To Save Its Democracy, Turkey May Destroy It

ISTANBUL — Turkey, the West’s gateway to the East, a pivotal member of North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the buffer against many of the last rogue states or authoritarian regimes, is at a precipice perhaps unparalleled in its modern history. Last week, the crisis reached the point that the army appeared prepared to overthrow the government. After weeks of believing the generals couldn’t or wouldn’t repeat what they had done in 1960, 1971 and 1980, popular wisdom is now beginning to believe they’ll do it again--in 1997. Maybe soon.

The problem? Democracy.

At the core of a complex dispute is a key issue: Does democracy have to be secular?

The military contends it does. At a series of emergency briefings with judges, academics, journalists and civic leaders last week, the top brass repeatedly cited Article 2 of the Constitution, which says Turkey is a secular state. And Article 4, which says Article 2 can never be changed. And subsequent laws that assign the army to protect this secular state.

Yet, in the 1995 democratic elections, which were weighted in favor of traditional parties, the largest bloc of voters cast ballots for an Islamist party called Refah, or Welfare. It won 22% of the vote, which translated into almost a third of the seats in Parliament. After protracted wrangling, Welfare leader Necmettin Erbakan formed a coalition with the True Path Party of former Prime Minister Tansu Ciller.

Suddenly, the most secular state in the Muslim world had an Islamist prime minister with an agenda at least partly tinged with Islamist overtones.

The result has been an escalating sense of panic in both traditional political and military circles. Since February, the military has launched a progressively tight squeeze of Refah in the form of several ultimatums. The latest has been dubbed the “last warning” by the Turkish press. Last month, the state prosecutor added to the pressure by filing suit in the country’s constitutional court to have Refah outlawed, somewhat late in the political day, for being a religion-based party operating in a secular state.

In an attempt to defuse the crisis, Erbakan agreed Friday to cede the top job to his secular coalition partner. Ciller, now deputy prime minister, would become prime minister under this arrangement. But it is little more than a cosmetic swap, since Erbakan will take her portfolio and the foreign ministry. Refah would remain in power.

The real danger in Turkey today, however, is not Refah. Rather, it is that either the military or the constitutional court will act on the pretext of preserving Turkey as a secular state. Because the price will be democracy. And in the end, Turkey will be no safer or more stable. Probably the opposite.

Indeed, just how much of a “threat” Refah really represents for Turkey is seriously debatable.

By standards in the United States, a land of personal freedoms and parochial schools, the majority of items on Refah’s agenda are petty or non-issues: allowing girls to wear head scarves to school if they prefer; permitting children to go to religious schools through middle school; allowing those with Islamist beliefs to remain or rise in the military. On the horizon was a looming debate over changing the day of rest, in an overwhelmingly Muslim country, from Sunday to Friday, the Muslim Sabbath.

To curb what they view as the threat of Islamic militancy, the generals have gotten involved in the minutia of daily civilian life--demanding that private Koranic instruction be brought under government control, that the activity of Islamist groups be restricted, that school dress codes be secular and that the numbers of pupils in religious schools be cut. The army has also demanded that military officers with Islamist leanings be retired. On each issue, Erbakan has agreed, albeit reluctantly, then moved slowly in implementation.

That doesn’t mean Refah’s rise has been particularly welcome on several fronts. But events and patterns of the past 18 months do need to be put in perspective, then a cost-benefit ratio calculated, before tolerating drastic steps that would amount to a bloodless coup d’etat or an undemocratic court edict.

Refah’s campaign rhetoric, for example, did often range from inflammatory to downright worrisome. It was critical of U.S.-led Operation Provide Comfort against Iraq, which is based in Turkey, and of past Turkish governments for being U.S. lackeys. It talked of a foreign policy leaning eastward to Asia rather than westward. It opposed joining the European Customs Union, a step on the road to membership in the European Union. It talked instead of an Islamic common market, an Islamic NATO and an Islamic currency.

Yet, most of Refah’s actions and words since taking office have struck a far different note. After a calamitous maiden trip to Iran and Libya, where Erbakan was embarrassed or criticized and which top aides now concede was a mistake, his government has struck a more modest note. Indeed, Turkey has closer diplomatic and economic relations with Israel than at any time since the Jewish state was founded--a situation orchestrated by Ciller but accepted by Refah.

A new alliance sponsored by Erbakan mobilizes seven other Muslim countries, all but one with populations exceeding 50 million: Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria and Pakistan. Tentatively called the Muslim-8, he switched the title to the Developing-8. Instead of confronting the industrialized nations of the G-7, he reportedly asked the U.S. ambassador to organize a dialogue and diplomatic interchange.

Many of the Islamist outlets, including dozens of print and broadcast media outlets, schools, businesses and social service groups, have received financial support from countries ranging from Saudi Arabia to Iran. But this long predates Refah’s political rise and is common among Muslim states; Washington even encouraged and exploited the practice to strengthen mujahadeen opposition to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Some sponsors are close U.S. allies. And while perhaps undesirable in Western eyes, or unwelcome in the view of Turkey’s secular politicians, they are not illegal, Turkish diplomats concede.

Most important, trade patterns are still overwhelmingly with the West. In the first six months of 1996, the most recent figures available, 70% of Turkey’s imports came from the United States and Europe, while 63% of its exports went to the West and Israel. That pattern has not changed in the past year, except for more trade with Israel, diplomats say.

Is this an overall situation worth forfeiting democracy? Is Turkey’s secularism worth retaining, whatever the cost? Definitely not.

“A military coup is the worst dead-end for human rights and democracy. No other power can take precedence over the consensus of the people,” the Human Rights Assn. in Ankara said last week.

Perhaps ironically, much of Turkey’s current crisis has little to do with either the emergence of an Islamist party or the military’s response. It instead centers on the flawed democracy in this vital country, which straddles both Europe and Asia and its most volatile areas, from the Balkans to the Middle East.

The real problem is that Turkey’s political system is badly in need of reform. Candidates are decided by parties, not constituents, and representatives in Parliament are drawn from ranked party lists. So the party that wins in one area, for example, may not put the candidate from that area in Parliament--because he or she wasn’t high enough on the party list. Then that area is effectively without input from one of its own.

Even more troubling is the trend within politics, which today reflect egos and power games among inner-circle elites. Until Refah’s rise, a minority had a lock on power for the better part of a generation and it was often unresponsive to the wishes of the majority. Local politicians, academics and journalists admit that the system has become disorderly, unrepresentative and increasingly susceptible to assorted forms of corruption.

Indeed, a widely held view here is that Ciller, a long-standing secularist, abandoned her pledge never to work with Refah in order to protect herself from corruption charges. Under Turkish law, senior politicians are immune from criminal prosecution.

It is in this context that Refah emerged. And it is in this context that the answers to Turkey’s crisis should be found. In other words, the spotlight has been on the wrong issue.

In a region where Islam has been an increasingly energetic force, many voters surely cast ballots with Refah because of their religious or political beliefs. But some also clearly opted for Refah as an alternative political force, and a rejection of others--a pattern common in other states where opposition is limited or ineffective.

The failure to open up the system and reform one of the world’s most strategic democracies is a formula for political disaster that could have consequences well beyond Turkey’s border.

Already, the failure of the traditional establishment parties to heed the message of the 1995 elections--to get their own houses in order or to offer reforms--has led many key barometers of public opinion here to predict that Refah will probably do even better in the next elections, which could be as early as this fall. That could virtually assure that the military or the court take steps undermining democracy--if they don’t this time around.