Why Lebed Had to Go--Pronto

The dramatic ouster of Russia’s colorful “man on horseback,” Gen. Alexander I. Lebed, again brings into sharp relief the inherent instability of a country that is in the middle of an intense succession power struggle, even as it waits to see if President Boris N. Yeltsin’s job may not be available, after all. The unceremonious firing of the chief of the Security Council, considered by many the odds-on favorite to succeed the president, greatly simplifies the political calculus in the Kremlin and, as such, makes policy, at least for the time being, more predictable. This is certainly a welcome development, given that Lebed’s short tenure at the top was characterized by incessant controversy almost to the point of policy paralysis. On the other hand, his departure will almost certainly exacerbate the festering Chechnya problem and perhaps lead to renewed hostilities in that breakaway republic. Beyond that, the circumstances surrounding the general’s firing show, surprising as this may sound, to what extent Russia has changed for the better.

Though sudden, Lebed’s fall from grace was hardly unexpected. Placing third in the first round of last June’s presidential elections, the general was ushered into the circles of power by Yeltsin, who needed Lebed’s supporters in the runoff election. Distrusted from the beginning by the Kremlin’s power brokers, Lebed probably infuriated Yeltsin early on by suggesting that he would become president when Yeltsin’s second term ended, “and perhaps much earlier.” Although considered by some as a folk hero after he negotiated an end to the extremely unpopular war in Chechnya, Lebed has since seen his power gradually whittled down by Kremlin rivals and by Yeltsin.

To a considerable degree, though, Lebed became his own worst enemy. He made a mortal foe of the powerful minister of the interior, Gen. Anatoly S. Kulikov, when he accused him of corruption and of losing Chechnya. He angered many in the army’s top brass, who saw his negotiated cease-fire in Chechnya as a humiliating surrender.

Lebed also alienated many of his erstwhile allies. He quarreled with his own choice for defense minister, Gen. Igor N. Rodionov, over military reform and earned the enmity of fellow hard-liner Yevgeny M. Primakov, the foreign minister, by encroaching on his turf. In the end, isolated and progressively powerless, he seemed to turn to plotting and intrigue himself.

While there is no firm evidence that he actually plotted a coup, as Kulikov accused him of, Lebed’s opponents could certainly point to behavior unbecoming of a top government official as reason enough to dump him. For example, after frequently warning of an imminent mutiny in the army, Lebed attended, two days before he was fired, a secretive meeting of disgruntled airborne commanders, a meeting that could only be interpreted by his critics as encouraging insubordination.

Though this meeting may have served as the immediate pretext for Lebed’s dismissal, the real reason probably lies in another recent development far more threatening to the general’s rivals in the Kremlin. This concerns the Lebed’s alliance with Alexander V. Korzhakov, the shadowy and corrupt former chief of Yeltsin’s security detail. Though out of power, Korzhakov is believed to have tapped the telephones of many of the Kremlin’s power players and to possess reams of compromising evidence. More important, Korzhakov is known to have been the political protector of the shady Russian arms-sales monopoly Rossvooruzhenie, a secretive organization with huge amounts of slush funds for sympathetic politicians.

Should Lebed, using Korzhakov’s services, be able to gain access to Rossvooruzhenie’s money in return for political protection, he would suddenly become a much more formidable presidential aspirant, since lack of financing is his most serious weakness. Recent evidence that Lebed had already intervened on the arms dealers’ behalf may have triggered the decision to get rid of him now.

The big question is to what extent Lebed remains a force in the presidential-succession sweepstakes. There are reasons to believe that his popularity and stature among the electorate have, if anything, benefited from his perceived mistreatment by the Kremlin. In the view of some observers, he would be tough to beat if a presidential election were called in the next few months.

But there are also reasons to doubt this. It is widely believed that Lebed’s most likely route to a presidential victory would be an alliance with the powerful Communist and nationalist factions that dominate the Russian Parliament and whose views on many issues are compatible with the general’s. But, to the surprise of many, Communist Party leader Gennady A. Zyuganov supported the government’s move against Lebed, and arch-nationalist Vladimir V. Zhirinovsky approved of his dismissal, too, inveighing against “loose-cannon generals.” It is difficult to see how Lebed can mount a credible campaign in the absence of a strong power base and money, given the power of the government and the nearly universal hostility toward him in the media.

Of course, should Yeltsin’s health improve, the question of succession would become academic, and Lebed almost certainly would fade into political insignificance. It would be no great loss to the cause of Russian democracy. It was Lebed, after all, who, in one of his more inspired moments, suggested that Russian legislators be appointed rather than elected.

The one certain negative consequence of Lebed’s departure will be the fate of Chechnya. It is no exaggeration to say that Lebed’s personal tenacity and the rebels’ trust in him constituted the only glue that held the tentative peace accord together during the past two months. Although Prime Minister Viktor A. Chernomyrdin will mightily strive to prevent an outright collapse of the agreement--the political repercussions of failure will be treacherous--there are just too many factors that work against a smooth continuation of the cease-fire.

Many Russian generals are itching for revenge. Some Chechen rebels are determined to push ahead with their independence agenda. Religious extremists are bent on creating an Islamic republic. And, lately, a powerful separatist movement in the ethnically Russian northern districts of the republic is forming. Throw in catastrophic economic conditions and Russia’s refusal to help ameliorate them--and you have a new explosion of violence in the making.

In the aftermath of Lebed’s ouster, with its coup and countercoup accusations, lurid tales of back-stabbing, intrigue and corruption, it may seem as if we are back to the age-old Byzantine traditions of Kremlin politics. But if you look again, you will realize that virtually everything that unfolded did so in full daylight of media scrutiny. Also, no official acted unconstitutionally. Not a perfect democracy, to be sure, but certainly a vast improvement from just five years ago, even in the middle of a no-holds-barred power struggle. Conventional wisdom notwithstanding, the more Russia changes, the more it seems not to be the same.