nine-plus-one treaty, Russia’s neighbors will be freed of a threat that has been part of their landscape since Peter the Great. With new republics along the Soviet western border, with the Ukraine declaring itself independent and Belorussia part of a loose confederation, the institutional basis for Russian westward expansion will diminish, if not disappear. This would lay the basis for linking Russia to Europe in a way that has always been thwarted by Russia’s scale and the ambitions of its Russian rulers.

Such a realignment will also bring about a shift in the center of gravity of Russian foreign policy. At this point, it is too early to tell whether the Muslim republics, with their 65 million people, will opt for independence or association. In either case, they will be very sensitive to developments in the Islamic countries along their borders.

As the Russian center of gravity moves toward the Urals, Moscow may resume a historic activism in Asia. It was within this century, after all, that Russia and Japan fought a war over which country should govern Manchuria and Korea.

It is far too early to speculate about the long-term initiatives of the new leadership in Moscow. But it is not too early to begin reflecting about the nature of a new world order in conditions that now seem quite foreseeable.