Gates Says He ‘Learned Lessons’ of Iran-Contra : Intelligence: CIA nominee tells senators he should have done more as deputy director to head off scandal.

Robert M. Gates, President Bush’s nominee to head the CIA, conceded Monday he should have done more in the mid-1980s to head off one of the worst scandals in the agency’s history, but he assured senators he has since “learned the lessons of Iran-Contra.”

During the first day of his long-delayed confirmation hearings, Gates was much more self-effacing and apologetic than he had been four years ago when allegations about his role in the Iran-Contra affair forced him to withdraw his original nomination as CIA chief.

At the same time, he seemed more willing than in the past to lay blame for Iran-Contra on his former boss, the late William P. Casey. Gates portrayed Casey as an aloof, “unbureaucratic” CIA chief who personally ran covert operations out of his back pocket.

Gates, who now serves as White House deputy national security adviser, was the CIA’s deputy director when the Iran-Contra scandal unfolded during the Ronald Reagan Administration. His nomination to replace retiring CIA Director William H. Webster is being considered by the Senate Intelligence Committee.

As the confirmation hearings opened, a majority of committee members appeared inclined to believe that Gates would never repeat the mistakes of Iran-Contra, the secret sale of arms to Iran with the proceeds illegally diverted to aid Nicaragua’s Contra rebels. Even so, several Democrats indicated they blamed Gates not only for his role in Iran-Contra but for other CIA shortcomings as well, including its failure to foresee the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union.

“There is no question that Mr. Gates got it wrong,” said Sen. Bill Bradley (D-N.J.), referring to Gates’ statement that the Soviet Union’s communist bureaucracy was impervious to change. “The question is why.”

Bradley also blamed Gates for failing to focus the intelligence resources of the CIA on the emerging threat posed to the Middle East by Iraq following the end of the Iran-Iraq war--a mistake that left the United States unprepared for the invasion of Kuwait.

Another critic, Sen. Howard M. Metzenbaum (D-Ohio), questioned how an intelligence analyst who had served in the CIA for most of his career could remember so little about the details of his involvement in Iran-Contra. He noted that in a questionnaire Gates filled out just before the hearings, he answered, “I do not recall” in response to 33 questions about Iran-Contra.

“Many of us wonder how, in an organization whose motto boasts ‘know the truth,’ you, as a top official, could know so little of it,” Metzenbaum said. “ . . . I hope your memory improves during the course of these hearings.”

Although Bush nominated Gates last May, Senate hearings on the nomination were delayed after the former director of the CIA’s Central American Task Force, Alan D. Fiers, pleaded guilty last July to two misdemeanors arising from his role in the Iran-Contra affair. Fiers testified that he had told Gates’ subordinate, Clair E. George, about the illegal diversion of funds to aid Nicaragua’s Contra rebels.

Gates has since been identified as a “subject” but not a “target” of a grand jury investigation into the CIA’s role in Iran-Contra, indicating that his actions fall within the purview of the probe, but he is not likely to be indicted.

As he did during his earlier nomination to become CIA chief in February, 1987, Gates insisted Monday that he was never told until Oct. 1, 1986, that profits from the secret arms sales to Iran were possibly being diverted to the Nicaraguan resistance fighters. His critics, on the other hand, said they found it hard to believe that Gates was not informed earlier about the diversion, either by his subordinates or by Casey.

In the more than four years since Gates was last considered for the top CIA job, many new details have emerged about Iran-Contra. Former White House aide Oliver L. North has testified in court that he told Casey about the diversion of funds as early as January or February of 1986. And acting CIA Director Richard J. Kerr, who will testify later this week, has said he talked with Gates himself about a possible diversion as early as August or September of 1986.

But even though he did not depart from his earlier version of events, Gates acknowledged for the first time publicly that he had made mistakes in his handling of Iran-Contra. He added that if he had an opportunity to relive the events of late 1986, he would have done three things “differently” and perhaps “better”:

* “I should have taken more seriously . . . the possibility of impropriety or even wrongdoing in the government and pursued this possibility more aggressively,” he testified. “I should have pressed the issue of a possible diversion more strenuously with Director Casey and (White House National Security Adviser John M.) Poindexter.”

* “I should have been more skeptical about what I was told. I should have asked more questions and I should have been less satisfied with the answers I received, especially from Director Casey . . . “

* “I should have pressed harder for reversing” the decision of then-President Reagan to prevent the intelligence oversight committees of Congress from being told about the covert arms sales to Iran.

At the White House, Bush, who was vice president in 1986, reiterated that he strongly supports Gates to become CIA director. But asked if he, too, wished he had asked more questions about the Iran-Contra matter at the time, he replied: “I wish the damned thing had never happened. . . . But what I might have done about it, that’s something else.”

Gates served as acting CIA director prior to Webster’s appointment as director in 1987. He then served as Webster’s deputy for two years until Bush chose him as deputy national security adviser. It was during that period, he testified, “that I learned the lessons of Iran-Contra. I suspect few people have reflected more than I have on the Iran-Contra affairs--what went wrong, why CIA played by rules not of its own making, and what might have been done to prevent or at least stop this tragic affair.”

He pledged he would resign as director before condoning a policy of lying to Congress about the CIA’s role in any operation. “You will not find a nominee for director of central intelligence more aware of and sensitive to the lessons of that time, or more understanding of the importance of a good-faith relationship with the Congress,” he said.

In his defense, Gates cited a number of “well-intentioned and honest” actions he took during the Iran-Contra affair. He noted that he opposed the sale of weapons to Iran, advocated notification of Congress and informed his colleagues--including the CIA’s general counsel--when he recognized the possibility of wrongdoing.

Gates’ supporters on the committee seemed anxious to accept his apology. Chairman David L. Boren (D-Okla.) said Gates’ statement had demonstrated to the committee that the nominee is “a big person” who can admit mistakes.

During his first confirmation hearings in February, 1987, Gates defended Casey, who at that time lay dying in a hospital bed after suffering a stroke. But on Monday, he portrayed his former boss as an elderly bumbler who had trouble using the CIA telephone system and a renegade director who failed to keep his subordinates informed of his decisions.

“There was a certain distance in the relationship,” Gates said, explaining that he and his wife were never invited to Casey’s house for dinner without others and that the former director never inquired about his wife and children.

Under friendly questioning from Boren, Gates recalled in great detail the events leading up to Casey’s closed-door testimony before the House and Senate intelligence committees on Nov. 21, 1986, shortly after the nation had learned about the arms sales to Iran. It was not until four days later that then-Atty. Gen. Edwin Meese III disclosed publicly that money from the arms sales had been diverted to the Contras.

In Casey’s 1986 testimony, which was made public for the first time Monday, he failed to give the committees crucial facts about the operation. Among other things, he led the committees to believe that even though CIA officials had helped to arrange a plane flight to Tehran in 1985, they were unaware that the cargo included weapons.

Casey also failed to disclose the existence of a politically embarrassing presidential document called a “finding” that retroactively authorized the November, 1985, CIA-assisted shipment of Hawk missiles. The finding portrayed the sale as part of an “arms for hostages” deal--a characterization that Reagan had strongly denied.

Gates indicated he was not deeply involved in the drafting of Casey’s statement, even though he attended several related meetings, and thus could not be held responsible for the details. In addition, he said, CIA officials decided not to mention some details about which were they were not absolutely certain.

Even Gates’ supporters on the committee questioned his inability to remember crucial facts about Iran-Contra. Sen. Dennis DeConcini (D-Ariz.) said the hearings had been delayed in part by Gates’ “memory loss.”

In virtually all of his answers to more than 60 questions, Gates replied that he either did not know or could not recall the details of conversations, classified intelligence reports or confidential memorandums that other participants in the cover-up said they shared with him.

He was asked about a memorandum he signed which refers to a meeting between Gates and Poindexter to discuss a “special Iranian project” on Oct. 2, 1986. The memo ends with instructions by Gates to have “Tom Twetten and Charlie Allen call me.” He answered in response to the committee’s question about the memo that he could not remember why he wanted to talk to Twetten and Allen, or what he subsequently conveyed to them.

After learning that independent counsel Lawrence E. Walsh had dropped charges against North earlier in the day, the committee briefly considered calling North as a witness in the Gates hearings. But that possibility was ruled out when North’s attorney, Brendan V. Sullivan Jr., told Boren by telephone that the former White House aide would not testify without immunity from prosecution.

Meanwhile, Boren disclosed the panel will hold hearings next week into the issue of Gates’ role in assessing the Iraqi threat. He said the hearings would be held in closed session because officials fear it might undermine efforts to free American hostages.