Little Details That Valley Secessionists Would Rather Forget

There seems to be a presumption that, if the San Fernando Valley seceded from the city of Los Angeles, it would take with it its “fair share” of government services: water, power, sewer infrastructure, street-repair equipment, and so on. Such details of city governance may seem minor now, especially when compared with soaring secessionist rhetoric that extols the virtues of home rule. But once the money is spent, as required by law, to determine the meaning of “fair share,” these details are likely to turn into major impediments to the creation of a new Valley city.

The most basic issue, as it always has been, is water. The part of L.A.’s water that comes from the ground, including in the Valley, and all the water in the Los Angeles River, was granted to the city by the king of Spain and is indivisible. It is a “pueblo right” that has been strengthened in the courts through the years; the supply of water it governs will be no more accessible to a Valley city than it is to Burbank, through which the river also passes.

The city also purchases water from the Metropolitan Water District, but the greatest portion, by far, comes to the Department of Water and Power (DWP) from the Eastern Sierra. That water cannot be sold outside the city of Los Angeles without breaking a contract with the Owens Valley. A Valley city would have to buy water from the Metropolitan Water District, at a rate of about $400 per acre foot, compared with the current DWP rate of $130 per acre foot.

Historically, communities linked up with Los Angeles to gain access to the water flowing through the Owens Valley Aqueduct. This is why the San Fernando Valley ultimately became part of L.A. It stands to reason that, even if “something could be worked out,” as advocates of Valley secession contend, it would have to be an overwhelmingly compelling “something” to nullify a contract held so dearly by the city for so long.

While the deregulation of the electric-power industry will enable anyone, in or out of the city, to choose their source of electricity, there is still the DWP’s $7-billion debt--and Valley residents of a new city would still have to pay their “fair share” of it, since the debt was incurred when they were a part of Los Angeles. It’s just like a divorce: The debts as well as the assets are divided, except in this case, most of the assets will remain with the older partner, Los Angeles. Other long-term financial commitments include pension liability for retired cops and firemen. How would those costs be distributed between Los Angeles and the new Valley city? The list could go on and on, given the tendency to finance projects with bonds, rather than through taxation, since passage of Proposition 13.

Some assets, of course, would remain in the Valley: physical plants like police and fire stations, libraries and other city property, although they might have to be paid for one way or another. The costs of maintaining the sewer system would devolve to Valley city residents.

A new Valley city, even if it weren’t starting out with a large debt, would have to raise taxes to pay for the services its residents now get from the city of Los Angeles. Some secessionists believe they can turn to county government for police and fire protection, but that isn’t likely. Large cities, as a rule, provide such basic municipal services themselves, because it would be unfair to tax nonresidents for services they did not receive.

Cities in California chiefly obtain their revenue from property, sales and business taxes collected within their borders. A new Valley city would no doubt rely on these revenue sources as well, but lacks the kinds of businesses that generate really big revenue flows. Nor would it have access to the hundreds of millions of dollars that the DWP, LAX and the Harbor annually contribute to the L.A. general fund.

To make up any shortfall, a new Valley city would have to raise taxes, which requires a two-thirds vote of approval. It should be noted that Valley residents have a history of being stingy with their tax dollars. Accordingly, if secessionists want to be responsible, they will define success in terms of a secession vote that approaches the one needed to raise taxes. Otherwise, their city might end up like Malibu, unable to fix its roads when they wash out and teetering near bankruptcy.

The frustration Valley residents express about life in Los Angeles is shared by many residents in the rest of the city. In dealing with it, there are many alternatives to secession, most of which should be explored in reforming the City Charter. Secession is probably worse than any problem it purports to solve, but that doesn’t mitigate the larger issue: The whole city needs to think creatively and imaginatively about what it means to be a community, and what it would take to be a better community. It’s not just a question of size, although it is hard to imagine how growing smaller would promote the city’s well-being. Rather, it is a deeper question of learning how to connect the parts to make everyone feel they are part of one city, one community.*