U.S. Position on Land Mines Is a Dud

The United States will be conspicuously absent when representatives of 100 or so nations gather in Ottawa today to outlaw the use of land mines. Why does the U.S. government consider this treaty such a bad idea?

The last three administrations have spent billions updating America’s land mine arsenal, and the U.S. military wants to keep it. We are told that to dispense with a weapon that now kills or maims mainly civilians--around 26,000 a year--will endanger American troops.

The best reason the Clinton administration can come up with is the defense of South Korea, an ally that, according to Washington, has nearly 1 million land mines seeded along its mountainous border with North Korea--about one mine per Northern soldier. Almost 700,000 South Korean troops along with 37,000 Americans defend this border. Conjuring the worst case, the Clinton administration says that without land mines, these defenders could be overrun and Seoul taken. But is this at all likely when North Korea is beset by famine, medical supplies are nonexistent, its former allies have deserted (Beijing recognized South Korea in 1992) and spare parts and maintenance for its weapons, along with morale, must surely be at a low level?

Washington’s policy wonks recall for us the fearsome forces of Saddam Hussein massed in southern Iraq seven years ago. Similar hordes are said to be poised to kill for Kim Jong Il, and if they pour south, their lead elements will be spearheaded by tanks. But a mine is not the only way to disable a tank, and mines did not destroy the Iraqi tanks in the Persian Gulf War. In fact, retired Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf scoffs at the need for mines and supports the treaty to ban them.

Mines are meant to slow down and break up a massive frontal attack. But South Korea does not sit astride a plain. Korea’s mountains channel invaders into narrow north-south invasion routes, which dictate massed artillery, air power and high-tech weapons. Moreover, the South Korean military today is not the constabulary of 1950. It outguns the North with more modern weaponry and conducts more field exercises where actual bullets are fired and airplanes are flown. The proper comparison for South Korea’s military is the Israeli Defense Forces.

Some argue that South Korea needs land mines as a form of early warning. The shadow of the surprise attack of June 25, 1950, continues to haunt our historic memory. But surely the U.N. forces stationed in the Demilitarized Zone can count on more than the noise of mines exploding to warn them that the enemy is approaching. Satellites (South Korea has had one in orbit since 1992), signal intelligence and the vaunted Korean intelligence agency have the early warning mission. A U.S. fleet is nearby and B-52s wait on Guam. Compared to that, what can land mines matter?

The fact is that the Clinton administration made a strategic error in initially declining to participate in the land mine talks organized a year ago by Canada. Coming to the talks late, in September, the U.S. found delegates from 100 nations ready to approve a ban. One of the last to get on board was Russia. Even Japan, usually America’s yes-man on Asian defense matters, has promised to sign on. The treaty, which will take effect once 40 nations have ratified it, gives signatories 10 years to get rid of mines; the U.S. wanted 19 years in Korea, as well as the right to booby-trap tank mines there.

But why does the Clinton administration insist on 19 years instead of 10? In the 1960s the U.S. decided to put a man on the moon, and within 10 years he was there. Surely an acceptable defense weapon to replace land mines could be developed in a decade. And where is it written that the U.S. military will remain in Korea for 19 more years?

In any case, the notion of greater security for American troops won’t wash. As in the Cold War days with the Berlin Brigade, the American 2nd Infantry Division is in Korea as a trip wire, deliberately placed in harm’s way. It is supposed to get bloodied in any invasion, thereby triggering automatic American retaliation. The logic here is that this is what keeps the North in the north. But you can’t have it both ways. If American blood will not be spilled (thanks to all those land mines), then where is the credible deterrence?

Amazingly, in the hawkish Reagan years the U.S. moved to control the use of antipersonnel mines through the Convention on Conventional Weapons. But like most international meetings, the Geneva-based operation moved at glacial speed while civilian mine casualties mounted. Even in the supposed no-man’s land of the Korean DMZ, at least 35 people have been killed and 43 injured by land mines since 1992. And these casualties were not infiltrating North Koreans but South Korean farmers injured by mines washed into civilian areas by heavy rains.

The United States would be wise to change its position on the subject of land mines while there is still time to do so gracefully.