Broaden Nuclear Doctrine to Include Non-Nuclear Weapons

It drew a swift and disdainful rebuff from the Clinton administration when members of Germany’s new government first suggested that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization abandon its Cold War nuclear theology and adopt a “no first use” doctrine. Yet, even discounting the flakier tendencies of Berlin’s “Red-Green” coalition government, it boggles the mind that neither the administration nor its NATO allies has asked a basic question: In the absence of a nuclear-war scenario with an equal superpower, how many nuclear weapons does the United States need, and must any of them be on hair-trigger alert? If Germany doesn’t believe a NATO nuclear response to a non-nuclear security threat is necessary, why does Washington?

The nuclear issue is emblematic of NATO’s larger problem: defining a clear mission as an alliance after its original raison d’etre has evaporated. Unfortunately, Berlin, under fire from Washington, retreated from its proposal, thereby diminishing chances of serious debate on the issue when NATO foreign ministers convene this week in Brussels to discuss the alliance’s purpose. If they avoid reconsidering prevailing nuclear doctrine, NATO’s ministers will not only reveal their conceptual poverty and bureaucratic inertia, but they also will miss an opportunity to adapt to new security challenges.

Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright has suggested that combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction should be one of NATO’s tasks as it transforms itself into an “alliance of interests.” If so, there is a graceful way out of the Washington-Berlin clash over nuclear strategy. Why not adjust NATO doctrine to fit the security challenges of the second half of the nuclear century by adopting a doctrine of no first use of all weapons of mass destruction.

Such a reformulation would bolster global nonproliferation and update the nuclear bargain, because it would establish a moral equivalence between nuclear weapons, on the one hand, and chemical and biological weapons and their missile-delivery systems, on the other. For example, under current U.S.-NATO doctrine, if Libya fired a chemical-tipped missile at Rome, a nuclear response by NATO would be ruled out automatically. Under a policy of no first use of weapons of mass destruction, Libya would have to consider the possibility of such retaliation.

This is no mere academic argument. The diffusion of technology has made it possible for small states, or even individual terrorists, to obtain weapons of mass destruction. North Korea, a decrepit, failing state with 1,300-mile-range missiles capable of ferrying chemical and biological weapons, is a case in point. Accordingly, it does not strain the imagination to conjure up plausible scenarios putting European capitals at risk from chemical- or nuclear-tipped missiles from Libya, Iraq or North Korea. The point is that casualties resulting from these hypothetical attacks would be no less morally repugnant than those incurred in a nuclear holocaust. Yet, the two tend to be viewed quite differently.

The 1970 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty formally calls on nuclear-weapons states to reduce and eventually eliminate their nuclear arsenals. The other part of the bargain is the willingness of the non-nuclear “South” to eschew nuclear weapons in exchange for the “North” ’s cooperation in developing peaceful uses of nuclear energy and a general commitment to disarm. What is inevitably overlooked in the rhetoric--most notably India’s before it tested nuclear weapons last May--of the non-nuclear South is the treaty’s linkage of nuclear disarmament with “general disarmament” under “effective control.” Achieving such a state of affairs would require a radical redefinition of the meaning of sovereignty. It would require, among other things, intrusive inspections along the lines of those resisted by Iraq, and the experience with Saddam Hussein has highlighted the limits of such exercises even in a militarily defeated regime. Similarly, a reasonable definition of effective enforcement would have to go far beyond sanctions to include a U.N Security Council mandate for preemptive action if intelligence verified a state engaging in nuclear proliferation. Practically speaking, securing an international consensus on such measures would be impossible.

Yet, with the exception of China, all the declared nuclear-weapons states have reduced their arsenals significantly since the end of the Cold War, as called for in the nonproliferation treaty. If 1993 START II and future START III are concluded--or, as appears more likely, unilateral cuts on both sides occur--the United States and Russia will have reduced their arsenals by nearly 85% from Cold War peaks.

But there has been a concurrent and worrisome proliferation of ballistic missiles throughout Asia and the Middle East with nuclear as well as chemical and biological potential. When the nonproliferation treaty was signed in 1968, this reality probably did not occur to the signatories. Today, it can’t be ignored.

Nuclear abolitionists cannot have it both ways, demanding that nuclear-weapons state disarm, on the one hand, while permitting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, on the other. Would it be a safer world if the United States and other states retired their nuclear weapons while countries like Libya and Iraq were allowed to maintain long-range missiles armed with chemical or biological weapons?

Thus, there is a compelling logic to joining moral imperatives with Realpolitik to revise U.S. and NATO nuclear doctrine. Politically, it is highly improbable that any U.S. president would a priori renounce the option of nuclear reprisal. But this does not make the case for retaining Cold War NATO doctrine, as some U.S. officials contend. Rather, it is an opportunity for the United States to align strategy with the security challenges of the 21st century and take the moral and political high ground as well.

One may contend that expanding nuclear doctrine to include other weapons of mass destruction could undercut U.S. and U.N. Security Council assurances that non-nuclear states need not worry about nuclear attacks from nuclear-armed states. Quite the contrary. It would only redefine such pledges, known as “negative security assurances,” to meet new security circumstances. It is security fears, not narrow legal definitions, as some might argue, that affect a nation’s behavior.

Nearly a decade has passed since the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the next chapter in the nuclear era has yet to be written. In writing it, we must be guided by the first principles of arms control: Any agreement must enhance stability and predictability and reduce the risk of war. A doctrine of no first use of weapons of mass destruction would be a modest step in that direction.