A Conflicted Strategy on the Taliban

Great powers with global interests often find themselves with strange bedfellows, and the United States has had its share of uncongenial companions. But perhaps none has been as embarrassing as the Taliban, chief contender for power in Afghanistan, which the U.S. is accused of supporting, at least by acquiescing in the supply of arms and money by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. The irony is that few groups, even in the Middle East and environs, are as much at odds with the United States, and especially the Clinton administration, in terms of values, worldview and actual behavior.

The Taliban preaches the most obscurantist interpretations of Islam, denies women the right to education and health care, applies the Islamic penal code with extreme harshness, considers other Muslim sects such as the Shiites as heretics worthy of extermination and has carried this view into practice with mass killings, including those of Iranian diplomats, after their victories in Mazar-i-Sharif and Bamian. In so doing, the Taliban has also raised the specter of a war with Iran.

Furthermore, with the exception of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which have recognized the Taliban as Afghanistan’s legitimate government, all Central Asian countries, Russia and even U.S. ally Turkey are worried about the impact of the Taliban’s mastery of Afghanistan on regional security and politics. Nor are these concerns new. Since the Taliban began its string of victories in 1996, all regional countries have expressed deep concern that they could achieve control in Afghanistan. The question thus arises, why did the United States close its eyes to Pakistani and Saudi efforts to promote the Taliban and, while condemning its behavior in recent months, do little to stop its march to power and seem to side with the Taliban in its dispute with Iran?

The answer lies in Washington’s vision of its geopolitical and economic interests in Central Asia and the Middle East and the contribution that the Taliban could make in bringing it about. The U.S. wants both to secure the export of Central Asian energy resources to world markets and to contain Iran, and in both cases the Taliban has been seen as a useful instrument. Meanwhile, the United States has hoped that the Taliban might be persuaded to moderate its views and behavior, hopes fed by Pakistani leaders, notably ex-Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, who said that Pakistan would have a moderating impact.

Since January 1992, when Secretary of State James A. Baker III visited Central Asia, the United States has been determined to prevent Iran either from making significant inroads in the region or from becoming a transit route for Central Asia’s energy exports and its link to the outside world. But this strategy meant that the Central Asian countries would be dependent on Russia unless a southern oil pipeline was built that bypassed Iran. Pakistan is the only other neighboring country with access to the sea, but reaching it means putting a pipeline through Afghanistan if Iran is to be avoided. Thus an Afghanistan stabilized under the Taliban and cooperating closely with Pakistan would provide the vital southern link. Moreover, setting up an Afghan government that was anti-Iran and anti-Shiite would tighten Iran’s encirclement.

The flaw in this strategy has been a misreading of Afghan realities, the true nature of the Taliban, the concerns of Afghanistan’s neighbors and the limits of Iran’s patience in face of threats posed to its security.

* An Afghan government made up only of one ethnic group--the Pashtuns--with strong anti-Tajik tendencies and excessive sectarian bias cannot in the long run pacify Afghanistan. Therefore, rather than advancing U.S. strategic and economic goals in the region, such a government would hinder them.

* A Taliban government could become a source of instability in Central Asia as it tries to export its brand of radical Islam. The Taliban can also create problems for Pakistan by exacerbating its sectarian tensions and strengthening its more reactionary Muslim forces.

* A conflict between Iran and Afghanistan, in which the U.S. directly or indirectly supported the Taliban, would only strengthen Iran’s radicals, undermine President Mohammad Khatami, rekindle anti-American feelings and destroy prospects of U.S.-Iranian rapprochement. Moreover, an Iran-Afghan conflict could degenerate into a broader conflict in South Asia with uncertain consequences.

* U.S. acquiescence in the Taliban’s actions would give credence to conspiratorial views in the Muslim world that the United States wants to cause sectarian warfare among the Muslims and give Islam a bad name.

* U.S. inaction in face of Taliban transgressions would erode American credibility as the champion of human rights.

Yet it is not too late for Washington to reconsider its Afghan policy. It should place its weight on the side of forming a broad-based and moderate Afghan government more in tune with Afghanistan’s and regional realities and more likely to avoid an armed conflict with Iran. Such a policy would also best serve U.S. strategic and economic interests, including the establishment of a viable southern outlet for Central Asia’s energy resources.