Who Wins in Stadium Shootout?

Amid the explosions in entertainment jobs, high-tech business and Silicon Valley real estate prices, California is in the throes of another boom: Pro sports stadiums and arenas.

Private and public entities in California will be spending more on professional sports venues than on any other single category of local public infrastructure between now and the new millennium.

In the Bay Area alone, roughly $1.1 billion in construction and renovation is on the drawing boards. That is more than the amount spent nationwide throughout the 1980s.

Projects in Orange County and San Diego--and two proposed projects in Los Angeles--will swell the statewide total.

They are part of a record-setting nationwide boom in pro sports facilities. More than $12 billion in stadium and arena construction has been completed since 1990 or is underway or proposed for teams in the National Football League, major league baseball, the National Basketball Assn. and the National Hockey League.

Public entities are floating tax-exempt municipal bonds, raising sales and excise taxes, and even dipping into their general funds to finance what are essentially business facilities for multimillion-dollar private enterprises. Of 59 individual projects across the United States, all but five are wholly or partially financed by taxpayers, The Times has found.

Although Los Angeles, the country’s second-largest metropolis, has so far been left out of the craze, its turn may be coming.

The Sports Arena downtown and the Forum in Inglewood, home courts of the NBA’s Clippers and Lakers, are the two oldest in the NBA. At least one is due to be replaced. A proposal is before the Los Angeles City Council to build a $250-million sports and entertainment complex for the Lakers and the NHL’s Kings.

The next century may also see renovation or reconstruction of Dodger Stadium under new ownership and construction of a stadium for an NFL franchise, possibly within the walls of the existing Coliseum.

By some measures, upgrading the Southland’s pro sports venues is long overdue. Stadium architect Dan Meis of Los Angeles recalls being shocked by the dearth of high-revenue luxury seating here while studying sports facilities for the Clippers in 1993.

“There wasn’t a suite in the Los Angeles marketplace,” he said, noting that smaller cities had been luring pro franchises with lucrative club seats and luxury boxes. “I think it was a timing thing. A lot of the bigger cities came to this later because the younger cities trying to attract teams had to do something more aggressive.”

But in coming late to the stadium party, Los Angeles does have a chance to learn from the lessons of other cities. The Times found:

* Even stadium and arena projects that are said to be entirely private usually involve heavy costs for the public sector. Team owners seldom pay for more than construction, saddling public entities with millions of dollars worth of land acquisition, freeway reconstruction and other hidden costs.

* Teams today not only insist on state-of-the-art facilities; they also demand the lion’s share of revenues from concessions, parking, luxury seating and other amenities. This often includes revenue generated by off-season use.

* Despite the claims of politicians and promoters, large-scale stadium projects appear to provide little, if any, benefit to local economies. Some studies show that the net economic impact is negative.

Why? Because the immense public investment generates ephemeral jobs in construction and longer-term but low-paying jobs such as concession attendants and janitors. And the money that fans spend on game day generally comes out of family funds earmarked for other forms of entertainment.

“Game day expenses can include $30 a ticket, plus concessions and parking,” said Dean Baim, a Pepperdine University economist who analyzes sports and development. “Does that mean you and your wife don’t go to see ‘Showboat?’ ”

* Although new stadiums can produce windfalls for team owners and money to pay star players, they create continuing financial burdens for public entities. Baltimore’s Oriole Park at Camden Yards, perhaps the most admired new ballpark, is costing Maryland taxpayers $14 million a year for financing and operations.

* Teams generally demand in their leases that stadiums be kept at or near state of the art, or the team will be free to leave. With everything from scoreboard technology to luxury amenities constantly improving, such clauses amount to an ever-rising bar for taxpayers to hurdle.

Arena and stadium construction has been driven not by municipal development needs but by the economics of pro sports.

The trend began in 1987 with construction of the Miami Dolphins’ Joe Robbie Stadium, which included 215 luxury suites leased to corporations for $55,000 to $150,000 a year. The boxes were alluring because their revenues, unlike those of regular seats, did not have to be shared with visiting teams.

By the mid-1990s, franchises in all sports were clamoring for new stadiums or renovations with luxury boxes. They also demanded other revenue-boosting amenities such as roomier and more numerous concession stands and “club seats,” which generate high-end concession sales.

Ironically, the fans are beginning to be left behind by the stadium frenzy.

“The real demand [by teams] is for luxury boxes, not more seats,” Houston Mayor Bob Lanier said in 1995 after the NFL’s Oilers demanded a replacement for the 30-year-old Astrodome. “The average working person is asked to put a tax on their home or pay sales or some other consumer tax to build luxury boxes in which they cannot afford to sit.” (Having failed to secure a new stadium, the Oilers decided to move to Nashville this season.)

League and team officials justify public financing by arguing that teams bring a distinct, if indirect, economic gain to their communities.

They also maintain that ballparks are too expensive to be financed entirely with private funds--even when the owner is someone like Microsoft co-founder Paul Allen, a billionaire who insisted that Seattle taxpayers approve $325 million in public financing to replace the Kingdome before finalizing his purchase of the NFL’s Seahawks.

“In almost every case, there’s going to have to be a public-private partnership,” said Roger Goodell, NFL executive vice president.

The problem for many municipalities is that the “partnership” tends to be a one-way street. In the 1990s, not only do the taxpayers have to pay for much of a stadium’s construction, but they have to forgo most of the income generated by their new facility.

St. Louis built the $280-million TWA Dome by raising taxes and tapping other public sources. But lease terms grant the NFL’s Rams--lured from Anaheim in 1995--all income from luxury boxes, plus most concessions income from all events in the Dome. The team pays a nominal $250,000 in annual rent.

More stadiums are built than there are teams to fill them, in part because the professional sports leagues control expansion to ensure that municipalities will compete with one another for pro franchises.

“Teams are out there shopping themselves and cities are doing the bidding,” said Robert A. Baade, a Lake Forest (Ill.) College economist who has written and consulted on stadium issues.

SAN FRANCISCO: Two Strategies on Financing

It’s hard to imagine civic leaders in any city treating a local landmark with less respect than 3Com (formerly Candlestick) Park got at a recent luncheon of tourism officials.

Forty-niner President Carmen Policy pronounced the 37-year-old park’s condition “terminal,” and NFL Commissioner Paul Tagliabue placed it among the bottom 25% of the league’s stadiums.

The coup de grace was delivered by Mayor Willie Brown, who said “most people are required to wear hard hats if they enter this sort of a facility.”

The stadium’s reputed obsolescence has less to do with physical condition than earning power. Its two departing tenants, the 49ers and the baseball Giants, have long complained that the park needs more luxury and club seats and concession space.

“The real bottom line is a revenue issue,” said Laurence M. Baer, executive vice president and chief operating officer of the San Francisco Giants, who will abandon the park in two years for a new, privately financed ballpark at the bayside China Basin.

But the paths the two teams have taken speak volumes about the economics of pro sports and political realities in big cities.

Both recognized that voters would be loath to subsidize wealthy team owners. The Giants had lost four referendums for a new taxpayer-financed stadium when new owners placed a private financing plan before the voters in 1995, this time successfully.

Financing for the $265-million park includes $130 million in loans from a bank consortium and $50 million from sale of the park’s name to Pacific Bell. Public approval was needed only to relax construction limits for building on the waterfront.

But some local activists charge that the city may spend as much as $100 million on infrastructure such as mass transit lines and stations and traffic rerouting. The Giants say most of the transit work was already planned.

The 49ers, meanwhile, were warned away from requesting public financing. Brown informed team owner Edward J. DeBartolo Jr.--one of the country’s wealthiest men--that voters would never agree to his requested $100-million city bond issue to help build a stadium. But he did think they might go for a project recast more as a jobs development program, similar to projects in Cleveland and St. Louis.

The result was the $525-million stadium-retail mall complex narrowly approved by voters last month. The mall is supposed to generate sales taxes to cover principal and interest on $100 million in city bonds.

Projected net cost to taxpayers: zero.

But some experts doubt that the proposed mall can spur enough new business to create a net gain in the economy or to raise enough tax revenue to cover the bonds.

Others are skeptical about a promised employment boom for disadvantaged Bayview Hunter’s Point adjacent to the Candlestick Point site. The team has pledged to draw a set percentage of construction workers from the district, but no similar commitment binds retail tenants to train and hire local residents.

OAKLAND: Hasty Negotiations With High Price Tag

Q: What can you say about a 25-year-old stadium that’s vacant?

A: That it was a prospect too horrible for Oakland and Alameda County to contemplate.

So they rushed into a $64-million deal to lure the NFL Raiders back from Los Angeles in 1995. It left scant months to market season tickets and led to $30 million in renovation cost overruns.

The deal has already cost the city and county $15 million in unanticipated expenses and is likely to cost $8 million more annually, well into the future.

It has also stained the local image of the once-heralded Raiders and caused critics to accuse the team’s principal owner, Al Davis, of fleecing public officials.

“Al Davis went in there, he had a ski mask on, and did what he could,” 49er owner DeBartolo told the San Francisco Chronicle in May.

Davis did not return calls to his office seeking comment.

Local officials concede that negotiations with the Raiders took place in an atmosphere of haste and near-panic:

The NBA Golden State Warriors, who played in the neighboring Oakland Arena on a year-to-year lease, were grumbling about its condition. And the baseball A’s were up for sale.

Bringing back the Raiders after 13 years, the local officials reasoned, would generate so much fan excitement that ticket sales would pay for the renovations demanded by the A’s and Warriors too.

Oakland, lacking the luster of San Francisco and Silicon Valley, could ill afford a blow to its fragile image.

It was exactly the kind of city that might reap indirect benefits from having a major league franchise in town.

“We believe the NFL teams do provide a benefit to the communities,” said the NFL’s Goodell. “Every city that’s lost an NFL team has worked very hard to get it back. That in itself is proof that there’s a benefit.”

But it is almost impossible to quantify those benefits so municipal leaders and taxpayers can balance them against paying for schools, police and other services. “We found there were flaws in all the attempts to measure economic impact,” said Ezra Rapport, then-Oakland city manager and now a Coliseum Commission official.

Oakland’s other needs were profound. While the city was considering spending $340 million to renovate sports facilities, it faced budget constraints for such services as schools, where officials have decried the fact that the African American majority of the student body maintains a D+ grade point average.

Nevertheless, city and county negotiators ended up offering the Raiders a commitment to renovate the Coliseum. Revenue from as many as 125 new luxury boxes belongs to the team, while money from naming rights and the club suites will be split 50-50 between the team and local government.

In return, the team would pay yearly rent of $525,000 and $1 per ticket.

The financing of the stadium renovation was predicated on the sale of at least 80% of the roughly 60,000 personal seat licenses--10-year rights to the purchase of season tickets. The license revenues go entirely to local governments to cover construction work.

But sales sagged badly. Experts say the licenses were priced too high, especially because the team had already raised ticket prices to an average of $51 each--the highest level in the league--while falling out of playoff contention.

The deal’s popularity plunged with revelations that it included a $54-million “loan” to the Raiders plus construction of a $10-million practice facility. Testimony before the Alameda County Civil Grand Jury indicated that the terms make it doubtful the loan will ever be repaid.

“The question is, if those payments had been disclosed to the public, would people have voted for them?” asked Neil Goodhue, foreman of the grand jury.

The Raiders last year began to sell season tickets to people who did not hold personal seat licenses, making the licenses all but worth less. Unlike the license fees, the season ticket income goes to the team. So the Raiders benefited at the expense of local taxpayers.

Coliseum officials say they hope a stronger showing on the field this season will heighten fans’ interest in the Raiders and salvage the deal. But it still has many bemoaning the lost opportunities represented by the $64-million public investment. “My view is that if you invested $64 million, you could have gotten an awful lot of economic development,” Goodhue said.

ANAHEIM: Symbols of Desperation

Two edifices bracketing the Orange Freeway--the Pond and Anaheim Stadium--are symbols of how far a desperate city will go to keep a team and protect a risky investment. They also stand as testament to the bargaining power of a company with almost unlimited marketing expertise and financial resources.

The Walt Disney Co. started with the Mighty Ducks. Its financial success in hockey enabled the company to put its other foot into sports three years later by purchasing part of the baseball Angels. Both deals have been controversial.

Although the arena had no professional sports tenants on the horizon, the Pond construction was launched in 1990 under a contract between the city and Ogden Corp. In return for building the facility, Ogden received a 30-year lease with a “white elephant clause.” This provided the company with up to $20 million if no NHL or NBA team moved to the arena.

When the Mighty Ducks took to the ice in 1993, sports business executives said the Pond contract was one of the nation’s most favorable for a sports franchise. Not only does the team retain 100% of revenue from hockey-related advertising, it receives half the revenue from non-hockey-related advertising. For example, if an NBA team played there, Disney would get half of its ad revenue.

“It’s probably been eclipsed now by a deal or two--but it still ranks as one of the best,” said Tony Tavares, president of the Mighty Ducks and Anaheim Angels.

But critics say the deal has put Anaheim in a box. City Councilman Bob Zemel contends it hinders any deal to bring an NBA team to share the Pond--a traditional arrangement at arenas--because Disney has rights to most of the revenue.

“There’s no room to bring a second team in,” Zemel said. “Everything goes to Disney.”

Because Anaheim is unable to secure an NBA tenant for the Pond, the city must start paying Ogden $1.5 million a year, starting this fall, for up to five years.

Across the freeway at Anaheim Stadium, Disney cut a similarly tough deal.

Last year, Angel owners Gene and Jackie Autry were trying to sell 25% of the Angels to Disney when the team threw what Zemel called “a high hard one.” They threatened to leave the city when the team’s lease expired in 2001 if the city did not agree to renovations demanded by Disney.

After an initial rejection, the City Council approved a modified deal. It called for the city to pay $30 million of a $100-million renovation and granted Disney all game-day and other event revenue from the baseball-only facility until a high threshold is reached.

“Where’s the partnership in that?” asked Zemel. “That sounds like a bad divorce settlement.”

Anaheim City Manager Jim Ruth and other city officials say the Disney deal is a fair one. The deal required the team to change its name from the California Angels to the Anaheim Angels, providing valuable publicity for the city.

“There’s a big boost in increased awareness of the city by outsiders,” said Pepperdine’s Baim. “That helps in attracting corporate relocations, regional offices, and the convention trade.”

SAN DIEGO: High-Stakes Gamble on Game Attendance

Forget about keeping an eye on quarterback Stan Humphries’ movement in the pocket--the most nerve-racking moment at Charger games this season could be a simple announcement: The paid attendance today is . . .

The city of San Diego has promised to pay the Chargers for every unsold general admission seat. The unprecedented NFL stadium expansion agreement has Mayor Susan Golding and the City Council walking a political tightrope.

The guarantee covers the first 10 years of the 25-year lease. A San Diego County Taxpayers Assn. analysis reported that the break-even number for the city’s debt service and operations was about 57,000 tickets sold. The team has only reached this level once in the last seven years--the 1996 season.

The city’s gamble has focused scrutiny on the deal and the politicians who made it. “What usually happens is that the bills come due well after the leadership group that created the problem is gone,” said San Diego attorney and stadium expansion opponent Bob Ottilie.

“Susan Golding wants to be a senator. Her hope is if this thing goes south, she’ll be sitting in Washington by that time.”

Golding said the gamble would be having a stadium with no team, but said if she had to do it again, she probably would not have the ticket guarantee, eliminating the “element of risk.”

“When you look at what other cities spent, we were conservative,” Golding said. “Two independent studies said it was a fair deal.”

Scott Barnett, executive director of the San Diego Taxpayers Assn., supported the deal but recognized that it is “not without risk.”

Politics were always a part of the equation in this emotionally charged deal.

“There were threats of recalling the council, there was litigation,” Barnett said. “There was more anger and venom privately and publicly than I’ve seen, maybe ever. It was extraordinary.”

Local politicians face perils whenever they wrestle with stadium issues. But in San Diego, the political pluses and minuses will resound with every click of the turnstile.

(BEGIN TEXT OF INFOBOX / INFOGRAPHIC)

The Sports Building Boom

A $12-billion boom in construction of sports stadiums and arenas has swept across the nation. Most of the facilities are wholly or partly financed with public funds. Generally, the construction has meant more expensive seats, pricier concessions and additional advertising and ticket revenue for teams.

FINANCING

Public/Private: 66%

Public: 20%

Private: 14%

NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE

TEAM / FACILITY: 1. Atlanta Falcons Georgia Dome

COST (in millions): $214

FINISH: 1992

SEATS: 71,228

SUITES: 203

HOW PAID FOR*: Public

*

TEAM / FACILITY: 2. Baltimore Ravens Unnamed

COST (in millions): $200

FINISH: 1998

SEATS: 68,400

SUITES: 108

HOW PAID FOR*: P/P

*

TEAM / FACILITY: 3. Buffalo Bills Rich Stadium

COST (in millions): $60 renovation

FINISH: NA

SEATS: 80,024

SUITES: 136-148

HOW PAID FOR*: Public

*

TEAM / FACILITY: 4. Carolina Panthers Ericsson Stadium

COST (in millions): $248

FINISH: 1996

SEATS: 72,500

SUITES: 160

HOW PAID FOR*: P/P

*

TEAM / FACILITY: 5. Cincinnati Bengals Cinergy Field**

COST (in millions): $625 proposed***

FINISH: 2000

SEATS: 70,000

SUITES: 104

HOW PAID FOR*: P/P

*

TEAM / FACILITY: 6. Detroit Lions Unnamed**

COST (in millions): $505***

FINISH: NA

SEATS: 72,000

SUITES: 100-120

HOW PAID FOR*: P/P

*

TEAM / FACILITY: 7. Jacksonville Jaguars Alltel Stadium

COST (in millions): $121 renovation

FINISH: 1995

SEATS: 73,000

SUITES: 75

HOW PAID FOR*: Public

*

TEAM / FACILITY: 8. Oakland Raiders Oakland Coliseum

COST (in millions): $100 renovation

FINISH: 1996

SEATS: 62,500

SUITES: 143

HOW PAID FOR*: Public

*

TEAM / FACILITY: 9. Pittsburgh Steelers Unnamed

COST (in millions): $196 proposed

FINISH: NA

SEATS: 62,000

SUITES: NA

HOW PAID FOR*: Public

*

TEAM / FACILITY: 10. St. Louis Rams TWA Dome

COST (in millions): $280***

FINISH: 1995

SEATS: 65,321

SUITES: 124

HOW PAID FOR*: Public

*

TEAM / FACILITY: 11. San Diego Chargers Qualcomm Stadium

COST (in millions): $78 renovation

FINISH: 1997

SEATS: 71,422

SUITES: 110

HOW PAID FOR*: P/P

*

TEAM / FACILITY: 12. San Francisco 49ers Unnamed

COST (in millions): $525***

FINISH: 2000

SEATS: 75,000

SUITES: 185

HOW PAID FOR*: P/P

*

TEAM / FACILITY: 13. Seattle Seahawks Unnamed

COST (in millions): $425***

FINISH: NA

SEATS: 72,000

SUITES: 116

HOW PAID FOR*: P/P

*

TEAM / FACILITY: 14. Tampa Bay Buccaneers Unnamed

COST (in millions): $168

FINISH: 1998

SEATS: 65,000

SUITES: 100

HOW PAID FOR*: P/P

*

TEAM / FACILITY: 15. Tennessee Oilers Unnamed

COST (in millions): $124

FINISH: 1999

SEATS: 65,000

SUITES: 137

HOW PAID FOR*: Public

*

TEAM / FACILITY: 16. Washington Redskins J.K. Cooke Stadium

COST (in millions): $250.5***

FINISH: 1997

SEATS: 78,000

SUITES: 280

HOW PAID FOR*: P/P

MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL

TEAM / FACILITY: 17. Anaheim Angels Anaheim Stadium

COST (in millions): $100 renovation

FINISH: 1998

SEATS: 45,000

SUITES: 78

HOW PAID FOR*: P/P

*

TEAM / FACILITY: 18. Arizona Diamondbacks Bank One Ballpark

COST (in millions): $333

FINISH: 1998

SEATS: 48,504

SUITES: 69

HOW PAID FOR*: P/P

*

TEAM / FACILITY: 19. Atlanta Braves Turner Field

COST (in millions): $242.5

FINISH: 1997

SEATS: 49,831

SUITES: 60

HOW PAID FOR*: P/P

*

TEAM / FACILITY: 20. Baltimore Orioles Camden Yards

COST (in millions): $210

FINISH: 1992

SEATS: 48,262

SUITES: 72

HOW PAID FOR*: P/P

*

TEAM / FACILITY: 21. Chicago White Sox Comiskey Park

COST (in millions): $150

FINISH: 1991

SEATS: 44,321

SUITES: 102

HOW PAID FOR*: Public

*

TEAM / FACILITY: 22. Cincinnati Reds Unnamed**

COST (in millions): $625 proposed***

FINISH: 2001

SEATS: NA

SUITES: NA

HOW PAID FOR*: P/P

*

TEAM / FACILITY: 23. Cleveland Indians Jacobs Field

COST (in millions): $169

FINISH: 1994

SEATS: 42,865

SUITES: 122

HOW PAID FOR*: P/P

*

TEAM / FACILITY: 24. Colorado Rockies Coors Field

COST (in millions): $215

FINISH: 1995

SEATS: 50,200

SUITES: 52

HOW PAID FOR*: P/P

*

TEAM / FACILITY: 25. Detroit Tigers Unnamed**

COST (in millions): $505***

FINISH: NA

SEATS: 42,000

SUITES: 80

HOW PAID FOR*: P/P

*

TEAM / FACILITY: 26. Milwaukee Brewers Miller Park

COST (in millions): $250

FINISH: 2000

SEATS: 43,005

SUITES: 75

HOW PAID FOR*: P/P

*

TEAM / FACILITY: 27. Minnesota Twins Unnamed

COST (in millions): $345 proposed

FINISH: NA

SEATS: 42,000

SUITES: 52

HOW PAID FOR*: P/P

*

TEAM / FACILITY: 28. Oakland Athletics Oakland Coliseum

COST (in millions): $100 renovation

FINISH: 1996

SEATS: 62,500

SUITES: 143

HOW PAID FOR*: Public

*

TEAM / FACILITY: 29. Pittsburgh Pirates Unnamed

COST (in millions): $200 proposed

FINISH: 2001

SEATS: 38,000

SUITES: 66

HOW PAID FOR*: P/P

*

TEAM / FACILITY: 30. San Diego Padres Qualcomm Stadium

COST (in millions): $78 renovation

FINISH: 1997

SEATS: 71,422

SUITES: 110

HOW PAID FOR*: P/P

*

TEAM / FACILITY: 31. San Francisco Giants Pacific Bell Park

COST (in millions): $262***

FINISH: 2000

SEATS: 42,000

SUITES: 65

HOW PAID FOR*: Private

*

TEAM / FACILITY: 32. Seattle Mariners Unnamed

COST (in millions): $384***

FINISH: 1999

SEATS: 45,611

SUITES: 66

HOW PAID FOR*: P/P

*

TEAM / FACILITY: 33. Tampa Bay Devil Rays Tropicana Field

COST (in millions): $65 renovation

FINISH: 1998

SEATS: 46,000

SUITES: 65

HOW PAID FOR*: Public

*

TEAM / FACILITY: 34. Texas Rangers The Ballpark at Arlington

COST (in millions): $191

FINISH: 1994

SEATS: 49,178

SUITES: 121

HOW PAID FOR*: P/P

NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSN.

TEAM / FACILITY: 35. Anaheim Mighty Ducks Arrowhead Pond

COST (in millions): $120

FINISH: 1993

SEATS: 17,174

SUITES: 84

HOW PAID FOR*: P/P

*

TEAM / FACILITY: 36. Atlanta Thrashers Unnamed

COST (in millions): $213***

FINISH: 1999-2000

SEATS: 20,000

SUITES: 100

HOW PAID FOR*: P/P

*

TEAM / FACILITY: 37. Boston Bruins FleetCenter

COST (in millions): $160

FINISH: 1995

SEATS: 17,565

SUITES: 104

HOW PAID FOR*: P/P

*

TEAM / FACILITY: 38. Buffalo Sabres Marine Midland Arena

COST (in millions): $122

FINISH: 1996

SEATS: 18,500

SUITES: 80

HOW PAID FOR*: P/P

*

TEAM / FACILITY: 39. Calgary Flames Can. Airlines Saddledome

COST (in millions): $35 renovation

FINISH: 1995

SEATS: 18,500

SUITES: 117

HOW PAID FOR*: Private

*

TEAM / FACILITY: 40. Carolina Hurricanes Unnamed

COST (in millions): $175

FINISH: 1999

SEATS: 20,000

SUITES: 82

HOW PAID FOR*: P/P

*

TEAM / FACILITY: 41. Chicago Blackhawks United Center

COST (in millions): $175

FINISH: 1994

SEATS: 20,500

SUITES: 216

HOW PAID FOR*: Private

*

TEAM / FACILITY: 42. Colorado Avalanche Pepsi Center

COST (in millions): $150

FINISH: 1999

SEATS: 19,200

SUITES: 84

HOW PAID FOR*: Private

*

TEAM / FACILITY: 43. Florida Panthers Broward County Arena

COST (in millions): $212

FINISH: 1998

SEATS: 19,000

SUITES: 74

HOW PAID FOR*: Public

*

TEAM / FACILITY: 44. Los Angeles Kings Unnamed

COST (in millions): $250 proposed***

FINISH: 1999-2000

SEATS: 20,000

SUITES: 160

HOW PAID FOR*: P/P

*

TEAM / FACILITY: 45. Montreal Canadiens Molson Centre

COST (in millions): $230

FINISH: 1996

SEATS: 21,273

SUITES: 135

HOW PAID FOR*: Private

*

TEAM / FACILITY: 46. New York Islanders Unnamed

COST (in millions): $160 proposed

FINISH: 1999-2000

SEATS: 18,000

SUITES: 60

HOW PAID FOR*: P/P

*

TEAM / FACILITY: 47. Ottawa Senators Corel Centre

COST (in millions): $146

FINISH: 1996

SEATS: 18,500

SUITES: 148

HOW PAID FOR*: P/P

*

TEAM / FACILITY: 48. Philadelphia Flyers CoreStates Center

COST (in millions): $206

FINISH: 1996

SEATS: 17,380

SUITES: 126

HOW PAID FOR*: P/P

*

TEAM / FACILITY: 49. Phoenix Coyotes America West Arena

COST (in millions): $96

FINISH: 1992

SEATS: 19,023

SUITES: 88

HOW PAID FOR*: P/P

*

TEAM / FACILITY: 50. Pittsburgh Penguins Civic Arena

COST (in millions): $12.9 renovation

FINISH: 1997-98

SEATS: 16,750

SUITES: 55+

HOW PAID FOR*: P/P

*

TEAM / FACILITY: 51. San Jose Sharks San Jose Arena

COST (in millions): $162.5

FINISH: 1993

SEATS: 17,190

SUITES: 68

HOW PAID FOR*: P/P

*

TEAM / FACILITY: 52. St. Louis Blues Kiel Center

COST (in millions): $170

FINISH: 1994

SEATS: 19,260

SUITES: 90

HOW PAID FOR*: P/P

*

TEAM / FACILITY: 53. Tampa Bay Lightning Ice Palace

COST (in millions): $139

FINISH: 1996

SEATS: 19,500

SUITES: 72

HOW PAID FOR*: P/P

*

TEAM / FACILITY: 54. Vancouver Canucks GM Place

COST (in millions): $160

FINISH: 1995

SEATS: 18,422

SUITES: 88

HOW PAID FOR*: Private

*

TEAM / FACILITY: 55. Washington Capitals MCI Center

COST (in millions): $175***

FINISH: 1997

SEATS: 20,000

SUITES: 110

HOW PAID FOR*: Private

NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSN.

TEAM / FACILITY: 56. Atlanta Hawks Unnamed

COST (in millions): $213***

FINISH: 1999-2000

SEATS: 20,000

SUITES: 100

HOW PAID FOR*: P/P

*

TEAM / FACILITY: 57. Boston Celtics FleetCenter

COST (in millions): $160

FINISH: 1995

SEATS: 18,600

SUITES: 104

HOW PAID FOR*: P/P

*

TEAM / FACILITY: 58. Charlotte Hornets Unnamed

COST (in millions): $192 proposed

FINISH: NA

SEATS: NA

SUITES: NA

HOW PAID FOR*: P/P

*

TEAM / FACILITY: 59. Chicago Bulls United Center

COST (in millions): $175

FINISH: 1994

SEATS: 21,711

SUITES: 216

HOW PAID FOR*: Private

*

TEAM / FACILITY: 60. Cleveland Cavaliers Gund Arena

COST (in millions): $152

FINISH: 1994

SEATS: 20,562

SUITES: 92

HOW PAID FOR*: P/P

*

TEAM / FACILITY: 61. Denver Nuggets Pepsi Center

COST (in millions): $150

FINISH: 1999

SEATS: 19,200

SUITES: 84

HOW PAID FOR*: Private

*

TEAM / FACILITY: 62. Golden State Warriors Oakland Col. Arena

COST (in millions): $100 renovation

FINISH: Fall 1997

SEATS: 19,200

SUITES: 72

HOW PAID FOR*: P/P

*

TEAM / FACILITY: 63. Indiana Pacers Indiana Fieldhouse

COST (in millions): $175

FINISH: 1999-2000

SEATS: 20,000

SUITES: 65

HOW PAID FOR*: P/P

*

TEAM / FACILITY: 64. Los Angeles Lakers Unnamed

COST (in millions): $250 proposed***

FINISH: 1999-2000

SEATS: 20,000

SUITES: 160

HOW PAID FOR*: P/P

*

TEAM / FACILITY: 65. Miami Heat Unnamed

COST (in millions): $165 proposed

FINISH: 1999-2000

SEATS: NA

SUITES: NA

HOW PAID FOR*: P/P

*

TEAM / FACILITY: 66. Minnesota Timberwolves Target Center

COST (in millions): $104

FINISH: 1990

SEATS: 19,006

SUITES: 68

HOW PAID FOR*: P/P

*

TEAM / FACILITY: 67. Philadelphia 76ers CoreStates Center

COST (in millions): $206

FINISH: 1996

SEATS: 18,168

SUITES: 126

HOW PAID FOR*: P/P

*

TEAM / FACILITY: 68. Phoenix Suns America West Arena

COST (in millions): $96

FINISH: 1992

SEATS: 19,023

SUITES: 88

HOW PAID FOR*: P/P

*

TEAM / FACILITY: 69. Portland Trail Blazers Rose Garden

COST (in millions): $262

FINISH: 1995

SEATS: 21,538

SUITES: 70

HOW PAID FOR*: P/P

*

TEAM / FACILITY: 70. San Antonio Spurs Alamodome

COST (in millions): $186

FINISH: 1993

SEATS: 20,662

SUITES: 64

HOW PAID FOR*: Public

*

TEAM / FACILITY: 71. Seattle SuperSonics KeyArena

COST (in millions): $110 renovation

FINISH: 1995

SEATS: 17,072

SUITES: 58

HOW PAID FOR*: Public

*

TEAM / FACILITY: 72. Toronto Raptors Air Canada Centre

COST (in millions): $200

FINISH: 1999-2000

SEATS: 22,500

SUITES: NA

HOW PAID FOR*: Private

*

TEAM / FACILITY: 73. Utah Jazz Delta Center

COST (in millions): $94

FINISH: 1991

SEATS: 19,911

SUITES: 56

HOW PAID FOR*: Private

*

TEAM / FACILITY: 74. Vancouver Grizzlies GM Place

COST (in millions): $160

FINISH: 1995

SEATS: 19,193

SUITES: 88

HOW PAID FOR*: Private

*

TEAM / FACILITY: 75. Washington Wizards MCI Center

COST (in millions): $175***

FINISH: 1997

SEATS: 20,000

SUITES: 110

HOW PAID FOR*: Private

* P/P: Public-Private partnership

** Site includes two new stadiums.

*** Includes retail, entertainment or other attached amenities.

NA: Not Available

Note: Chart does not include NHL expansion teams for Columbus, Ohio, Minneapolis-St. Paul and Nashville.

Sources: 1997 Inside the Ownership of Professional Sports Teams by Team Marketing Report, Inc., Chicago; the leagues; L.A. Times news files.

Researched by TRACY THOMAS / Los Angeles Times

WHERE L.A. PROPOSALS STAND

Two stadium construction projects have been proposed in Los Angeles--with King owners Philip F. Anschutz and Edward Roski Jr. as the catalysts.

Los Angeles Arena

A 20,000-seat arena to house the NHL Kings and NBA Lakers, possibly opening by 2000

Cost: $250 million, including $70 million in city bonds

Luxury suites: 160

Next step: City council votes on anenvironmental impact report this summer.

*

Los Angeles Coliseum

Creation of a state-of-the-art stadium within the existing stadium for an NFL team.

Cost: Up to $250 million, all privately financed.

Luxury suites: 140.

Next step: Anschutz and Roski wait for the NFL’s next step.