L.A. Is Liable in Rape by Officer, Court Rules : Law: The decision could affect a San Diego case in which a motorist was murdered by a CHP officer.

The state Supreme Court, in a major expansion of governmental liability for crimes by peace officers, held Thursday that the city of Los Angeles can be forced to pay damages to a woman raped by a police officer who had detained her.

The justices, reinstating a $150,000 jury verdict against the city, rejected the city’s contention that under state law, municipalities are protected from financial responsibility for a criminal act it said was entirely unrelated to official duty.

The court, by a vote of 5 to 2, concluded that the vast powers given officers called for broad legal remedies for their crimes against citizens, however rare. Making the government liable for damages would encourage steps by public officials to prevent offenses by officers and provide greater compensation for victims, the justices said.

“When law enforcement officers abuse their authority by committing crimes against members of the community, they violate public trust,” Justice Joyce L. Kennard wrote for the court. “. . . The public employer must be held accountable for their actions.”

Justice Marvin R. Baxter, joined by Chief Justice Malcolm M. Lucas, agreed that the city should be held liable for damages, but only on narrow grounds. In a separate opinion, they disagreed sharply with Kennard and the majority on the broader issue, warning that the court’s “unprecedented expansion” of governmental liability would leave taxpayers responsible for “almost any abuse of position” by an officer.

Baxter said the ramifications of the ruling are “sweeping.” Government could be held responsible any time a wide variety of legally designated peace officers--ranging from sheriffs to voluntary fire wardens--use their authority in any way to commit a murder, robbery or rape, he said.

The ruling, he said, could “convert blameless public agencies into liability insurers for much, if not all, of the intentional misconduct committed by peace officers in their employ.”

A spokesman for City Atty. James K. Hahn said there would be no official comment from the city pending study of the court’s opinion.

But one Los Angeles city lawyer familiar with the case, speaking on condition that he not be identified, said he was seriously concerned about the impact of the decision. “This could have unbelievable ramifications for government all over,” the lawyer said. “This means there’s no limit on what the public is going to have to pay.”

An attorney for the firm representing the victim in the case declined comment. A public relations company representing the firm said a news conference would be held today in Los Angeles to discuss the case and its ramifications.

The court’s ruling is also expected to have an impact on a San Diego case, in which former California Highway Patrol Officer Craig Peyer was convicted of first-degree murder in 1988 in the strangulation death of Cara Knott.

Knott, 20, was killed Dec. 27, 1986, at the darkened Mercy Road off-ramp on Interstate 15. Peyer, 41, who was on duty at the time, is the first CHP officer convicted of committing murder while in uniform. He is serving 25-years-to-life in state prison.

The Knotts sued Peyer and the CHP for damages. Earlier this year, a Superior Court jury awarded the family $7.5 million in damages from Peyer, but the CHP was cleared of any liability. Despite the jury’s verdict, it is unlikely that the family will ever receive any money from Peyer.

During the civil trial, Superior Court Judge James Milliken ruled that attorneys for the Knotts could not argue that Peyer was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the murder. The Knotts’ attorneys said that Milliken’s ruling was based on the fact that the Supreme Court had not ruled on the case in Los Angeles.

“The jury was never presented with the question of whether Peyer was acting within the scope of his authority. The judge ruled that the jury could not decide that issue. Instead, the jury was asked whether the CHP or any CHP supervisor was negligent and they answered no,” said Mike Crosby, a Knott family attorney.

The Los Angeles case arose after the victim was detained in 1981 by Sgt. Leigh B. Schroyer on suspicion of drunk driving. According to testimony, after the woman pleaded not to be taken to jail, the officer drove her home in his patrol car. At the woman’s Northridge residence, Schroyer seized her, told her to be quiet and raped her.

The officer was charged, convicted and sent to prison for 18 months. The victim brought a civil suit against the city and the officer, saying the rape had caused her to develop drinking and other personal problems. A Los Angeles Superior Court jury awarded her $150,000 in damages from the city and a like amount from the officer.

The city challenged the judgment and in 1988 a state Court of Appeal reversed the award against the city, saying Los Angeles was protected from liability because the crime was personally motivated and was so unusual it could not have been reasonably foreseen by the city.

In Thursday’s ruling, the high court concluded that contrary to the Court of Appeal’s decision, the officer’s misconduct was properly found by the jury to be within his “scope of employment”--the legal standard that must be met to hold the city financially responsible as the employer under state governmental immunity statutes.

In her 39-page opinion for the majority, Kennard said that Schroyer was using his official authority when he detained teh woman, ordered her to perform a field sobriety test and told her to get into his police car. By later threatening to take her to jail if she resisted his sexual advances, he continued to assert his official power, the justice said.

Kennard noted that peace officers are granted “extraordinary power and authority” that inherently contains the potential for abuse.

“The cost resulting from misuse of that power should be borne by the community, because of the substantial benefits that the community derives from the lawful exercise of police power,” the justice wrote.

Sexual assaults by officers “are fortunately uncommon,” Kennard said, but the risk of misconduct is “broadly incidental to the enterprise of law enforcement,” thus opening the city to liability.

Kennard’s opinion was joined by Justices Stanley Mosk and Edward A. Panelli and retired Justice Allen E. Broussard, participating in the ruling by special assignment.

Justice Armand Arabian concurred in a separate opinion, citing statutes and court opinions in recent years that have provided a variety of other legal protections to victims of rape.

Baxter, joined by Lucas, agreed that the verdict against the city should be reinstated, but only on narrow grounds based on the city’s erroneous request for jury instructions that “virtually guaranteed” it would be held liable.

The two justices disagreed sharply with the majority’s expansion of governmental liability. A city should never be held financially responsible when an officer commits a crime “entirely unrelated to his law enforcement responsibilities,” Baxter said.

Baxter noted there was no claim that the city negligently failed to screen or to adequately train the officer who committed the rape.

The potential impact of the ruling on a pending damage suit against the city of Los Angeles by police beating victim Rodney G. King was not immediately clear, and King’s attorney in the case could not be reached Thursday for comment.

However, in argument before the high court in the rape case last June, Deputy City Atty. Katherine J. Hamilton acknowledged that under then-existing law, municipalities could be held liable in excessive-force cases.

Hamilton sought to draw a distinction between excessive-force cases, where officers are authorized to use some force but sometimes go beyond proper limits, and cases involving rape, in which officers have no authority at all for their behavior. Hamilton told the justices it was “absurd” to equate the improper use of a police baton with a sexual assault by an officer.

In the Cara Knott case, attorneys for the family are preparing an appeal to the state 4th District Court of Appeal, and Crosby, the attorney representing the family, said the Supreme Court’s ruling “will have a great bearing on our appeal.”

“Our case is much stronger than the Mary M. case. It was shown at both the criminal and civil trials that Peyer established a pattern of conduct in stopping young, attractive women. Cara was not the only one,” Crosby said.

Times staff writer H.G. Reza in San Diego contributed to this story.