Riot Study to Say L.A. Lacked Emergency Plan : Inquiry: Draft of Webster report blames structural flaws at City Hall, LAPD command, sources say.

A combination of poor contingency planning by Los Angeles officials and failure to quickly marshal law enforcement from other Southern California cities seriously hampered efforts to contain the arson and looting that swept large areas of the county during last spring’s riots, a special investigating panel has found.

A five-month study headed by former FBI Director William H. Webster and Hubert Williams, president of the Washington-based Police Foundation, will enter a broadly critical judgment on the riot readiness of the Los Angeles Police Department and city government when it is released next week, sources familiar with the study have told The Times.

Much of the blame, these sources say, is placed on an unwieldy City Hall emergency preparedness system that scattered responsibility and accountability among bureaucrats and politicians.

The 300-page study, which is being kept secret until Wednesday’s release, was the result of an intensive inquiry by dozens of volunteer attorneys and drew on testimony from hundreds of police officers, city officials and residents. It was ordered by the city Police Commission after widespread criticism that the LAPD response was slow and chaotic as violence erupted after not guilty verdicts in the trial of four police officers charged with beating Rodney G. King.

Several sources who have seen draft copies of the report say it singles out for criticism former Police Chief Daryl F. Gates, Mayor Tom Bradley and City Administrative Officer Keith Comrie. The report was still undergoing last-minute revisions, the sources said, and it was not immediately clear how pointed the criticism of key officials will be.

The sources say the emphasis is on deeper structural problems at City Hall--a diffusion of authority that made it unclear who was supposed to ensure that city government was ready for the worst.

“There was a lack of effective planning . . . a failure of anyone to really take responsibility,” one source said, summarizing the findings.

Webster did not return a reporter’s phone calls, and a panel spokesman declined to comment.

The panel’s conclusions and proposed remedies, the sources said, are being closely guarded by an inner circle of investigation leaders, including Webster, Williams, and General Counsel Richard J. Stone.

But sources said the 12-chapter report will contain several major themes. Among them:

* Despite Gates’ repeated assurances to the contrary, the LAPD brass developed no detailed plan for dealing with the possibility of major disturbances after verdicts in the King beating case. A longstanding emergency manual cited by Gates as the riot plan was actually a general training guide that did not specifically address the situation at hand. “It was just something sitting on the shelf,” said one source familiar with the report. “They didn’t really have a plan, if you will.” Gates, who left police headquarters to attend a political fund-raiser as violence spread, also is faulted for not assuming more direct command responsibility in the riots.

* A top-level emergency preparedness committee at City Hall, which is supposed to oversee readiness and training for earthquakes and other crises, was not properly geared up to deal with widespread civil disorder. The standing Emergency Management Committee, headed by Comrie, is intended to play a key role in preparations, ensuring that law enforcement and other agencies are working together. The committee also is charged with coordinating emergency plans with other state and local agencies.

* Officials relied on the National Guard for help early in the riots rather than seeking aid from nearby law enforcement agencies--a key mistake that exacerbated delays in quelling the violence. In the first hours of the rioting, the report notes, Bradley bypassed a well-established, regional emergency aid system that could have provided large numbers of sheriff’s deputies and police officers from neighboring communities. Instead, the mayor, after a request from an LAPD official, asked Gov. Pete Wilson for National Guard troops, which under the best of circumstances can take 24 hours to deploy.

Reinforcements from the Sheriff’s Department and other local law enforcement agencies were requested, but not until the morning after the violence began.

“The call for help wasn’t done right,” said one committee source. “The mayor got on the phone and called the governor and asked for the National Guard. But he was supposed to turn to the regional (police reinforcement) plan first, and it would have immediately deployed reinforcements to the city.”

Another source who read a draft of the report said: “Had they adequately utilized (police from other jurisdictions) they could have brought to bear a lot of resources.”

Among the many factors the report is expected to cite as evidence of the city’s poor planning and coordination is the 13-month period leading up to the verdicts in the King case during which Bradley and Gates, who were locked in a bitter feud, had no direct communications.

On the positive side, the report gives some credit to the individual efforts made by Bradley and Gates to forestall trouble, the sources said.

The mayor is cited for behind-the-scenes attempts to organize a peaceful rally and community patrols with inner-city church and civic leaders on the night the verdicts were announced. And the report notes that before the verdicts, Gates appealed to all LAPD patrol officers to respond calmly and professionally, the sources said. He also publicly requested special funding to pay for anticipated police officers’ overtime.

The study, the sources said, encompasses a wide range of information from what happened before and during the riots to a summary of city history and demographic changes, as well as the complexities of the bureaucracies that operate in City Hall and the Los Angeles Police Department.

A lot of the report “is going to be kind of dull,” said one source who read a draft. “It struggles mightily not to be political.”

Indeed, some sources said the report is expected to be ambiguous on some key points. An exhaustive analysis suggests that the rioting could have been contained more quickly by better planning and deployment, but just how quickly remains vague.

The LAPD command staff also comes under fire, the sources said, but the report is fuzzy in analyzing actions of commanders and field supervisors in the crucial first hours of the riots.

For example, sources said, the report does not say who in the LAPD was responsible for an hours-long delay in securing the intersection of Florence and Normandie avenues--a flash point of the riots where the nation watched televised images of mobs looting and beating motorists.

Overall, the sources said, the report stresses fundamental weaknesses in the city’s emergency planning and training procedures, rather than mistakes that may have been made by individuals. Some sources strongly defended this approach.

“This is about fixing the city,” one source said.

Also contributing to this story was Times staff writer Ted Rohrlich.