PERSPECTIVE ON ARMS CONTROL : What If Armenia Joins Nuclear Club? : The republic supports non-proliferation, but it also has both the means and an incentive to build the ultimate defense.

Nuclear weapons are a symbol of scientific expertise and technological development. As such, they are almost synonymous with great-power status and are viewed by many states as a source of international prestige and autonomy. It is not surprising, therefore, that in the heady atmosphere of post-communist nationalism a number of former Soviet republics would have second thoughts about proclaiming themselves nuclear-free zones.

Most attention in the West and in Moscow has focused on the non-proliferation threats posed by the Ukraine and Kazakhstan, the two non-Russian republics with the greatest concentration of Soviet nuclear weapons. These two republics also possess the greatest potential indigenous nuclear-weapons capability outside of the Russian Federation, in terms of nuclear power and engineering infrastructure (the Ukraine) and weapons testing facilities (Kazakhstan). Indeed, a number of Ukrainian spokesmen have made the point that a process of nuclear inheritance would catapult the Ukraine into third place (ahead of France, Britain and China) in terms of the size of its nuclear arsenal.

An extensive literature on nuclear proliferation, however, makes clear that one should not confuse a technical capability to acquire nuclear weapons with a political decision to exercise that capability. The nuclear abstinence of Canada, Japan, Germany and Italy are useful reminders of this point. Any proliferation prognosis for the non-Russian republics, therefore, must carefully weigh not only technical capabilities but also the balance of pressures and constraints on acquiring (or, as the case may be, retaining) nuclear weapons.

This mode of analysis suggests that, barring blatant Russian revanchist behavior, the republic with the greatest security incentive to acquire nuclear weapons may well be Armenia.

Armenia, in fact, shares a number of “proliferation push” characteristics with Israel. The peoples of both nations have experienced a Holocaust and perceive themselves to be faced with extinction. Both nations confront hostile Muslim neighbors with larger populations. Although not nearly as advanced in its nuclear program as Israel, Armenia also possesses a highly developed nuclear science and engineering infrastructure and may be expected to call on assistance from the large number of affluent and skilled Armenians living abroad (i.e., its version of the Jewish Diaspora). If Soviet troops withdraw from the region and ethnic conflict with Azerbaijan intensifies, the Armenian leadership could conclude that a nuclear bomb might possess deterrent value for a nation without allies that faces hostile Muslim neighbors.

Armenia possesses a cadre of nuclear scientists and advanced training and research facilities, as well as two recently decommissioned light-water power reactors. It is estimated that, if reactivated, these reactors could produce up to 200 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium a year. In light of this combination of potential nuclear capability and security incentives to acquire nuclear weapons, it is reassuring that the Armenian Parliament pledged last month to abide by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Few if any of the successor states to the Soviet Union are apt to oppose treaty membership overtly. In most instances the fear of nuclear accidents, weapons development and maintenance costs, environmental considerations and the lack of external security threats are likely to outweigh significantly the perceived benefits of acquiring nuclear weapons or retaining those now deployed on their territory.

It is imperative, nevertheless, that the United States and the other major economic powers make clear to the new states that quick accession to the non-proliferation treaty is expected and that diplomatic recognition and economic assistance will not be forthcoming in its absence.