Doubt Cast on FAA’s Handling of 757 Data : Aviation: Report suggests that agency, lacking proper procedures, acted tardily on airliner’s wake turbulence.

The Federal Aviation Administration may have mishandled reports on turbulence problems associated with Boeing 757 airliners because it doesn’t have the proper procedures to ensure that safety concerns are acted upon in a timely fashion, according to a federal report released Tuesday.

The 46-page report, a joint effort by the FAA and the Department of Transportation, concluded that some officials within the FAA believe the agency could have acted sooner in taking steps designed to prevent accidents caused by wake turbulence from Boeing 757s. Others in the agency, however, do not share that view, the report said.

Aside from the conflicting views on whether the agency mishandled the issue of 757 wake turbulence--a phenomenon that has been linked two fatal airplane crashes--the panel assembled by U.S. Transportation Secretary Federico Pena and FAA Administrator David R. Hinson found a “consensus” within the FAA that the agency’s ability to spot potential safety threats and take appropriate action is lacking.

“The B-757 wake vortex episode should serve as a wake-up call to the FAA to re-examine its processes for addressing emerging safety issues promptly and effectively,” wrote the two officials who headed the review team, DOT general counsel Stephen H. Kaplan and FAA Deputy Administrator Linda Hall Daschle.

Historically, the FAA has been criticized for being slow to act on safety issues.

While the report maintained that the FAA has an “unparalleled” safety record, it sent a clear message--as well as a list of recommendations--to Hinson and Pena that the agency could do better.

Daschle said during a discussion of the report that bureaucracy and a lack of leadership and “clout” have compromised the efficacy of the Office of Aviation Safety, whose job it is to identify, analyze and otherwise call attention to safety-related issues.

Pena and Hinson ordered the review in mid-June after a series of reports in The Times indicated that the FAA knew about the potential danger of 757 wake turbulence long before two crashes that claimed 13 lives.

Caused by the rapid movement of air across aircraft wings, wake turbulence amounts to a pair of “horizontal tornadoes” emanating from each wingtip. Although aviation experts disagree on the level of danger, some believe that the sleek wing and body design of the fuel-efficient 757 can cause wake turbulence that is more powerful and lasts longer than turbulence from other aircraft of comparable size.

Relying on FAA internal documents and aviation safety sources, The Times reported June 5 that the FAA’s top scientist, Robert E. Machol, repeatedly expressed concern about 757 wake turbulence and warned in December, 1992, that it could be lethal and might cause a “major crash” if the agency failed to act. Eleven days after Machol’s prediction, a crash did occur on Dec. 18, 1992, in Billings, Mont., killing eight people.

Then in December, 1993, five people died in Santa Ana after a corporate jet encountered the wake turbulence from a 757 on approach to John Wayne Airport and crashed. Among those killed were the top two executives of the In-N-Out Burger chain.

Reacting to recommendations made in February by the National Transportation Safety Board, the FAA instituted a new set of policies governing smaller planes landing and taking off behind 757s, including an extra mile of spacing on final approach. The agency has also embarked on an aggressive program to educate pilots and air traffic controllers about the potential 757 wake turbulence hazard.

A congressional subcommittee is scheduled to take up the specific issue of whether the FAA tarried too long before acting on 757 wake turbulence concerns, as well as the general topic of whether the people who detect potential safety problems within the FAA communicate effectively with the agency’s policy and decision makers.

In its report, the FAA and DOT were unwavering in their opinion that nothing the FAA could have done would have prevented the Billings crash. Safety investigators have concluded that the pilot in the Billings accident was operating under visual flight rules, meaning it was up to him to maintain a safe distance behind the 757 he was tailing. Other aviation safety officials have suggested, however, that had the FAA called attention to the potential 757 turbulence hazard earlier, the Billings pilot might have been more prudent.

Because the NTSB has not finished its investigation of the Santa Ana crash, the report did not speculate on whether the FAA’s actions could have affected the incident.

Like the pilot in the ill-fated Billings accident, the pilot in the Santa Ana crash was flying under visual flight rules. He, too, had inadvertently strayed too close to the 757 and dropped below the flight path of the 757, which made his smaller plane more susceptible to the wake turbulence.

Though it did not draw a conclusion, the review panel found that some people within the FAA believe it “would have been appropriate” for the agency to have communicated what it knew about 757 wake turbulence much earlier than it did. Others told the panel that although the FAA had a fair amount of information on 757 wake turbulence as far back as 1990, it was not definitive enough to prompt policy changes or its dissemination to pilots.

The panel recommended that the agency:

* Review the role of the Office of Aviation Safety and create a more effective mechanism to address safety issues.

The agency lacks “a single organization, mechanism or entity” that can identify potential safety problems, alert others within the agency and follow up on safety recommendations, the report said.

* Take a more proactive approach when it comes to communicating potential safety hazards to pilots, air traffic controllers or others in the industry.

For example, while some within the agency considered reports from NASA’s Aviation Safety Reporting System and the United Kingdom’s Civil Aviation Authority--both of which had red-flagged 757 wake turbulence before the accidents--to be incomplete, the panel noted that “a more careful consideration of this type of data might have raised the possibility” that further action was “merited.”

* Better define who is responsible for what within the agency.

In one instance, the panel said, two departments within the FAA each thought the other bore the responsibility for certain aspects of wake turbulence research.

* Improve research and development, including that for wake turbulence.

The panel found that although wake turbulence is considered a potentially deadly threat, the agency’s wake turbulence program has suffered from inadequate funding, high turnover and unclear goals.

From 1989 to 1993, for example, the FAA spent more than $11 million on wake turbulence research and had nothing useful to show for it, the panel concluded.

* Improve communication between those within the FAA involved in day-to-day operations of the nation’s airways and those who conduct research on safety issues.

The panel found that recommendations from Machol, the agency’s chief scientist who began singling out 757 wake turbulence as a potential hazard in the late 1980s, were sometimes ignored or brushed off by some officials who perceived him as “a thorn in the side of engineers and program managers”--a not uncommon perception for someone whose job essentially amounts to quality control.

In a remarkable finding that suggests a troubling degree of pettiness inside the nation’s air regulatory agency, the report said, “That it was Dr. Machol making these recommendations might have influenced the decision . . . not to take action.”

For his part, Machol, who retired recently from the FAA, said this week that he knew he was perceived as one who “rattles chains,” but that that was part of his job.

* PUBLIC INFORMATION: FAA urged to overhaul handling of requests for data. A12