If L.A. Wants Bonds Passed, It Must Have Voters’ Trust : Leaders need to find ways to ensure that promises are kept

In recent years, the City of Los Angeles has made it evident that it has been unable to make good on promises to the voters. Voters have passed big-money bond propositions and then didn’t get what they thought they paid for. A few examples:

--Political leaders came up with lousy cost calculations on a 1989 bond measure to upgrade Police Department facilities. This failure helped feed voter distrust, and the resulting credibility gap played a role in the narrow defeat last June of another bond measure, Proposition 1, a $171-million proposal to fund new police stations in the Wilshire area and the San Fernando Valley and other structural upgrades to relieve overcrowding.

--City officials failed to live up to a pledge made in the 1992 Proposition M campaign to undertake “immediate improvements” in the 911 emergency phone system. After promising to speed construction on two new dispatch centers and to bolster the existing system, officials got mired in the familiar bureaucratic bog. Various parties took turns adding “input” to the project. Then, last year, the number of callers who abandoned 911 in despair broke a record.

--Blatant “mission creep” has occurred in the City Hall retrofitting project. In 1990, estimates of the cost to shore up the 68-year-old structure stood at $92 million. Since then, projections have ballooned as high as $300 million.

We cite these examples because a new 66-page draft study by the consulting group Kosmont and Associates, “Los Angeles Police Department Facilities Study,” calls for a sweeping overhaul of LAPD infrastructure. The report urges the city to undertake a capital improvement program for police facilities it estimates would total $1 billion. For starters, it recommends a $432.5-million issue be placed before the voters no later than November.

The money would be used to construct two new stations and replace the aging Hollenbeck (built in 1964), Rampart (1967) and West Valley (1967) stations. Funds would also cover improvements for 10 other stations. Another key change calls for the demolition of Parker Center. The cramped and crumbling downtown headquarters would be replaced with a new, safer and more spacious facility, preferably in an existing commercial structure.

As for the LAPD crime lab, which was roundly criticized for mishandling evidence in the O.J. Simpson case, the report rightly recommends a consolidation. Currently the special LAPD unit is scattered over three locations--Piper Tech, Parker Center and a building adjacent to the Northeast station. To gain national accreditation, the lab should be placed under one roof in a move that addresses design flaws and alleviates overcrowding.

Overcrowding is not a problem just at Parker Center and the crime lab. Space is a luxury throughout the department. Officers have to change into their uniforms behind hallway partitions. Interview rooms for suspects double as offices. Detectives are exiled, blocks from their stations, in rented building space. And some officers have to do paperwork at desks placed in locker room shower stalls.

These conditions are deplorable and unsafe. No one disputes that. But if city leaders hope to convince voters that Los Angeles needs new police facilities, they are going to have to provide proper assurances that they can deliver as promised--at cost and on time.

As the draft of the Kosmont study states, “There is little point to making more investments in police facilities in the absence of an appropriate facilities management program.” Before any measure is placed on the ballot, all major parties--elected leaders, police officials and department heads--must agree on priorities. There must be accountability and clear lines of authority. Bad planning, poor management, diffused leadership and an overall lack of accountability have plagued other city bond projects. City leaders should make sure this does not continue, whether police bonds or any other civic endeavors are involved.