COLUMN LEFT / ALEXANDER COCKBURN : John Wayne Endings Only Work on Film : Sending U.S. troops to guard Somali relief shipments may actually cause more starvation.

Western news reports from Somalia stress the utter breakdown of normal inhibitions and sanctions and dissolve a complicated historical, social and class landscape into a cartoon terrain of “warlords,” drug-intoxicated, gun-toting young hoodlums and starving children ministered to by Western relief workers.

A cartoon narrative demands a cartoon finale: U.S. Marines to the rescue, riding shotgun on the relief convoys ready to blow away the Somali homeboys. Questions of whether the Somalis actually desire U.S. intervention are shunted aside.

The Marines will not go in and out of Somalia in a week or a month. Their arrival will affect political rivalries, systems of pillage and black-marketeering and a series of private arrangements by the relief organizations--the Red Cross, Save the Children, Catholic Relief Services, CARE and others--already working in the field. So the troops will be challenged and most likely will kill or be killed. U.S. military commanders will be forced to intervene in Somalia’s internal struggles, the most recent round of which were triggered by the 1991 flight of Mohamed Siad Barre, the country’s tyrant of a quarter of a century.

Rakiya Omaar, a Somali who, until last week when she was fired, directed the human-rights organization Africa Watch, stresses that the talents required in the reconstitution of Somalia’s civil society are the very opposite of the brusque irruption of U.S./U.N. military force. (Omaar’s dismissal by Human Rights Watch director Aryeh Neier was for publicly contradicting the organization’s welcome of Bush’s offer to send U.S. troops.)

Omaar points out that many non-U.S. relief groups deplore intervention with substantial force. The United Nations asserts that up to 80% of all relief shipments are being stolen. But Omaar says that well-run private relief organizations such as the Red Cross or Save the Children are enduring a loss rate of less than 10%.

Omaar said from London last week that “Mogadishu is totally flooded with food” and “anybody can buy rice, it’s very cheap.” Not every Somali is starving, nor, despite there being no government, is the country bereft of civic institutions. Northern Somalia, seeking independence, has a functioning government that does not welcome major U.N. military intervention.

Relief agencies like the Red Cross have established elaborate arrangements for supervision and protection of relief convoys, managing these much more successfully than does the existing U.N. contingent. “If troops go in shooting,” Omaar argues, “All foreign relief workers will become targets for terrorist reprisals. (The British wing of) Save the Children has already said that it will be forced to withdraw if this happens. Only the United Nations will stay, and their program is incompetently run and doing precious little good anyway.”

Equally important, the work of the Somali clan leaders, doctors and humanitarian workers will become impossible. These people are absolutely vital if the international relief effort is to stand any chance of success, but none will be able to work on behalf of an invading force. Omaar stresses that the contribution of Somalis to relieving the famine, healing the sick and resolving the conflict is greater than the entire international relief effort.

If armed enclaves are set up, Omaar says, hungry Somalis will be obliged to move to them in order to be fed, and hence more Somalis could be killed than saved. Famine camps invariably lead to epidemics of disease and death rates five or more times higher than in neighboring villages. Even in the famine zone, relief is only a small part of the total diet. Locally grown and traded food, wild foods and the charity of neighbors and relatives are all more important than the international relief effort. Taking away self-help to give aid is no benefit; it is a loss.

But what does Omaar recommend? Ironically, she says there was a solution that worked. It was tried by Mohamed Sahnoun, the U.N. special envoy to Somalia until his dismissal by Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. It consisted of negotiating with all the elements of Somali society that could play a constructive role. In October, progress was being made by clan elders toward ensuring that relief could be safely distributed. The power of the warlords was eroding.

What is needed is some good diplomacy by someone who follows Sahnoun’s strategy, using a prudent U.N. troop presence as a backup if need be and a decent humanitarian U.N. program (with competent professional staff consulting with the voluntary agencies). Then, says Omaar, we would probably find that the U.N. troops are not even needed.