Superpowerdom: Is It the Mantle America Needs to Wear? : Answer is yes, but in the post-Cold War era there can be no real leadership without consistency and no consistency without leadership

Just a few years ago the United States was enjoying what surely must be counted as among its most remarkable foreign policy achievements of the last 200 years, and its political leaders were proudly proclaiming America’s new post-Cold War status as the world’s only superpower. That claim is seldom heard anymore, at least on an official level. Superpowerdom, it seems, is now perceived not so much as something to boast about as a burden to bear.

True, the United States, by virtue of its still formidable military strength, its massive economy and the complex web of trade, commercial, diplomatic and security ties it has spun around the world, unquestionably remains the dominant international power. True, also, that much of the world continues to insist that the United States lead in moments of international crisis or distress, and often seems prone to sink into a kind of stuporous inertia if Washington passes on the opportunity to do so. The leadership role has by no means been abdicated. But Americans are also clearly in no hurry to undertake new adventures or responsibilities abroad.

NEO-ISOLATIONIST VOICES AREN’T REACHING MANY

There are few signs at the same time that Americans in any significant numbers are being attracted to isolationism, though neo-isolationist voices at both extremes of the political spectrum are being raised. Instead Americans not unreasonably want to hear their political leaders make a convincing case that accepting any new international obligation in fact serves their country’s interests, foremost of which are protecting its security and furthering its economic well-being.

Throughout most of its history the Cold War took precedence when it came to apportioning the nation’s resources and making choices about what the United States should do abroad. Now priorities have been largely reordered.

Walt Rostow, economist and former presidential security adviser, probably speaks for most Americans when he says, “If we wish to have increased influence in the world we must first regain our international competitiveness and show an ability to pay our own way.” Samuel P. Huntington of Harvard’s Institute for Strategic Studies agrees: “The consequence of a failure to renew our economy is a decline in our relative (global) power.”

OLD DEBATE: THE ‘REALISTS’ VERSUS THE ‘IDEALISTS’

At the academic level today, if not yet very loudly in the political arena, the old debate between foreign policy “realists” and “idealists” simmers on.

As David Callahan defines the issues in his book “Between Two Worlds,” the argument is between those who would pretty much maintain the U.S. global outlook of the last half-century, with its emphasis on national strength to promote international stability, and those who call for “more ambitious U.S. initiatives for promoting democracy, sustainable development and collective security,” all to be funded out of sharply reduced defense spending.

In the real world in which policy-makers must try to find their way such an either-or approach is of little practical use. An effective foreign policy has no choice but to deal with the world as it is rather than as theorists would like it to be.

At the same time a foreign policy that ignores basic American values is morally as well as politically unsustainable. Even a rigorously “realistic” approach to the world must maintain an active commitment to human rights and support for fledgling democracies.

The issue is one of emphasis. Graham Fuller, a senior political scientist at RAND, argues that “creating a community of like-minded states should be the underlying principle that drives most of our foreign policy,” since “it is a matter of historical fact that democratic states do not fight each other.”

Expanding the world’s democracies and encouraging the growth of market economies--stated goals of the Clinton Administration--are noble objectives. But in a world composed of vastly different cultures with their own particular notions of how society should be organized, how effectively can U.S. policy pursue these goals?

Leslie Gelb, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, notes that “most Americans now understand that democracy is a state of grace not readily attained and not within their power to impose. Nor are they eager to expend lives and resources to transform sinkholes into free enterprise paradises.” Edward Luttwak, president of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, is equally blunt: “States require a cultural basis for democracy, and if they do not have it, it is nonsense to suppose that the United States can create or sustain such an atmosphere.”

STABILITY AS THE PRIME AIM OF FOREIGN POLICY

None of this means the United States should forget about trying to promote its most basic values, only that its ability to do so must be weighed pragmatically. Princeton’s Richard Falk is one of those who believes that “the primary aim of U.S. policy should be to maintain stability. Efforts to build democracy and protect human rights, while valid, must remain peripheral.” Moreover, recalling the Clinton Administration’s dismal and humiliating retreat on its China policy, “we should reject any linkage between access to U.S. markets and human rights performance by specific states.”

ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION, POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION

Graham Fuller agrees, at least in part: “The causal relationship between economic and political liberalization is sufficiently complex that we should consider striving for the former instead of the latter in certain cases, as with China . . . some double standards (in trying to promote American values) are inevitable.”

Double standards are hardly novel in international relations. Our government, for example, routinely deplores abuses of human rights in, say, Iran, an antagonist, while keeping mum about the absence of many freedoms in, say, Saudi Arabia, a friend.

Most governments, doing the same thing themselves, tend to overlook such inconsistencies. But foreign governments, especially unfriendly ones, can be brutally unforgiving when Washington’s approach to larger issues is seen to be marked by uncertainties, confusion or inconstancy.

The Bush Administration gave Saddam Hussein good reason for misreading American intentions before he invaded Kuwait. Similarly the Clinton Administration’s record of strong words but weak actions in regard to Bosnia, Somalia, North Korea and Haiti at best can be seen to have invited international confusion and derision. At worst it invites a dangerous testing of U.S. will.

Inconsistency or instability is punished in world politics, warns Edward Luttwak. What the United States needs, he says, is “a policy that maximizes its credibility and minimizes our need to actually intervene.” Often, he adds, “the message an action or inaction sends is even more important than the policy itself.”

By its very nature, the long and sometimes perilous competition with Soviet-led communism elicited a host of U.S. commitments around the world, some of which it’s clear now had only the most marginal connection with real national interests. That era has ended. But precisely because it seeks a stable world in which its own and other economies can flourish and where humane values can be advanced, the United States is destined to remain deeply involved in world affairs.

What should the nation’s strategic priorities be? There’s broad agreement that domestic economic renewal must be at the top of the list, for without a vigorous economy U.S. influence and credibility seem sure to decline. Political influence and diplomatic influence are not, of course, always effective in deterring threats to peace and security. That’s why it’s essential that adequate American military power be maintained, with particular priority given to high-tech “smart” weapons and an ability to move rapidly. But direct U.S. military engagement should be undertaken only when strategic interests clearly demand it. The Persian Gulf War, with its threat to world oil supplies, was such a case; Somalia and Bosnia are not.

A WELL-ARTICULATED POLICY BACKED BY REAL DEEDS

Since indecision and imprecision among policy-makers so clearly weaken America’s political, diplomatic and moral standing, consistency in stating and carrying out strategic policies is vital. The President and his top officials must be prepared to put deeds--and, if need be, military power--behind their words. That could require acting unilaterally when national interests warrant doing so. More often, it will likely mean participating as part of a larger collective effort.

“Multilateralism, for good or ill, almost always requiring American leadership, has descended on the world,” notes Leslie Gelb. The key words in that sentence are American leadership. Can it rise to the myriad and largely unforeseen challenges that the post-Cold War world presents?